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I.  INTRODUCTION  
apan is a country whose present legal system dates to only 
the late Nineteenth Century.   In this relatively short pe-
riod, Japan’s legal system has undergone dramatic changes and 
has been influenced by both the civil law and common law sys-
tems of Europe and the United States (“U.S.”).1  The modern 
Japanese legal system started as a civil law system based on 
French and German models;2 however, before World War II, the 
nation modified its legal system in order to strengthen govern-
ment control at the expense of individual rights.3  After the war, 
during the U.S. occupation of the nation, Japan modified its 
system to accommodate American common law notions.4  
Throughout this period of legal adaptation, the Japanese 
tended to avoid using the legal system to resolve disputes, and 
instead used more traditional models of alternative dispute 
resolution, which are characterized by conciliation, compromise 
and mediation.5  This Japanese anti-litigation preference seems 
consistent with norms existing prior to Japan’s adoption of its 
modern legal system in the late Nineteenth Century.6  More 
recently, the Japanese government has adopted a policy of 
strengthening the “Rule of Law” in Japanese society.7  The 
  
 1. HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 7–9 (2d ed. 1999).   
 2. Id. at 29–31. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Tetsuya Obuchi, Role of the Court in the Process of Informal Dispute 
Resolution in Japan: Traditional and Modern Aspects, with Special Emphasis 
on In-Court Compromise, 20 LAW IN JAPAN 74, 75 (1987). 
 6. Id. at 78. 
 7. The “Rule of Law” concept is not easily defined.  Stated attributes of 
Westernized Rule of Law systems include: utilizing the legal system as a pri-
mary means of ordering society; governing in a manner that adheres to the 
law; resolving disputes based on the application of preexisting, general, ab-
stract and depersonalized rules to a given set of facts; and resolving  disputes 
in terms of a winner and loser.  RUDOLF B. SCHLESIGNER ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
LAW 320–22 (6th ed. 1998); U.S. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has recently 
defined the Rule of Law to mean: “that laws should be enacted by democrati-
cally elected bodies and enforced by independent judiciaries.”  SANDRA DAY 
O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW 33 (2003) [hereinafter O’CONNOR].  In-
herent in these definitions are two basic underpinnings of the Rule of Law 
idea: (1) an independent judicial system to resolve disputes through enforce-
ment and application; and (2) laws adopted by the society that are not so 
 
J
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Japanese Diet rewrote Japan’s Civil Procedure Code in 1996 
(“New Code”), to make litigation more readily available as part 
of the nation’s policy to strengthen the Rule of Law in Japan.  
In 2003, the Author undertook a study, involving interviews 
with bengoshi (licensed practicing lawyers)8 and statistical 
analyses, to determine whether the New Code had made litiga-
tion the official dispute resolution mechanism of a Rule of Law 
society — a more favored method of resolving disputes.  This 
Article sets forth the results of that study. 
Following this introduction, Part II offers a short synopsis of 
the recent legal changes made in Japan and discusses the Civil 
Procedure system in Japan and the research project underlying 
this Article’s study.  This Part deals with some of the major 
changes brought about in the New Code and discusses the rea-
soning behind those changes.   
  
flexible as to lack either understanding by the public or meaning sufficient to 
control both public (governmental) and private action.  
 8. Legal professionals in Japan fall into various categories.  At the top of 
the list are the bengoshi, or licensed lawyers, who are authorized to represent 
parties in litigation before the courts and to generally give legal advice.  How-
ever, there are other legal professionals in Japan, some of whom perform 
functions that are typically undertaken by lawyers in the U.S.  Thus, legal 
scriveners prepare documents, such as wills, and assist in the drafting of 
pleadings although they are not licensed lawyers.  In addition, patent attor-
neys give advice on patent law matters, but they are not licensed lawyers.  
Most Japanese law departments of major companies are not staffed with ben-
goshi but are staffed with highly trained and knowledgeable graduates of 
hogakubu law faculties at Japanese Universities that provide  four-year un-
dergraduate law programs.  Bengoshi are licensed under the “Bengoshi Ho” or 
Practicing Attorney’s Act (1949 c. 205, art. 4) (Japan).  To become a bengoshi a 
candidate must pass a difficult Bar examination, attend the Legal Training 
and Research Institute, pass another exam after completing the Institute and 
be registered with the local Bar Association.  See HIDEO TANAKA, THE 
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 563 (University of Tokyo Press, 1976) [hereinafter 
TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM].  “Admission to the Japanese Bar is a 
prerequisite for practicing law, and admission to the Bar is accomplished by 
registering on the Lawyer’s List (Bengoshi Kaiim Meibo) maintained by the 
Japan Federation of Bar Associations.”  TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO 
HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED § 2.04(1) (Yasuhei Taniguchi 
et al. eds., Juris Publishing 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
JAPAN REVISED].  “Bengoshi, a translation of the English word ‘barrister’ is in 
use today.  The term first appeared in an occupation title in the draft of the 
Lawyers Law which was prepared for submission to the Diet in 1890. The 
term daigennin had currency before 1890.”  Richard W. Rabinowitz, The His-
torical Development of the Japanese Bar, 70 HARV. L. REV. 61, 64 n.5 (1956). 
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Part III then moves on to the effect that these changes have 
had on litigation as a means of resolving disputes.  Specifically, 
Part III.A. considers the effect of the legal changes on the pace 
of litigation in both the Trial Court (District Court) (III.A.1.) 
and Appeals Courts levels (High Court and Supreme Court) 
(III.A.2.).  Part III.A.4. explores potential reasons why the ac-
celerated pace of litigation has not resulted in an increase in the 
use of litigation as a dispute resolution mechanism.  Part III.B. 
discusses the effect of the changes made in the procedures deal-
ing with production of evidence.  Part III.B.1. then analyzes the 
new inquiry procedures and links the system’s malfunction to 
procedural inadequacy stemming from the lack of sanctions for 
failing to respond to inquiries.  Part III.B.2. examines the New 
Code’s effect on document production and the consequences of 
the Japanese legal system’s “self-use” document exception, 
which serves to effectively restrict the meaningful production of 
evidence.  Part III.C. deals with the New Code’s outcome on 
Japanese litigation and its effect on the Commercial Code as 
applied to stockholder derivative suits in Japan.   
Part III.D. deals with the Japanese alternative to the class 
action — the Representative Action — and explores whether the 
New Code’s changes, designed to enhance the use of such ac-
tions, has had the desired effect.  Part III.E. considers the rela-
tively new phenomenon in Japan of the “Complicated Case”9 
and the anticipated future modifications and adaptations of 
provisions in the New Code that can be expected to deal with 
“Complicated Cases.”  Part III.F. discusses the relations be-
tween the Japanese Bench and Bar and how the legal changes 
set to increase the size of the legal profession by approximately 
threefold, could enhance the Rule of Law in Japan.   
The conclusion, in Part IV, makes some suggestions for future 
changes and areas deserving of further study if the objective of 
strengthening the judicial system as a Rule of Law dispute reso-
lution mechanism is to be realized in Japan.    
  
 9. Shozo Ota, Reform of Civil Procedure in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561, 
565 (2001). 
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II.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM  
A.  Japan’s Legislative Reforms 
In 1996, the Japanese legislature completely rewrote the na-
tion’s Civil Procedure Code.10  The rewriting of the New Code 
took five years to complete; however, lengthy discussion and 
debates regarding the need for such a fundamental change in 
Japan’s Civil Procedure Code long preceded the rewriting ef-
fort.11  The New Code was an amalgam of the old Japanese Civil 
Procedure Code (“Old Code”) and reforms designed to speed-up 
the pace of Japanese litigation and create reliable means of re-
solving disputes.12  Some heralded the New Code as ushering in 
major change for Japan’s civil procedure for the Twenty-first 
Century.13  Others wondered whether the New Code would ac-
tually result in major change or would simply serve as a set of 
“baby steps,” having little impact on how litigation in Japan 
would be handled in the future.14  Several English language ar-
ticles have explained the changes in the New Code at its incep-
tion.15   
The New Code went into effect on April 1, 1998.16  In the 
summer of 2003, as a response to the continued negative per-
ception of litigation in Japan, the Japanese Diet (Japan’s Par-
liament)17 enacted legislation requiring the completion of cases 
  
 10. Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil Procedure of Japan – A 
Procedure for the Coming Century?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767 (1997). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Ota, supra note 9, at 564–66. 
 13. See, e.g., Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 790–1. 
 14. Toshiro M. Mochizuki, Baby Step or Giant Leap?: Parties Expanded 
Access to Documentary Evidence Under the New Japanese Code of Civil Proce-
dure, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 285 (1999).   
 15. See generally Taniguchi, supra note 10; Mochizuki, supra note 14 (de-
tailing changes in access to document production); Takeshi Kojima, Japanese 
Civil Procedure in Comparative Law Perspective, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 687 
(1998); Ota, supra note 9, 568–72; Carl F. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Re-
luctant Litigant: Japan’s Changing View Towards Civil Litigation, 32 LAW & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 769 (2001) [hereinafter Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluc-
tant Litigant].   
 16. Ota, supra note 9, at 561. 
 17. Article 41 of Japan’s Constitution provides that “the Diet shall be the 
highest organ of the State Power and shall be the sole law-making organ of 
the State.”  KENPŌ [Japanese Constitution], art. 41.  The Diet consists of two 
Houses: the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors.  KENPŌ, 
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at the trial court level within two-years of initiation.18  This leg-
islation, as well as the New Code and the 2001 Report of the 
Judicial Reform Council are considered part of Japan’s ongoing 
effort to strengthen the concept of the Rule of Law in Japanese 
society.19   
One of the main characteristics of a society governed by the 
concept of the Rule of Law is that the legal system’s dispute 
resolution mechanism (i.e., the judicial system) provides a reli-
able means of resolving legal disputes within a nation.20  A reli-
able judicial system must in turn provide its litigation partici-
pants with a reasonable opportunity to obtain reasonable relief 
when warranted, and a reasonable opportunity to defend 
against unwarranted, specious, or malicious claims.  Although a 
  
art. 42.  A bill becomes a law when passed by both Houses or, if rejected by the 
House of Councilors, is again passed by a two-thirds vote of the House of Rep-
resentatives.  KENPŌ, art. 59. 
 18. 15 Heisei [Act to Accelerate Court Procedures] Statute No. 107, art. 2. 
(2003) (Japan).  See also Lower House Approves Speedy Trial Legislation, 
JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, May 13, 2003, available at LEXIS, News & Business 
Library, Japan Economic Newswire File.  The Asahi Shinbun reported that a 
unanimous lower House of the Japanese Diet approved a bill “to limit lower 
court trials to less than two years” in an effort to speed up the justice system.  
Id.  The Asahi Shinbun described the Japanese judicial system as operating 
“snail-like.”  See id.  As the statistics referred to infra show, this description 
appears to unduly criticize the pace of litigation in the Japanese court system, 
at least as it applies to average dispositions of civil cases handled after pas-
sage of the New Code.  The Japanese Diet enacted the two-year law on July 9, 
2003.  According to the Japan Times, the law applies to both civil and crimi-
nal cases at the District Court, Summary Court and Family Court.  Trials to 
be Expedited as Judicial Reform Bills Pass, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, July 10, 
2003, available at http://japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.p15?nn20030710 
b1.htm [hereinafter Trials to be Expedited].  For a discussion of how such leg-
islation may adversely affect the Rule of Law concept in Japan, see infra notes 
209, 210, 212 and Part III.A.4.   
 19. See The Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations of the Jus-
tice System Reform — For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Cen-
tury, (proposed June 12, 2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/ 
judiciary/2001/0612report.html [hereinafter Recommendations of the Judicial 
Reform Council].  See also Major Legal Reform Handed to Koizumi, JAPAN 
TIMES ONLINE, June 13, 2001, available at http://japantimes.co.jp.cgibin/g 
etarticle.pl5?nn20010613a1.htm.   For a discussion of recommendations made 
by the Justice System Reform Council, see CARL GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW 
IN JAPAN — A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 265–67 (2003) [hereinafter GOODMAN, 
THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN].    
 20. SCHLESIGNER ET AL., supra note 7, at 11; O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 65–
79.   
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Rule of Law judicial system requires the fair treatment of all its 
participants, reality reveals that defendants are usually unwill-
ing or at least non-initiating participants to litigation.  In the 
criminal law arena, the State, typically through the prosecutor’s 
office, initiates litigation.21   In a criminal case, the judicial sys-
tem in carrying out a Rule of Law mandate must provide the 
accused defendant with a reasonable opportunity to defend him 
or herself in a timely proceeding, e.g., a fair trial.22  Both the 
Japanese and U.S. legal systems attempt to implement these 
ideals through Constitutional provisions guaranteeing the ac-
cused defendant in criminal cases the right to counsel,23 the 
privilege against self-incrimination,24 and a right to a speedy 
trial before an impartial tribunal.25  How well these systems 
work to make these legal provisions a reality is not the subject 
  
 21. In Japan, the prosecutor’s office retains responsibility for bringing 
forward criminal prosecutions.  However, Japanese law does permit limited 
civilian review of prosecutor decisions not to prosecute.  For a discussion of 
prosecution review commissions, see GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, 
supra note 19, at 293 and Mark D. West, Prosecution Review Commissions: 
Japan’s Answer to the Problem of Prosecutorial Discretion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 
684, 693 (1992).  
 22. See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J. dis-
senting); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 
86 (1923); Vacher v. France, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 482 (1996) (setting aside a 
French criminal conviction because the defendant was not given a fair hearing 
when his appeal was denied without receiving warning regarding any time 
limits for his response to the government’s assertions on appeal nor did the 
law specify any such time limits). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“to have the assistance of counsel for his de-
fense”).  KENPŌ, art. 37 para. 3 (“At all times the accused shall have the assis-
tance of competent counsel who shall, if the accused is unable to secure the 
same by his own efforts, be assigned to his use by the State.”).    
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself”); KENPŌ, art. 38 (“No person shall be compelled 
to testify against himself.”); X and 5 Others v. State, 1993 (O) No. 1189, 53 
MINSHU No. 3 at 514 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, Mar. 24, 1999) (Japan) (“In or-
der to exercise investigative power, there may be instances where it is neces-
sary to hold the suspect in custody and interrogate the suspect.”).  See gener-
ally Daniel H. Foote, Confessions and the Right to Silence in Japan, 21 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 415 (1991) (discussing the historical and current importance 
of confessions in the Japanese criminal system).  See also GOODMAN, THE RULE 
OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 312–14.   
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial”); KENPŌ, art. 37 (“In all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal.”).   
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of this Article or the study behind it, which solely focuses on 
civil non-administrative law adjudication.26  
In a civil justice system, the allegedly aggrieved plaintiff ini-
tiates litigation.  In order to carry out a Rule of Law mandate, a 
civil justice system must not only provide plaintiffs with a reli-
able, speedy and useable system, but it must also guarantee the 
defendant’s right to defend him or herself in order to ensure 
that both plaintiffs and defendants feel sufficiently confident 
with the legal system.27  In the case of Japan, because of struc-
tural impediments, some potential plaintiffs may not feel such 
necessary confidence in the Japanese legal system.   
In fact, many aggrieved Japanese potential litigants reject 
the existing judicial system in favor of alternative dispute reso-
lution mechanisms (“ADRs”) due to its unfavorable reputation.  
In fact, many Japanese citizens perceive the nation’s judicial 
system as failing to offer timely and adequate relief, and/or they 
believe that the Japanese judicial system is an unreliable or 
inefficient mechanism for resolving disputes.  For this reason, 
many Japanese litigants turn to ADR.28  As a result, Japanese 
  
 26. The Judicial Reform Council in Japan has made a number of sugges-
tions in the criminal law area, including the creation of a public defender sys-
tem, reform of the interrogation of suspects system, and lay participation in 
criminal trials.  For a discussion of the Japanese criminal justice system and 
the Judicial Reform Council’s recommendations, see GOODMAN, THE RULE OF 
LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at ch.13 (elaborating on Japan’s criminal law 
system).  
 27. See Nelson v. Adams, 529 U.S. 460 (2000); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714 (1877); Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that due process re-
quires notice and an opportunity to be heard); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
COUNCIL DRAFT NO. 2 (Sept. 29, 2003) (Principle 5: “Due Notice and Right to 
be Heard”) (formerly Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure), available at 
http://www.ali.org/ali/TransCP-CD2.pdf [hereinafter ALI/UNIDROIT Princi-
ples]. 
 28. HIDEO TANAKA, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF POSITIVE LAW (3d ed. 
1974), quoted in TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 492–
500 (University of Tokyo Press, 1976).  Tanaka explains:  
[C]onciliation has been widely used as a means of settling disputes, 
while regular adjudicative procedures have not been used very fre-
quently…the primary reason why a great number of people choose 
conciliation rather than the formal adjudication process seems to 
be…to avoid the time and expense required to go through the formal 
legal process. 
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society’s acceptance of the Rule of Law model may be subject to 
question.29  This Article does not wish to challenge the utility of 
ADR as an adjunct to the national legal system, or as part of a 
Rule of Law judicial system — far from it.  ADR, as an adjunct 
to a judicial system, is in fact a characteristic of a Rule of Law 
society,30 but the “A” must represent a true “alternative” and 
not an adequate forum replacement.   
In order for a judicial system to serve as a reliable means of 
resolving legal disputes, it must: (1) be reasonably quick (justice 
inordinately delayed is in fact justice denied);31 (2) be reasona-
bly available (a system that taxes the complaining party so 
much as to make the cost benefit analysis weigh in favor of not 
using the system does not provide a Rule of Law solution to le-
  
Id.  See also John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE 
STUD. 359 (1978) [hereinafter Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant]; No-
butoshi Yamanouchi & Samuel J. Cohen, Understanding the Incidence of Liti-
gation in Japan:  A Structural Analysis, 24 INT’L L. 443 (1991); Harold See, 
Dispute Resolution in Japan: A Survey, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 339 (1982).  
 29. See Kanako Takahara, Calls for Overhaul of Judge System Mount, 
JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 20, 1999, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/ 
cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn19991220b8.htm (“Discontent with the judicial system 
among lawyers, politicians and business people has prompted a Cabinet advi-
sory panel to launch discussions aimed at giving the system its first overhaul 
of the postwar era…”).  It is suggested that it is precisely because of such dis-
content that the Judicial Reform Council has made recommendations de-
signed to make the Rule of Law a more integral part of Japanese society. 
 30. For example, the U.S. is a Rule of Law society where ADR plays both 
the role of an alternative and adjunct to the nation’s judicial system.  The 
Federal Arbitration Act permits arbitration (a form of ADR) regardless of 
whether state law prohibits it.  Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 
(2003).  In addition, the Federal Arbitration Act requires that it must be in-
terpreted as an effort by Congress to fully utilize its authority under the In-
terstate Commerce Clause in a manner that is consistent with the Congres-
sional intent to override any pre-existing legal biases against arbitration.  See 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).  See 
also Mitsubishi Motors v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) 
(specifying that federal law favors arbitration).  
 31. See Prompt Justice, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. ONLINE EDITION (June 12, 2002), 
at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/June-12-Wed-2002/opinion/1 
893674.html (commenting on the “Short Trial Pilot Program” in Clark County 
Nevada, which has as its goal reducing the inordinate delay in civil proceed-
ings before the court).  “[I]n the current civil context no one really wins when 
justice lies a decade down the road…creating frustrations which can only en-
courage some to take the law into their own hands…or give up on [the] Justice 
System entirely.”  Id.   
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gal problems); (3) provide a neutral judicious decision-maker;32 
and (4) offer a procedure for resolving disputes that gives a vir-
tuous plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to be made whole.  
These factors, however, are not absolutes and different Rule of 
Law societies may properly draw different boundaries,33 making 
their systems: (1) work faster or slower; (2) more or less expen-
sive; or (3) more or less plaintiff friendly when it comes to ob-
taining and admitting evidence — all within a zone of reason-
ableness.34 
B.  A Comparison of the U.S. and Japanese Legal Systems  
1. The U.S. Civil Judicial System 
In the U.S., the nation expects its civil judicial system to per-
form law enforcement and social policy functions, which other 
societies delegate to the elected branches and bureaucracies.35  
  
 32. Marshall v. Jerrico Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Withrow v. Larkin, 
421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).  
 33. See generally ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 27.  
 34. While a neutral decision-maker is a sine qua non of a Rule of Law judi-
cial system, the mechanisms for decision-making may properly vary.  Thus, 
the American preference for a jury system is clearly not a Rule of Law re-
quirement although the early English law alternatives — trial by combat or 
by ordeal — would not be consistent with a Rule of Law society as understood 
in the Twenty-first Century.  Civil law societies do not provide for trial by jury 
in either criminal or civil cases, although in some civil law countries a panel of 
judges and laypersons may decide criminal cases.  See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 1058–59 (West Group 2003).   
In countries where French or German approaches to procedure pre-
vail, many criminal trials are conducted by a single judge or by a 
panel of judges without a jury.   Where there is a panel of judges, the 
panel often comprises a mixture of professional and lay judges, who 
work together at all stages of the case. 
Id.  Prior to World War II, Japan experimented with a modified form of jury-
trial in criminal cases.  This form of jury-trial was suspended during the war 
and remains suspended.  YOSIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 
137–38 (Anthony H. Angelo trans., Univ. of Tokyo Press 1976).  
 35. Richard L. Marcus, Reining in the U.S. Litigator: The New Role of U.S. 
Judges, Speech at the Chuo-o University Symposium on Multiple Roles and 
Interaction of Judges and Attorneys in Modern Civil Litigation (June 1, 2003), 
quoting R. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 47 (2001) (“Whereas European poli-
ties generally rely on hierarchically organized national bureaucracies to hold 
local officials accountable to national policies, the U.S. congress mobilized a 
distinctly U.S. army of enforcers — a decentralized, ideologically motivated 
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Within the U.S. civil judicial system, the legal system draws its 
boundaries in such a way as to favor plaintiffs.  Filing fees re-
main low as a consequence, and do not increase with the 
amount of damages sought.  Similarly, the U.S. licenses a sub-
stantial number of lawyers assuring an ample supply of profes-
sional legal talent available for plaintiffs while allowing lay ju-
ries to determine the quantum of damages.36  The collateral 
judgment rule, under which a plaintiff may recover damages 
from a defendant even after a third person has made the plain-
tiff whole,37 also serves as a boundary that favors plaintiffs.   
As the size of jury awards increase along with the number of 
available attorneys, lawyers are willing to assume cases on a 
contingent fee basis.  The contingency fee arrangement works 
as judges leniently grant high fees,38 which then guarantees a 
ready pool of attorneys.39  The “American Rule” for attorneys’ 
fees,40 where unsuccessful plaintiffs need not concern them-
selves with the expenses of reimbursing successful defendants’ 
attorneys, limits a potential plaintiff’s “costs” when thinking 
about litigation in terms of a cost-benefit analysis.  Together 
with fee-shifting statutes that require some unsuccessful defen-
dants to pay plaintiffs’ attorney fees but not visa versa, the U.S. 
rule tilts the playing field in favor of initiating litigation.41   
Once in court, the U.S. notice of claim pleading42 and liberal 
discovery rules43 similarly assist plaintiffs.44  The U.S. jury’s au-
  
army of private advocacy groups and lawyers.”).  Japan similarly relies on the 
bureaucracy to enforce the law.  Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant 
Litigant, supra note 15, at 772–79.  
 36. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
791. 
 37. See, e.g., Halek v. United States, 178 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 38. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
792. 
 39. Id. at 793. 
 40. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 
(1975).   
 41. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
792. 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. (stating that a plaintiff need not plead facts sufficient 
to prove his or her case but must simply notify the other side of the basis for 
the claim).  
 43. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (stating that evidence can be ob-
tained from the defendant during the course of the litigation).   
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thority to determine the award amount of compensatory and 
punitive damages with some but limited judicial supervision45 
has led to a fear of “runaway” juries that has now become such 
a part of American folklore that it has inspired the subject of a 
film based on a best selling novel on this matter.46  
The “pro-plaintiff” U.S. judicial system has recently come un-
der challenge as failing to serve the “public interest.”47  Natu-
rally most opponents of this system are those who typically rep-
resent deep-pocket defendants, who are required to pay damage 
awards, such as insurers and hospitals.48  Meanwhile, plaintiffs 
  
 44. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
789. 
 45. The problem of excessive damages is particularly felt in the punitive 
damage arena.  In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the U.S. Supreme 
Court attempted to limit the amount of punitive damages that may be 
awarded by “federalizing” and “constitutionalizing” the issue of grossly exces-
sive punitive damage awards.  See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996).  The Court set aside a punitive damage award as 
excessive and set forth guideposts for lower courts to use in assessing the 
reasonableness of jury punitive damage awards.  Id. at 573.  In another case, 
the Court was much more specific than in Gore in setting the permissible lim-
its on punitive damage awards.  See generally State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).  But see Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Hold-
ing Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 367, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1137 (2d Dist. 2003) & Henly v. 
Phillip Morris, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42, 112 Cal. App. 4th 198 (1st Dist. 2003).  
 46. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE RUNAWAY JURY (DOUBLEDAY 1996).  See also 
Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Runaway Judges? Selection Effects and 
the Jury, 16 J. OF L., ECON. AND ORG. 306 (2000). 
 47. Cf. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS 
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994) (arguing that the litigious nature of U.S. society 
and the availability of damages in questionable circumstances is having an 
adverse effect on American society).  See also Lawsuit Hell, How Fear of Liti-
gation is Paralyzing Our Professions, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 43. 
 48. See, e.g., Lloyd’s Chairman Calls for Action to Tackle Compensation 
Culture, INS. J., Sept. 16, 2003, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/ 
news/newswire/west/2003/09/16/32323.htm (“[Lloyd’s Chairman] said that tort 
reform was urgently needed to combat growing litigiousness in the U.S., 
which ultimately resulted in skyrocketing premiums for policy holders.”); 
AAHP Board of Directors Statement on Medical Malpractice Reform, AM. 
ASS’N HEALTH PLANS, June 11, 2001 (“[L]awyers have effectively tipped the 
balance in health care creating serious consequences that threaten purchas-
ers’ ability to offer insurance….”), at http://www.aahp.org/Content/Navigation 
Menu/About_AAHP/WhatWe_Stand_For/Board_Of_Directors_Statements/Me
dicalMalpracticeReform.pdf; Press Release, American Benefits Council, Ken-
nedy-McCain “Cap” on Punitive Damages Does Not Limit Excessive Liability 
for Employers or Health Plans, Feb. 7, 2001, at http://www.americanbenefits 
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and their representatives, who are trial lawyers for the most 
part,49 respond that defendants who commit wrongs should not 
escape liability and that punitive damages serve to rehabilitate 
and deter “bad” actors and adequately compensate plaintiffs for 
their injuries.  The parties, however, greatly differ on what 
compensation is adequate.  The general public has begun to be-
come involved in this debate as labor stoppages by physicians 
complaining about the high cost of malpractice insurance have 
made national headlines.50  In addition, political parties in the 
U.S. have lined up along traditional partisan grounds — the 
Democratic Party supporting plaintiffs and the trial lawyers,51 
and the Republican Party52 supporting big companies and their 
  
council.org/newsroom/pr02-07htm; DIVISION OF ADVOCACY AND HEALTH POLICY, 
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, Why Americans Needs Medical Liability 
Reform, at http://www.facs.org/ahp/whyamerica.html (last visited Oct. 19, 
2003).   
 49. Tim Hyland, Group to Fight Doctor Tort Reform, BALT. BUS. J., Sept. 
15, 2002, available at http://ww.bizjournals.com/Baltimore/stories/2003/09/15/ 
story6.html (“Maryland lawyers and victims of malpractice have formed a 
group to oppose caps on malpractice awards.…The new group, backed by the 
Maryland Trial Lawyers Association…”).  
 50. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, What Crisis?; GAO: Malpractice Pre-
mium Spikes Don’t Force Out Docs, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2003, at F1, avail-
able at 2003 WL 62215778; Texas Voters Back Limits on Malpractice Awards; 
Amendments Would Let Legislators Cap Noneconomic Damages in Lawsuits, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 62215336; NJ Doctors 
Threaten State-Side Malpractice Strike, FACTIVA GLOBAL INS. NEWS DIG., Feb. 
3, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4438287; West Virginia Surgeons Strike Against 
Malpractice Insurance Premiums, FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 1, 2003, at http://www. 
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,74369,00.html.  
 51. Jennifer Loven, Bush Urges Legal Reforms, Pushes Global-Trade Ef-
forts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2003, at A22, available at 2003 WL 
63280768 (“Democrats see the issue as partisan, with Republicans targeting 
trial attorneys, traditional major sources of campaign donations for Democ-
rats…”).   
 52. Id.  The Republican Party, both through the President and its Repre-
sentatives in Congress, has supported limiting the size of damage awards: 
In his weekly radio address, Bush pushed for Congress to limit dam-
age awards in medical malpractice cases…“We need to address the 
broader problems of frivolous litigation,” Bush said. “We need effec-
tive legal reforms that will make sure that settlement money from 
class actions and other litigation goes to those harmed and not to 
trial lawyers.”  The White House backs pending GOP legislation that 
would sharply curtail lawyers’ contingency fees in lawsuit awards 
topping $100 Million.  
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insurers, both sets of litigants ultimately providing their re-
spective political party with campaign funding.53   
The U.S. judicial system also has been hard pressed to join 
this political debate.  The system has responded to this pressure 
in a measured and judicious way by refusing to resolve the 
problems created by politically contentious litigation, such as 
the asbestos litigation mess.54   Instead, the U.S. judicial system 
urges the political branches to take up their constitutionally 
mandated role of serving the public interest by legislating reso-
lutions to problems such as the asbestos mess55 while the court 
steps in and attempts to control “run-away” punitive damage 
awards.56 
Whatever the merits or demerits of U.S. boundary drawing,57 
defendants and their representatives have not yet argued that 
the U.S. judicial system is inconsistent with the Rule of Law, 
because, for example, it denies defendants a reasonable oppor-
tunity to defend themselves.  Rather, while the conflicting sides 
differ as to where boundaries are properly drawn, all sides seem 
to agree that the American legal system, whatever its faults, 
supports a Rule of Law society.58  This mutual agreement, how-
ever, is not the case in Japan.  
  
Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers, No. 01–963, 2003 
U.S. Lexis 1956, at *55–56 (Mar. 10, 2003) (refusing to reconfigure liability 
rules in asbestos litigation).  
 55. Id. 
 56. Federal judges who are appointed for life can afford to remain impar-
tial in the political debate.  However, impartiality is difficult to achieve in 
states that require the election of judges.   The lure of campaign financing 
from one side or the other may taint the public’s view of the judicial system.  
See COMM’N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, AM. B. ASS’N, JUSTICE IN 
JEOPARDY 1–2 (2003).  
 57. For a discussion of whether appellate judges harbor a bias against 
plaintiffs who succeed at the trial level, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. 
ECON. REV. 125 (2001).  See also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000).  
But see Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (and Unsup-
ported Claims of Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 128 (2000).  
 58. The author is unaware of any due process or Rule of Law challenges to 
the American litigation system.  Indeed, Justice O’Connor has impliedly sug-
gested that easy access to the courts by plaintiffs seeking relief is a component 
of the Rule of Law in the U.S.: “In our system — and our experience has 
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2.  The Japanese Civil Judicial System 
As an historic matter, Japan requires its judicial system to 
perform a more limited function than the U.S. judicial system.59  
As a consequence, the Japanese judicial system has drawn its 
boundaries in a manner less favorable to plaintiffs.60  In addi-
tion, the shortage of lawyers in Japan makes a contingent fee 
system unworkable, even if technically lawful.61  The Japanese 
legal system’s requirement of paying a substantial part of law-
yer’s fee “up front” also inhibits litigation.62  The Japanese 
courts’ filing fee system, which for most cases has a graduated 
fee that increases with the size of damages sought, increases 
the cost of getting one’s case before the court.63  The Japanese 
legal system has a fact-pleading requirement that obliges a 
plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to be successful at the start of 
the case.64  Meanwhile, the system provides no means for com-
pelling the production of facts before a case’s initiation.65  To 
make matters worst, plaintiffs also have little opportunity to 
obtain meaningful factual discovery even after the case has be-
gun.  In addition, credible plaintiffs that are willing to under-
  
proved its efficacy — it is the citizens themselves, through the courts, who 
enforce their rights…ready access to independent courts allows any citizen to 
press his or her claim.”  O’CONNER, supra note 7.  
 59. See generally Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra 
note 15. 
 60. See id. at 789 (discussing the barriers to litigation in Japan).  See also 
Ota, supra note 9, at 5 (describing the process of litigation in Japan as slow, 
complex and expensive). 
 61. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
793 (noting that given the relatively small number of licensed lawyers permit-
ted to handle litigation, few attorneys desire a contingent fee system).  See 
also Ota, supra note 9, at 563 (discussing the shortage of lawyers in Japan). 
 62. Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 28, at 4. 
 63. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
791–92 (“In Japan…filing fees are typically based on the amount at issue in a 
case and can be quite high.”). 
 64. MINSOHŌ [Japanese Code of Civil Procedure], art. 133, sec. 2.2 [herein-
after MINSOHŌ].  See also MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU [Japanese Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure], art. 53(1) (on file with author).  Under Rule 133 of the Japanese Code 
of Civil Procedure, the complaint must assert “the gist and ground of” of a 
claim.  Id.  If deemed inadequate by the court, the court may reject the claim 
and, if not amended to satisfy the court the complaint will be dismissed.  Id. at 
art. 137.  
 65. Japan has no pre-trial discovery.  See MINSOHŌ, art. 163; see also Ya-
manouchi & Cohen, supra note 28, at 3. 
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take the cost of litigation and have evidence supporting their 
allegations are frequently deterred from doing so by the Japa-
nese system’s low damage awards66 and the difficulties in exe-
cuting a favorable judgment.67  In addition to the problems de-
scribed above, the Japanese general public views the nation’s 
judicial system as being too slow to resolve disputes.68  Faced 
with all of these obstacles, many potential plaintiffs in Japan 
are reluctant to litigate, and instead find ADR to be the more 
appropriate means for resolving disputes, whereas potential 
plaintiffs in other societies would find similar disputes more 
easily resolved by their nation’s court system.69   Many critics of 
  
 66. See generally JOSEPH W.S. DAVIS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN JAPAN 279 
(1996).   
 67. See Shunko Muto, Concerning Trial Leadership in Civil Litigation: 
Focusing on the Judge’s Inquiry and Compromise, 12 LAW IN JAPAN 23, 24 
(1979) (suggesting that one basis for successful compromise of litigation is a 
provision under which a plaintiff actually gets paid damages rather than hav-
ing to undergo the difficulties of execution after judgment).  See also Mark D. 
West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and the United 
States, Making Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 787 (1999) 
(“[C]ompanies can hire Yakuza to enforce judgments, a skill at which gangs 
appear to be more adept than the legal system.”) [hereinafter West, Informa-
tion].  A bengoshi interviewed in Nagoya supported settlement of litigation by 
compromise by noting both that: (1) it is easy for the losing defendant in liti-
gation to hide assets; and (2) there are high costs to obtaining execution.  In-
terview with bengoshi (A) in Nagoya, Japan (on file with author).  As a conse-
quence, it is “better for the plaintiff to get quick money.”  Id.  The settlement 
may result in the plaintiff getting less money, but at least the plaintiff gets 
the settlement money.  Id.  As used throughout this article the terms bengoshi 
and lawyer are used interchangeably.  For a discussion of the varying legal 
professionals in Japan, see notes 8, 21 & 76–78.  
 68. Kojima, supra note 15, at 687 (explaining that grave concerns about 
the delay and cost of litigation have diverted the Japanese people from the 
justice system).  See also John O. Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at 
the Problem, 10 WILLAMETTE J. OF INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 121, 134 (2002) (dis-
cussing the decrease in litigation time in Japan from 17.3 months in 1973 to 
9.3 months in 1997 and tying such decrease in delay to the increased use of 
litigation in the 1970’s) [hereinafter Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look 
at the Problem]. 
 69. See Obuchi, supra note 5, at 88.  See also Sato Yasunobu, Cultural 
Conflict in Dispute Processing Under Globalization: International Cooperation 
for Legal Aid, at http://www.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).  
Yasunobu argues that one purpose of supporting ADR over litigation is the 
advancement of Japanese industry over the rights of Japanese citizens: 
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the Japanese judicial system have even suggested that plain-
tiffs’ growing reliance on “extra-legal” means of resolution, such 
as resort to organized crime organizations, controlled violence70 
and Sokaiya71 have stemmed from the system’s inability, or at 
least the perceived inability, to obtain adequate relief for plain-
tiffs within a reasonably time.72  As a result, one of the Judicial 
Reform Council’s prime recommendations was aimed at reduc-
ing the amount of time required to resolve civil litigations.73  
Thus, Japan’s civil litigation system may be seen as defendant-
oriented while the U.S. civil litigation system may be seen as 
plaintiff-oriented. 
  
It cannot be denied that the Japanese people prefer conciliation to 
litigation.…even though litigation is initiated, it is not uncommon 
that a judge mediates for settlement in private in his/her chamber.  
Thus, the judiciary has long been left small and ineffective. This 
seems to have been part of a tacit industrial policy in order to dis-
courage the promotion of human rights and the development of indi-
vidual’s legal consciousness in exchange for the rapid national eco-
nomic growth measured by GNP or GDP. 
Id.  
 70. See Frank K. Upham, Litigation and Moral Consciousness in Japan: 
An Interpretive Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution Suits, 10 LAW AND SOC’Y 
REV. 579, 595–97 (1976).  See FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
POSTWAR JAPAN 78–123 (1987) (discussing the Buraku Liberation League’s use 
of “denunciation struggle” to persuade bureaucrats by the threat of limited 
physical force) [hereinafter UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR 
JAPAN].    
 71. Sokaiya are generally seen as corporate troublemakers who, for an 
extortionist price, will either remain mute themselves or will cause other 
shareholders to remain quiet at corporate annual meetings.  Professor West 
defines Sokaiya as follows: “A Sokaiya (literally ‘general meeting operator’) is 
usually a nominal shareholder who either attempts to extort money from a 
company’s managers by threatening to disrupt its annual shareholders’ meet-
ing with embarrassing or hostile questions or who works for a company’s 
management to suppress dissent at the meeting.”  Mark D. West, Why Share-
holders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. OF L. STUD. 351, 374 (2001) [here-
inafter West, Why Shareholders Sue].  See also Mark D. West, The Puzzling 
Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations from Japan and the 
United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 564 (2001) [hereinafter West, The Puz-
zling Divergence of Corporate Law].  
 72. See generally West, Information, supra note 67, at 770 (examining ex-
tortion by Sokaiya racketeers in a corporate context).  
 73. See Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at 
ch. II, pt. 1, § 1 (“Reinforcement and Speeding Up of Civil Justice”).   
File: GoodmanMacro.doc Created on: 2/17/2004 5:47 PM Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:27 PM 
2004] JAPAN’S NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE 529 
Unlike in the U.S., where the public does not feel that the ju-
dicial system’s pro-plaintiff orientation creates a Rule of Law 
society issue, the people of Japan have raised such a concern 
with respect to the capability of their nation’s judicial system.74  
In response, the Judicial Reform Council (the “Council”) made 
recommendations for liberalizing the judicial system, to make 
the judicial system’s relief more readily obtainable.   The Coun-
cil’s proposals were grounded in the public’s general Rule of 
Law concerns and were designed to carry out the Council’s view 
that the Rule of Law should more fully infiltrate Japanese soci-
ety.75  To this end, the Council has suggested, among other 
things, increasing the number of licensed bengoshi authorized 
to represent parties in court by more than three times the num-
ber annually admitted at the time the Council began its work.76   
The Council also urged for the expansion of the roles of other 
Japanese legal professionals, such as judicial scriveners77 and 
  
 74. The public’s concern is reflected in the Diet’s recent legislative action in 
creating the Law Reform Council and mandating it to examine and make 
recommendations concerning Japan’s legal system.  See Judicial Reform 
Council, Points at Issue in the Judicial Reform, at http://www.kantei.go.jp/ 
foreign/judiciary/0620reform.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2003).  The Council 
noted that the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in the 
Diet directed it to consider such questions as the judicial appointments sys-
tem, quality and quantity of legal professionals, public participation in the 
judicial system, etc.  Id. 
 75. See generally Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra 
note 19. 
 76. At the time the Council started its work, approximately 1,000 new 
lawyers were admitted each year.  This figure was twice the previous total of 
only 500 newly admitted lawyers as late as the late 1980s.  See LEGAL 
TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JAPAN 8–9 (S. Ct. of Japan  1977).   The 
Council recommends that 3,000 new lawyers be admitted each year beginning 
in 2010.  See Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, 
at ch. 1, pt. 3, § 2(2) (“How the Legal Profession Supporting the Justice Sys-
tem Should Be”).  See also Major Legal Reform Handed to Koizumi, supra note 
19 (“When the current bar exam is phased out in 2010, the number of those 
who pass the new bar exam should reach 3,000 a year, up from the current 
1,000.”).  Of these lawyers, a certain number become judges and prosecutors 
and it has been recommended that at least some of the additional lawyers be 
allocated to the judges’ pool in order to increase the number of judges.  
 77. TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 563.  Professor 
Tanaka sets forth the functions of judicial scriveners as follows: 
The functions of judicial scriveners are (a) to draft documents to be 
filed in courts, public prosecutors’ offices or local offices of the Minis-
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patent attorneys,78 in order for them to play a more active role 
in litigation.79  In addition, the Council recommended increasing 
the pool of judges so as to reduce the backlog of cases and free 
judges from their tight schedules to work on more recently filed 
cases.80  Further, the Council proposes to speed up the pace of 
litigation by enhancing the legal workforce’s lawyering skills by 
suggesting a new and hopefully better educational system with 
innovative teaching methods for lawyers.81  The Japanese gov-
ernment has already accepted these recommendations and by 
2006 and 2007 the first of the new crop of newly trained bengo-
shi will enter the field.82  Similarly, efforts are under way to re-
cruit practicing lawyers to become judges.83  
  
try of Justice on behalf of other persons, and (b) to take the necessary 
steps relating to the registration of transfers of title to land or other 
transactions in a registration office.…In connection with (a) above, 
judicial scriveners often give legal advice to laymen in the course of 
drafting legal documents. 
Id.  
 78. The function of patent attorneys is “to act on behalf of other persons in 
matters related to patents, ‘utility models’…designs and trademarks.”  Id. at 
564.  
 79. In the case of scriveners, the Council has suggested that they be al-
lowed to represent parties in Summary Court proceedings and that the law be 
amended to allow for  Summary Court jurisdiction in damage actions seeking 
amounts which take into account economic trends.  Recommendations of the 
Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, ch. III, pt. 3, § 7 & ch. II, pt. 1, § 5(3) 
(“Utilization of Specialists in Fields Adjoining the Law” & “Expansion of the 
Jurisdiction of Summary Courts & Substantial Increase in the Upper Limit on 
Amount in Controversy in Procedures for Small-Claims Litigation”).  
 80. Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, ch. 
III, pt. 1, § 2(1) (section entitled: “Judges”). 
 81. Id. at pt. 2. 
 82. In April 2004, Japan will usher in a new era of legal training with the 
opening of the new law schools recommended by the Law Reform Council.  
These schools will be graduate level schools and the first class of graduates 
will graduate in two years time.  Under the new curriculum, graduates of a 
hogakubu faculty who are admitted to the new law school may graduate after 
a two-year class while graduates of other faculties will require three years of 
legal education.  As a consequence the first crop of new graduates — most of 
whom will hopefully pass the new Bar Examination — will graduate in 2006 
and the next class of three year students in 2007.  See Major Legal Reform 
Handed to Koizumi, supra note 19 (“To nurture high-quality lawyers, the re-
port calls for establishment of law schools by April 2004 that require two or 
three years of study….Starting in 2006, when the first graduates of the new 
schools are expected, a new bar exam should be established…”).   In November 
of 2003, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
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The Council’s work does not stand-alone; the New Code pre-
ceded it.  One of the New Code’s main objectives is to modify the 
Japanese Civil Procedure so as to alleviate some of the prob-
lems that are at the core of the Rule of Law debate and ulti-
mately, which weaken the judicial system as a means of dispute 
resolution.84  The New Code made procedural, and some have 
suggested substantive, changes in the method by which cases 
are tried and also altered many evidence-gathering procedures 
during the trial.85  By limiting the right of appeal to Japan’s Su-
preme Court, the New Code attempts to speed up the date of 
“final judgment” by making the nation’s High Court decision 
final, at least in most cases, which, at the same time, frees the 
Supreme Court to devote its time and effort to more important 
legal issues.86  As counter-currents exists to the Judicial Reform 
Council’s work (such as strengthening ADR to make it at least 
an equal partner with the Judicial system in resolving disputes 
and scrapping the “American Rule” on attorney’s fees in favor of 
  
licensed sixty-six new American style law schools.  66 Institutions Win Ap-
proval to Open U.S.-style Law Schools, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 22, 2003, 
available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20031122a6. 
htm.   
 83. As explained in Part III.F. of this Article, such efforts are not likely to 
be successful absent substantial additional changes that do not appear to be 
forthcoming.   
 84. Kojima, supra note 15, at 687–88.  Professor Kojima pinpoints making 
civil trials understandable and the judicial system accessible as goals of the 
New Code: 
The reasons for the adoption of the new code can be summarized in 
three points…Second, civil trials today have raised grave concerns 
over the considerable delay and high costs of litigation, and this has 
diverted the Japanese people from the Justice System — the so-called 
“departure from justice symptom” (shihobanare). Unless civil trials 
are made easily understandable and accessible, the social functions of 
the civil justice system would be seriously undermined. 
Id.   
 85. Mochizuki, supra note 14, at 286–87; Kojima, supra note 15, at 701–04; 
Koichi Miki, Roles of Judges and Attorneys under the Non-Sanction Scheme 
in Japanese Civil Procedure, Speech at the Chuo-o University Symposium on 
Multiple Roles and Interaction of Judges and Attorneys in Modern Civil Liti-
gation (June 1, 2003) (transcript on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Interna-
tional Law).  
 86. Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 779–80; Kojima, supra note 15, at 715–17. 
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a “loser pays” system),87 the “pro-plaintiff orientation” debate 
also comes out in favor of altering Japan’s Civil Procedure Code.  
These forces of the status quo are accommodated, at least to 
some extent, in the New Code through such obstacles to effec-
tive discovery as the self-use document exception to production88 
and the failure to provide for sanctions89 in the new “inquiry 
process.”90  
C.  The Study on Japanese Litigation 
A 2001 study, about the changing Japanese legal system,91 
concluded that the New Code’s concentrated evidence gathering 
procedures92 had a positive effect on speeding up the litigation 
process.93  The study found that statistical evidence showed that 
the judicial system achieved dispositions at a higher absolute 
number than prior to the New Code; however, since the number 
of cases filed has changed, the ratio of dispositions to new cases 
filed may not be substantially different than before.  The study 
further found that the new “inquiries procedure”94 was not as 
helpful as originally thought would be the case.95 
This Article’s research purpose was to determine through in-
terviews with Japanese bengoshi and through discussions with 
Japanese professors of law whether the New Code has in fact 
significantly improved litigation and made it a preferable tool 
for dispute resolution.  In this regard, the present study primar-
  
 87. Japan follows the “American Rule” on attorney’s fees.  CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, supra note 8, at § 2.04(3).  The Council recom-
mends the abolishment of the “American Rule” as a means of fostering litiga-
tion.  See generally Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra 
note 19.  Modification of the Rule to permit successful plaintiffs to obtain 
counsel fees while not shifting the burden of litigation costs to unsuccessful 
plaintiffs, would foster litigation but abolition of the rule would not.  Abolition 
would change the risk/reward and cost/benefit analysis for a plaintiff — espe-
cially a small plaintiff that could not afford to pay a winning defendant’s 
council fees — and result in less litigation.  
 88. See infra notes 255–71 and accompanying text. 
 89. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 90. See generally Mochizuki, supra note 14, at 286–87; see also Taniguchi, 
supra note 10, at 772–91. 
 91. See Ota, supra note 9, at 569–70. 
 92. MINSOHŌ, art. 182. 
 93. Ota, supra note 9, at 577. 
 94. MINSOHŌ,  art. 163.  
 95. See generally Ota, supra note 9.  
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ily concentrated on new litigation rates than on disposition 
rates.  Further, this Article’s study focused on trial practice and 
lawyer attitudes towards the judicial system and their advice to 
clients concerning litigation as a dispute resolution mechanism.  
For this purpose, this Article’s study utilized a detailed ques-
tionnaire to structure interviews and in some cases interview 
subjects answered the questionnaire in writing before their oral 
interview.  A copy of the questionnaire follows this Article in 
Appendix A. 
These interviews took place in various parts of Japan in order 
to assure that the results would not be skewed toward the ma-
jor litigation centers of Tokyo and Osaka.  In this regard, bengo-
shi were interviewed in Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Kobe, Kyoto, Na-
goya, Osaka, Saitama, Sapporo, Sendai, and Tokyo.  Similarly, 
law professors from various localities were interviewed and a 
High Court Judge was interviewed outside of Tokyo.  Judges of 
the Tokyo District Court and officials of the Judicial Secretariat 
were interviewed in Tokyo.  This Article’s study reviewed the 
resulting statistical data, including the Judicial Secretariat’s 
information, in an attempt to determine whether the New Code 
has had an effect on litigation rates, disposition rates and liti-
gation in general.96  In addition, all interviewed bengoshi were 
requested to recommend one change in the nation’s civil proce-
dure law that they felt would provide a significant solution to 
the present problems facing Japan’s litigation system.  
The results of this Article’s study are presented below.  In 
summary, the study concluded that while the New Code repre-
sents a major change in procedure on its face, the New Code’s 
actual effect in areas other than the speed of disposition proved 
  
 96. Statistical information referred to herein and all statistical information 
compiled in the charts set out herein come from two sources: (a) Hosoh Jiho 
[compilation of annual statistics] for the years involved, and (b) statistics 
compiled by and provided by the Japanese Supreme Court’s Secretariat.  In 
the case of overlapping statistics, there were slight but insignificant differ-
ences.  In most cases, the statistics were identical.  In some situations, only 
one set of statistics was available, such as the Secretariat’s provisional 2002 
data.  Appreciation is extended to Professor M. Tanabe of Hiroshima Univer-
sity Faculty of Law who assisted locating and translating the Hosoh Jiho sta-
tistical data.  All 2002 data reported herein is provisional.  (Statistical infor-
mation is on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  [The Arti-
cle’s use of this statistical data is hereinafter referred to as “The Japanese 
Court System’s Statistics.”].     
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disappointing.  Litigation appears to be moving faster, although 
the trend to faster resolution was started prior to the New 
Code’s amendment.  Many Japanese lawyers expressed the 
view that the present trend is not significantly different or 
faster than the trend prior to the New Code.  However, when 
the average time of disposition was evaluated, it appeared that 
the present trend appears to be significantly different from and 
faster than the trend prior to the New Code’s enactment.   
Nevertheless, most Japanese lawyers see the New Code as 
having little, if any, effect on the speed of litigation, as com-
pared to the trend started prior to the New Code, although most 
agree that cases do move quicker today than prior to the New 
Code.97  There also appears to be agreement among Japanese 
lawyers that the New Code complements and carries forward 
the trend to faster litigation initiated prior to the New Code.  
The courts’ and lawyers’ attitudes toward moving litigation 
faster are most significant in this regard.98  Nonetheless, while 
it would seem that quicker resolution of litigation would lead to 
greater use of litigation to resolve disputes, this does not appear 
to be the case in Japan.  This phenomenon requires explanation 
and further study, and this Article presents some thoughts on 
this issue. 
Similarly, as Japanese litigation procedures improved, such 
as by the use of consolidated evidence gathering procedures, the 
expectation was that lawyers and litigants would have greater 
confidence in the judicial system as a Rule of Law dispute reso-
lution mechanism.  This too does not appear to be the case, even 
though the courts implemented consolidation procedures in 
more cases and at an even higher percentage in cases involving 
testimony by two or more witnesses.  Moreover, the New Code’s 
procedural devices, which are designed to make it easier for 
parties to obtain factual information, appear to have some, but 
little effect on the quality of information received.  In fact, most 
lawyers interviewed were not more inclined to recommend liti-
  
 97. Ota, supra note 9, at 577.  
 98. See generally Interview notes with Japanese legal professionals (on file 
with the author).   
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gation to their clients today than they were prior to the New 
Code’s adoption.99  
Japan’s reform of its Civil Procedure Code is an ongoing proc-
ess and it is anticipated that further amendments will be 
adopted to address issues that have come to light recently un-
der the new procedure.100  Thus, in July 2003, the Japanese gov-
ernment adopted changes to assist the nation’s court system in 
dealing with complicated cases involving expertise that the 
judges simply do not possess, such as an in-depth understand-
ing of medical malpractice, intellectual property, and construc-
tion engineering cases.101   
In addition, the Japanese government enacted changes that 
allowed prospective litigants to obtain information prior to the 
actual filing of a lawsuit.  However, it remains to be seen 
whether the new provisions will make more evidence available 
  
 99. A lawyer in Hokkaido noted that he would be prepared to recommend 
litigation more frequently if he noticed a change in aid to plaintiffs, but he has 
not seen such a change.  Interview with lawyer (K) in Hokkaido, Japan (on file 
with author).  Another lawyer in Sapporo, who primarily represents corporate 
clients, noted that he would not recommend litigation more frequently and 
that his clients were not being sued more frequently under the New Code than 
under the Old Code.  Interview with lawyer (C) in Sapporo, Japan (on file with 
author).  A lawyer in Hiroshima specifically tied the self-use document pro-
duction exception (MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(c–d)) to his willingness to rec-
ommend litigation, noting that he would recommend litigation more often if 
documents normally withheld by the defendant under this exception were 
produced.  Interview with lawyer (M) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with au-
thor).  See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(c–d) (defining the self-use document 
production exception).  For a discussion of self-use documents, see infra notes 
251–67.  A lawyer in Sendai noted that in the past he informed clients that 
civil cases were decided faster, but this fact did not change his attitude and he 
does not recommend litigation any more frequently today than he did under 
the Old Code.  Interview with lawyer (H) in Sendai, Japan (on file with au-
thor).  A lawyer in Tokyo stated that he was not prepared to recommend liti-
gation more frequently under the New Code because there was still no discov-
ery and possession of evidence was necessary before the suit was filed in order 
to prove a case.  Interview with bengoshi (S) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with 
author).  A bengoshi in Hiroshima based his unwillingness to recommend 
litigation on the difficulties of executing on a successful judgment.  Interview 
with bengoshi (V) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with author). 
 100. See Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 790 (noting that we need to “keep a 
close eye on the practices developing under the New Code and initiate neces-
sary legislation promptly”). 
 101. See Trial to be Expedited, supra note 18.   
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or will simply change the timing of evidence gathering.102  This 
Article will discuss these recent changes.  In addition to dis-
cussing the results of the research, this Article attempts to 
make some small suggestions as to changes that may more 
closely align Japan’s civil procedure with the Rule of Law soci-
ety proposed by the Council’s 2001 Report.103 
III. JAPAN’S 1996 REFORMS IN PRACTICE 
The New Code’s major reforms relate to procedures geared to 
speed up the pace of litigation and procedures to make evidence 
more freely available to parties.104  In a sense, the two ideas run 
together in the hope that providing evidence earlier in the proc-
ess can have an effect on the speed of the litigation process 
overall.  Thus, providing evidence at the earliest stages of issue 
identification may serve to resolve issues or at least shorten a 
trial’s duration.  In addition to evidence changes, the New 
Code’s major structural reforms were: (1) to add a new semi-
public procedure through which the parties and their counsel 
could, at an early stage, both define the issues and facts relat-
ing to those issues and discuss settlement, all outside the glare 
of a public proceeding; and (2) to consolidate evidence gathering 
at the trial stage.105   
In Japan, unlike in the U.S., trials do not take place on a 
daily basis with witnesses appearing one after the other until 
all evidence has been presented to the trier of fact.106  U.S. 
courts designed such trial practices to meet the needs of its citi-
  
 102. The mechanism adopted is a kind of pre-complaint adoption of the cur-
rent inquiry system.  As discussed infra at Part III.B.1 and notes 199–225, the 
current system does not appear to provide parties with much additional in-
formation, raising questions as to why a pre-complaint version would succeed.  
The answer appears to be that it is seen as a “first step” reform with later 
steps to include a sanctions regime for failure to truthfully respond to an in-
quiry.  For a discussion of the inquiry system, see infra Part III.B.1.  
 103. See Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19. 
 104. See Ota, supra note 9, at 568–70.  See generally Mochizuki, supra note 
14; Taniguchi, supra note 10; Kojima, supra note 15.  
 105. Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 771.  See Ota, supra note 9, at 564. 
 106. Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 769.  Japanese trials are similar to trials 
in most Civil Law countries.  Professional career service judges meet with 
counsel and receive evidence on widely dispersed dates.  Thus, trial dates may 
be separated by a week, month or more.  For a discussion of trial procedures 
in Japan see infra notes 108–38 and accompanying text.                                                                                               
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zen jurors.  Jurors, who having taken time out of their daily 
lives to perform their civic duty, need to get back to their daily 
lives as quickly as possible.107  For this reason, the U.S. court 
system cannot expect its citizen jurors to remember testimony 
heard weeks before they are called on to make their decision.  
The existence of a jury trial right in all cases at common law in 
which the matter in dispute exceeds twenty dollars108 requires a 
procedure that condenses the time for trial to as small a capsule 
of time as is possible.109  To achieve this goal, American lawyers 
— who in the U.S. are in charge of a case’s investigation stage 
and also play a major role in the trial stage — must be well 
prepared.  U.S. attorneys also have to prepare their witnesses 
in advance in order for testimony to go quickly and succinctly at 
trial.110  U.S. pre-trial procedure involves extensive discovery 
and taking the testimony of witnesses and potential witnesses 
outside of court and before trial, all of which serve to prepare 
the lawyers, parties and witnesses for the trial.111  By avoiding 
surprise, the U.S. pre-trial discovery procedures also serve to 
shorten the length of the trial, which in turn serves the time 
concerns of citizen jurors.112  Thus, while U.S. trials are rela-
tively quick affairs, pre-trial procedures may take several years. 
  
 107. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FAMILY LEGAL GUIDE, chs. 2, 24, avail-
able at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/practical/books/family_legal_guide/cha 
pter_2.pdf (How the Legal System Works) [hereinafter AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, FAMILY LEGAL GUIDE].  
 108. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court 
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”).    
 109. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FAMILY LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 
107, at chs. 2, 24.  
 110. See Craig P. Wagnild, Civil Law Discovery in Japan:  A Comparison of 
Japanese and U.S. Methods of Evidence Collection in Civil Litigation, 3 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 17 (2002).  
 111. American Bar Association, How the Courts Work: Steps in the Trial, 
available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/courts/discovery.html (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2003).  
 112. See Wagnild, supra note 110, at 17. Prior to World War II, Japan ex-
perimented with a form of jury trial in criminal cases.  ODA, supra note 1, at 
66–68.  This system permitted a defendant, in certain categories of cases, to 
ask for a jury trial.  Id. at 77–79.  However, the determination of the jury was 
not binding on the court, and if the court disagreed with the jury, it would 
order a new trial.  Id.  On the other hand, if the judge supported the jury ver-
dict, the defendant would lose the right to appeal the verdict.  Id.  Not surpris-
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In civil law countries, such as Japan, a right to a trial by jury 
does not exist.113  As a consequence, a professional judge (or 
panel of judges) try cases on a full time occupational basis.114  
Such a judge may be expected to keep detailed records of pro-
ceedings and to refer to those records when working on a case.115  
For this reason, there is no need to have as compact a trial as in 
the U.S.; the “trial” in Japan consists of the proceedings before 
the court that occur after the filing and serving of the com-
plaint.116  Under Japanese law, the trial is a public event and all 
trial proceedings are held in open court.117  While open court 
may serve a significant public interest in allowing the public to 
see how the court system operates,118 open court is not the best 
  
ingly, most defendants opted not to have jury trial.  The jury trial law was 
suspended and remains in suspension.  Id. at 77–79. 
 113. Id.  The Judicial Reform Council has suggested a form of lay participa-
tion in major crime cases in Japan, although it has rejected the U.S. style 
jury.  Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19.  The 
likelihood is that Japan will experiment with a more German form of lay par-
ticipation in some major criminal cases in the future.  See also Major Legal 
Reform Handed to Koizumi, supra note 19 (“The report recommends the in-
troduction of jurors in serious criminal trials.  They would be randomly se-
lected from registered voters to serve throughout a case and to consult with 
judges before handing out a verdict and sentence.”).  A recent proposal calls 
for a panel of three professionals and six lay judges in cases where the death 
penalty or life imprisonment may be implicated.  Hiroshi Matsubara, Citizen 
Judge System Close to Reality, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, available at http://www. 
apantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040129b2.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 
2004). 
 114. See Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 769–70. 
 115. Id. 
 116. The trial stage is also referred to as the “Plenary” or “Oral” Hearing. 
 117. KENPŌ, art. 82.  The Japanese Constitution in Article 82 states: 
Trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly.…Where a 
court unanimously determines publicity to be dangerous to public or-
der or morals, a trial may be conducted privately, but trials of politi-
cal offenses, offenses involving the press or cases wherein the rights 
of people as guaranteed in Chapter III of this Constitution are in 
question shall always be conducted publicly. 
Id. 
 118. In the U.S., one of the functions of the jury trial is to educate the public 
as to how the justice system operates by making the public a part of the actual 
operation of the system through service on the jury.  AKHIL REED AMAR & 
ALAN HIRSH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT 
YOUR RIGHTS 54 (1998).  This same function is part of the reason for sugges-
tions for more lay participation in criminal judicial proceedings in Japan.  See 
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place for discussions of procedural nuances and settlement con-
ferences.  The New Code seeks to avoid this problem by institu-
tionalizing a new procedural device called the “Preparatory Pro-
ceeding for Oral Argument,”119 where the court, parties, and in-
vited persons with an interest in the matter can meet outside 
the public glare and discuss both the issues and the potential 
settlement of the case.120  This procedural device was not actu-
ally created by the New Code but had been used on an experi-
mental basis in some courts prior to adoption of the New 
Code.121  However, the New Code does provide a lawful basis for 
this procedure.122  In practice, the Japanese pre-trial procedure 
appears to work as follows: first, the plaintiff files its case in 
court; second, the court conducts a first public Preliminary Oral 
Hearing;123 and, third, the court follows up this Preliminary 
Oral Hearing with a more informal proceeding to try to better 
define the issues and the evidence necessary to resolve the is-
sues in the case.124  
  
Public Weight to Balance Scales of Justice, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, June 4, 2003 
(public participation will “raise the public’s understanding of judicial proce-
dures and their confidence in justice”), available at http://japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20030604 b6.htm. 
 119. Kojima, supra note 15, at 690. 
 120. See MINSOHŌ, arts. 168–74 (setting out the procedures for the “Prepara-
tory Proceeding” for oral argument).  
 121. Miki, supra note 85, at 4–5.  A Preparatory Procedure prior to the for-
mal trial was common in pre World War II civil procedure.  See Kohji Tanabe, 
The Processes of Litigation: An Experiment with the Adversary System, in 
TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 507 (“under the prewar 
code, after an action was commenced by filing a complaint, the judge either 
conducted ‘preparatory procedure’…usually of several hearings, or one or sev-
eral sessions of ‘formal oral proceedings’…preliminary in nature.  In these, he 
attempted to fix the issues of fact and law.…”). 
 122. See Ota, supra note 9, at 570.  Professor Ota notes: 
As a way to legally authorize the new procedure, the New Code intro-
duced the “oral argument preparation procedure” and abolished the 
preparation proceeding.  The oral argument procedure is open to peo-
ple with interests.  The Benron-ken-Wakai was basically a settlement 
procedure with a color of oral argument, while the new oral argument 
preparation procedure is structured as a preparation procedure with 
a color of oral argument.  Under this scheme, the most important fac-
tor (settlement negotiation) retreats behind a facade. 
Id. 
 123. MINSOHŌ, arts. 164–67. 
 124. Kojima, supra note 15, at 705. 
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These informal or Preparatory Proceedings for Oral Argu-
ment may be held in an informal setting with a roundtable at 
which all participants are at the same level.125  Counsel from a 
distant location may appear by telephone and in some cases 
may even appear by video.126  At these proceedings, the court 
may suggest, after hearing the views and concerns of the coun-
sel for the parties, the production of documents or the response 
to inquiries, and will attempt to expedite the case by narrowing 
the issues to be tried and the witnesses and documents neces-
sary for trial.127  At some point, settlement discussions may be 
broached.  The end result of such informal sessions (if settle-
ment is not achieved) will be a kind of pre-trial order prepared 
by the court, which provides a road map for the trial itself.128  
Unlike U.S. pre-trial orders, the Japanese roadmap does not 
have any preclusive effect and the parties may attempt (and 
probably would be successful in such attempt) to introduce new 
or different issues and facts at the actual trial or Oral Proceed-
ing.129  Prior to the preparation of such an order, a Japanese 
  
 125. Even in a “closed” (non-public) proceeding, the court may permit par-
ties, persons invited by parties, or others to attend these closed sessions.  
Miki, supra note 85, at 5.  
 126. Interview with Judicial Secretariat at the Supreme Court of Japan (on 
file with author).  The Supreme Court of Japan Judicial Secretariat (the 
branch of the Court responsible for administration of the Justice System) has 
openly accepted new technology.  The Court has also worked hard to introduce 
such technology into judicial proceedings both to speed up the process of liti-
gation and to enable litigants and bengoshi located far from the courthouse to 
participate without undo cost in both time and money.  A lawyer in Sapporo 
noted that as a result of the use of telephone and video meetings facilities, he 
did not have to make the long trip to Tokyo to handle many matters that did 
not require a personal appearance in the court.  Interview with lawyer (C) in 
Sapporo, Hokkaido (on file with author).  
 127. Kojima, supra note 15, at 705–06. 
 128. Miki, supra note 85, at 6.  Article 173 of the Japanese Code of Civil 
Procedure requires that the parties state the results of the preparatory pro-
ceedings in oral argument.  MINSOHŌ, art. 173.  Oral argument is a public 
proceeding and hence the results must be stated in a public proceeding.  Id. 
 129. Under Article 157 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, the court 
has (and had) the power to preclude a party from introducing evidence and 
arguments not addressed at the proper time.  MINSOHŌ, art. 157.  Under Arti-
cle 167, a party wishing to introduce facts or arguments not disclosed at the 
preparatory proceeding must advise the other party of the reason that such 
facts or arguments were not originally disclosed.  MINSOHŌ, art. 167.  Due to 
the paternalistic attitude of Japanese judges and the view that the appropri-
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court may attempt to bring about a settlement of the case as 
part of the informal discussion.130  If settlement is not achieved 
during the Preparatory Proceeding for Oral Argument stage, 
the court will announce, in open court, the results of the proce-
dural issues (the defining and limiting of evidence), thus pre-
serving the fiction of public hearings.131  
After such informal procedures and the “pre-trial” order, the 
formal procedures called the “Oral Hearings” begin.132  These 
formal procedures involve the receipt of evidence, and if the 
court deems necessary, the taking of testimony as well.133  In 
complicated cases involving two or more witnesses, the court 
will typically utilize the new “consolidated” hearing method in 
which testimony is consolidated so that the examination and 
cross-examination of a single witness is completed on the same 
day and in which all witnesses are heard on the same day or 
within a short time of each other.134  This procedure is substan-
tially different from the old Japanese court procedure where 
witness testimony — even the testimony of a single witness — 
could be spaced over months and even years.135  To aid parties 
and attorneys located far from the courthouse, Japanese courts 
may now utilize video systems to take oral testimony; such a 
  
ate party is supposed to win, it is unlikely that preclusion would be ordered 
except in extraordinary situations evidencing bad faith.  Id. arts. 157 & 167.  
See also Miki, supra note 85, at 17 (“Japanese Judges are already equipped 
with a power which allows them to dismiss allegations and evidence produced 
after appropriate stage of procedure has passed, under the existing Article 
157(1), although they are extremely reluctant to exercise this power.”).  But 
see Tanabe, supra note 121, at 514, 520. 
 130. Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 771. 
 131. See MINSOHŌ, art. 173. 
 132. A lawyer in Tokyo described the “public trial” aspects of the new proce-
dure as follows: One or two public hearings; then a non-public preparatory 
hearing with parties (this non-public hearing stage can last several months 
and seeks to narrow the issues; at this stage, documents are presented and all 
issues are discussed); the court then prepares a statement describing the is-
sues to be tried; the case is finally tried in a public procedure.  Interview with 
lawyer (S) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with author). 
 133. See Kojima, supra note 15, at 706. 
 134. See Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 773. 
 135. See id. 
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system is even connected to medical facilities in order to enable 
those who are ill to testify.136  
At the conclusion of the Oral Proceedings (the trial’s conclu-
sion) the court announces the date when it will issue its deci-
sion.137  Japanese courts issue these decisions in public, open-
court proceedings.  Prior to preparing and issuing the final deci-
sion, the court may advise the parties of its imminent holding in 
an effort to obtain a settlement.138  
A. The Pace of Dispositions 
As one of the primary aims of the New Code was to speed up 
the civil litigation process, the first issue considered in the 
study underlying this Article was the speed with which civil 
litigation was handled after enactment of the New Code.  
1. The Japanese District Courts139 
The average time of litigation from filing to resolution at the 
District Court level has declined.  This speedier pace appears, 
  
 136. Interview with officials of the Judicial Secretariat in Tokyo, Japan (on 
file with author).  
 137. Kojima, supra note 15, at 699. 
 138. Advantages exist for everyone in a pre-decision settlement.  From the 
plaintiff’s perspective, a settlement in which the plaintiff gets monetary dam-
ages may warrant a “discount” from the anticipated judgment, rather than 
having to face appeal and the problems of execution.  From the defendant’s 
perspective, a sufficient discount may make it worthwhile to settle and not 
continue proceedings.  From the court’s perspective, settlement means that 
the judge does not have to write an opinion, thus saving time and obviating 
the need to make a win-lose decision.  Moreover, by obviating appeal and exe-
cution proceedings, settlement frees up valuable judicial time and relieves a 
burden from an already overloaded judicial system.  Some of the lawyers in-
terviewed expressed opinions regarding the judicial system’s inclination to-
wards settlements.  A lawyer in Tokyo commented that judges strongly advo-
cate for settlements because the parties’ burdens of litigation are great, and if 
there is a compromise, judges do not have to write an opinion (even at the 
appeal stage).  Interview with lawyer (S) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with author).  
Additionally, a lawyer in Nagoya stated that settlements save judicial time at 
both the District Court and High Court level — an important factor since 
judges have no clerks and must write opinions themselves.  Interview with 
lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan (on file with author). 
 139. This section discusses cases filed at the District Court as a first level 
court.  The District Court also acts as an appellate court for cases started in 
the Summary Court. 
File: GoodmanMacro.doc Created on: 2/17/2004 5:47 PM Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:27 PM 
2004] JAPAN’S NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE 543 
at least in part, to have been achieved through the adoption of 
and utilization of the procedures contained in the New Code.140  
In this regard, practitioners were asked: “Have the new pre-
liminary procedure provisions speeded up the pace of litiga-
tion?”  Although the majority of bengoshi interviewees were of 
the view that litigation moved faster under the New Code than 
had been the case prior to amendment, most bengoshi accred-
ited the accelerated pace of litigation to the legal community’s 
change in attitude rather than to changes brought forth by the 
New Code itself.141  These interviewees specifically noted that 
the pace of litigation had already been speeded up prior to the 
New Code’s adoption.  The statistical data discussed infra, 
though, supports the view that the New Code’s procedures are 
responsible, at least in part, for the accelerated pace of deci-
sions, although the attitude of judges and lawyers, for example, 
clearly does have some impact on the quickened pace of litiga-
tion.   
The accelerated pace of litigation does not, however, appear 
to have had a positive effect on the use of litigation as a dispute 
resolution mechanism — at least at the District Court level.142 
  
 140. Miki, supra note 85, at 16–17.  Professor Miki concludes that the New 
Code has been successful in speeding up the pace of civil litigation. 
The average length of civil litigation cases has shortened over the 
past decade and currently almost 90% of civil cases at first instance 
are concluded within two years, by either judgment or settlement. 
This must be a result of not a few judges and attorneys pushing 
themselves to improve their traditional way of practice. While, as al-
ready mentioned, the embryonic movement of this change had started 
before the reform of the Code of Civil Procedure, the New Code has 
provided the movement with a firm foundation. In this aspect, the 
1996 reform has proven successful. 
Id.   
 141. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (H) in Sendai City, Japan (on file with 
author).  The interview subject noted that long before the change in the New 
Code, the Court and the Bar made efforts to accelerate the pace of litigation 
and that such efforts had been very effective.  Id.  Note that while crediting 
the Code reform with placing the speedier procedures on a “firm foundation,” 
Professor Miki also credits the attitude of judges and lawyers for the speedier 
resolution of civil cases.  Miki, supra note 85. 
 142. This Article concerns itself only with District Court litigation since 
Summary Courts limit damages available to 1,200,000 yen — and this sum is 
a new increase from the prior 900,000 yen limit.  Recommendations of the 
Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, ch. II, pt. 1, § 5(3).  Statistical evi-
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Thus, most (but not all) lawyers interviewed indicated that they 
were not suggesting litigation to clients at any higher rate than 
had been the case prior to the New Code’s adoption.  Statistical 
evidence supports the view that the New Code has not resulted 
in litigation being adopted more frequently to resolve disputes 
than was previously the case.  An analysis of statistical data 
shows that the number of new “ordinary civil cases” filed since 
the New Code came into effect is not significantly greater than 
the number of such cases filed prior to the New Code’s applica-
bility.  The data on the number of ordinary civil cases from 1996 
to 2002 exhibits the following increase:143  
  
dence shows that the new Summary Court procedures have had a positive but 
minimal effect on the use of the judicial system as a dispute resolution 
mechanism.  See generally The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 
96.  Thus, there was an increase in new cases filed in Summary Court of ap-
proximately 10%, from 276,120 cases in 1997 to 306,169 cases in 1998.  Id.  
However, the number fell back in 1999 and 2000, and the provisional data for 
2002 shows that 312,952 cases were filed in Summary Court in that year — a 
relatively small increase from 1998.  Id.  Perhaps, the soon-to-be instituted 
ability of judicial scriveners to represent parties before the Summary Court 
will make Summary Court cases less intimidating for potential litigants than 
is currently the case.  This change would further increase the use of the 
Summary Court to resolve relatively small legal damage issues. 
 143. The data shown herein is not consistent with the data used in Profes-
sor Ota’s paper.  See Ota, supra note 9, at 580.  Professor Ota’s data appears 
to show a dramatic increase in new cases between 1997 and 1998 and a con-
tinuation of this new higher rate of filings after 1998.  See id.  However, Pro-
fessor Ota’s data includes appeals filed in the District Court under a new pro-
cedure and under new data reporting procedures adopted in 1998.  When 
these cases — which do not represent new litigation filed but rather are ap-
peals of cases previously filed in the District Court — are factored out, the 
data is consistent.  The data is not exact since Professor Ota’s study includes 
filings of new administrative cases and certain other cases such as expedited 
bills and notes cases, whereas the data herein deals solely with ordinary civil 
cases.  The data reported herein is consistent with data contained in Judge 
Michiharu Hayashi’s work.  J. Michiharu Hayashi, Actual Situations and 
Problems After the New Code of Civil Procedure was Enacted in 1998, 181 
MINJIHO JOHO 2–13 (2001).  See also The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, 
supra note 96. 
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Cases From 1996-2002 
Year Number of New  
Cases Filed 
1996 142,959 
1997 146,588 
1998 152,678 
1999 150,952 
2000 156,850 
2001 155,541 
2002 153,960 (provisional date) 
 
The data makes clear that the courts are disposing of cases at 
a faster rate than before the New Code, reducing the court 
backlog; however, this reduction is at least partly due to the fact 
that new cases are not being filed at an accelerated pace to 
match the speed of dispositions.144  The data indicates that such 
a distinction does exist:145 
  
 144. The data cannot be explained away by the suggestion that raising the 
jurisdictional limit for Summary Court cases has taken away cases from the 
District Court and placed them in Summary Court.  For example, the total 
number of newly filed cases in Summary Court and District Court in 1998 was 
468,157; in 1999, 473,669; in 2000, 466,264; and in 2001, 475,000.  These sta-
tistics indicate a small increase of only 6,500 cases from 1998 through 2001 
and an increase of less than 2,000 cases from 1999 through 2001.  See The 
Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.  Yet, in this period, the 
new “small claims” one-day trial procedure was adopted.  See Ota, supra note 
9, at 570–71.  This procedure should have resulted in cases that would never 
have reached the judicial system being filed in Summary Court and, thus, 
could well account for the slight increase noted.  In fact, the number of small 
claim cases has been steadily on the rise, this is one of the great successes of 
the New Code.  Thus, the number of small claims cases beginning in 1998 
when introduced is as follows: 1998: 8,348; 1999: 10,027; 2000: 11,128; 2001: 
13,504.  See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.  If these 
cases are factored out of the total remaining cases filed in the District Court 
and Summary Court together, the statistics indicate an increase from 459,809 
in 1998 to 462, 119 in 2001, or an increase of only .5%.  Id.   
 145. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96. 
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District Court Cases 
Year Completed District 
Court Cases 
Pending District 
Court Cases 
1996 145,858 110,396 
1997 147,373 109,611 
1998 156,683 105,606 
1999 154,395 102,163 
2000 158,781 100,232 
2001 157,451 98,322 
2002 155,755 (provisional data) Unavailable 
 
Moreover, since the New Code’s adoption, the average speed 
at which cases are disposed of by the District Court has acceler-
ated at a pace much faster than was true before the New Code.  
The Judicial Secretariat’s146 data shows: 
 
Average Number of Months from  Filing Complaint to 
Disposition — District Court 
Year All Cases Filed Cases Involving Testimony of 
Two or More Witnesses 
1992 10.9 21.8 
1993 10.1 21.2 
1994 9.8 20.9 
1995 10.1 21.1 
1996 10.2 21.3 
1997 10.0 20.8 
1998 9.3 20.8 
1999 9.2 20.5 
2000 8.8 19.7 
2001 8.5 19.2 
 
As the New Code came into effect in 1998, the comparison of 
pre-1998 rates and post-1998 dispositions is appropriate.  As-
suming that 1994’s reduction is an aberration and utilizing the 
  
 146. The General Secretariat of the Supreme Court is the internal depart-
ment of the court system for judicial administration.  See Court System of 
Japan, An Overview of the Judicial System: The Supreme Court, at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/soshikie_2.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).  
See also The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96. 
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1993 and 1995 data (almost identical and bracketing the 1994 
data), it would seem that in the four years prior to the New 
Code “all cases” proceeded at a relatively stable rate of decline 
of about .1 per month or experienced virtually no change from 
1993 to the end of 1997.  However, from 1998 through 2001, the 
rate of dispositions dramatically accelerated so that a full 
month and a half decrease had been achieved.  For more com-
plicated cases the decline in the four years prior to the New 
Code was approximately .4 of a month (again excluding 1994 as 
aberrational and using 1993 figures — if 1994 were used the 
decline was only .1 month) while in the four years after adop-
tion the decline was from 20.8 months in 1997 to 19.2 months at 
the end of 2001 or a decline of 1.6 months. 
The actual figures are even more dramatic than the data’s 
sharp decline because for all cases the figures include default 
cases where the rate of decline cannot be significantly changed, 
thus providing a stable base of about two months for many 
cases.  Moreover, there is surely a minimum amount of time 
required to handle any case, which also applies to complicated 
cases that expectedly take longer than relatively easy cases.  As 
the litigation time decreases, further time limitations become 
more difficult to implement given that the judicial system still 
needs to provide litigants with procedural justice and adequate 
trial of the facts.  
These statistics squarely contradict the expressed feelings of 
bengoshi that the disposition rate under the New Code is simi-
lar to the rate before the amendments.147  Therefore, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the New Code is at least partially re-
sponsible for the accelerated rate of dispositions.  Moreover, a 
  
 147. The data set out above shows that the disposition rate post-1998 is 
much greater than the disposition rate pre-1998.  The figure of 9.3 months in 
the table above for 1998 corresponds to Professor Haley’s use of 9.3 months for 
1997.  See Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at the Problem, supra note 
68, at 134.  The one-year difference may be accounted for by the date of the 
publication involved or by having statistics reported one year after the actual 
facts.  In any event, although Professor Haley notes a correlation between 
reducing the time of litigation and an increase in litigation in the 1970s, his 
2002 article does not deal with the rate of litigation since the passage of the 
New Code.  See id.  Professor Haley’s article does confirm that there is a per-
ception in Japan that the judicial process takes too long.  See id. at 127 (“Of 
those polled, the primary reason for hesitating to bring suit were belief that a 
lawsuit would take too much time (72%) and be too expensive (67.2%)”).   
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broader statistical analysis shows that while in the 1970s the 
pace of civil litigation in Japan could be considered to proceed at 
a “snail’s pace”148 (with over 15,000 cases in 1970 pending for 
more than 3 years and over 16,000 cases pending for over three 
years in 1979), the same cannot be said today.  By the end of 
1998, the number of cases pending for more than three years 
had declined to 7,614, but by the end of 2001 the number was 
down to 4,853.149 
The problem with utilizing the average time to dispose of a 
case as a measuring device is that averages are indeed aver-
ages.  To an individual litigant the important data is how long 
the individual’s case actually took to be resolved.  And here, 
practicing lawyers who most aggressively litigated their cases 
to judgment take as long today as before the New Code.150  The 
analysis of the time taken in resolving cases by judgment bears 
the following data:151 
 
Percentage of Judgment Cases Decided  
in One and Two Years 
Year Percentage of 
Cases Decided 
After One Year 
Percentage of Cases  
Decided After Two Years 
1996 15.1 13.1 
1997 15.0 13.4 
1998 14.2 12.8 
1999 14.4 13.3 
2000 14.4 14.0 
2001 14.8 14.7 
2002 15.4 14.7 
  
 148. Lower House Approves Speedy Trial Legislation, supra note 18.  See 
generally Trial to be Expedited, supra note 18.   
 149. In the period from early 1994 to the end of 1997, the number of cases 
pending for three years or more declined from 10,074 to 8,798, a decrease of 
1,276 cases.  By the end of 2001, the number had declined to 4,853, a decrease 
of an additional 3,945 cases, triple the earlier rate of decline.  It is reasonable 
to believe that the intervening event — the effective date of the New Code — 
had some effect on this accelerated pace of backlog disposition.  
 150. As the study’s results show, this observation especially holds true at 
least at the District Court level. 
 151. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96. 
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Thus, the percentage of litigated cases disposed of by judg-
ment that took either one year or two years to be resolved actu-
ally increased in 2002.  Nevertheless, the disposal of litigation 
brought to judgment in one or two years is hardly a “snail’s 
pace,” and may be viewed as quite fast, especially if complicated 
cases are involved. 
2. Appeals In Japan — The High Court and Supreme Court 
Appeals from District Court dispositions (when acting as a 
court of first instance) may be taken to the High Court.152  From 
a time perspective, a plaintiff’s main concern, when seeking re-
lief, is when their case, in its entirety, will be completed — not 
simply when the court of first instance will complete its consid-
eration of the case.153  Thus, it is relevant to consider the pace of 
litigation at the appellate level under the New Code.  This is 
especially relevant for Japan because, unlike in the U.S. where 
appeals are taken “on the record” of the lower court’s or trial 
court’s proceedings, in Japan it is possible to introduce new evi-
dence and even new theories in the High Court.154  One purpose 
of the New Code was to limit the use of the High Court proce-
dure as simply an extension of the trial, and indeed not just as 
an extension but practically a new trial with new issues and 
new witnesses.155  Thus, part of the function of the District 
Court’s new preliminary procedure was to finally determine the 
issues in a matter, rather than leave the relevant issues open at 
both the trial and appeals level.156  The statistical evidence sup-
ports the view that, in at least this regard, the New Code has 
had a great deal of success — not in eliminating all the de novo 
trial aspects of appeal but in substantially reducing the use of 
the High Court as a new trial court.  The following data shows 
  
 152. See MINSOHŌ,  art. 281. 
 153. See, e.g., Ota, supra note 9, at 571 (discussing the use of a special pro-
cedure in order to resolve minor issues in one day). 
 154. Under Article 297 of the Japanese Civil Procedure Code, the provisions 
of Chapters one through six of the Code (governing such things as introduc-
tion of evidence, trial, oral argument proceedings, etc.) are applicable to ap-
peals.  MINSOHŌ, art. 297.  
 155. See Ota, supra note 9, at 572. 
 156. To carry out this function, Article 298 of the Japanese Civil Procedure 
Code specifically makes Article 167 applicable to appeals.  MINSOHŌ, art. 298.  
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the steady decline of de novo matters on appeal in Japanese 
courts:157  
 
Percentage of Cases Where the High Court Received 
New Evidence  
in Normal Civil Cases on Appeal158 
 
Year Third  
Person  
Witness 
Party  
Witness 
Court 
Expert 
Other 
 
1996 19.0 18.0 1.4 0.6 
1997 16.3 15.8 1.4 0.4 
1998 15.4 14.9 1.4 0.4 
1999 13.8 12.6 1.3 0.3 
2000 11.4 9.7 1.2 0.3 
2001 10.0 9.7 0.9 0.2 
 
Percentage of Cases Where the High Court Received  
New Evidence in Administrative Cases 
 
Year Third Person 
Witness 
Party 
Witness 
Court 
Expert 
Other 
 
1996 19.4 10.1 — 0.9 
1997 25.5 10.6 0.2 0.5 
1998 16.1 7.2 — 2.0 
1999 15.6 5.1 0.4 — 
2000 10.0 3.6 0.4 0.1 
2001 13.7 3.2 0.5 0.5 
 
In addition, the time taken to handle appeals at the High 
Court level has also declined:159 
  
 157. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96. 
 158. A similar pattern exists where the District Court sits as an Appellate 
Court for Summary Court cases.  Here, the witnesses (both party and third 
persons) per one hundred cases at the District Court and appeal level are as 
follows: (1996:37); (1997:34.5); (1998:27.4); (1999:26.9); (2000:26.1); and 
(2001:20.2).  See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.  
 159. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.  
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Average Disposition Time (Months)  
at District Court and High Court 
 
Year District Court High Court 
1992 10.9 11.3 
1993 10.1 11.2 
1994 9.8 10.9 
1995 10.1 10.6 
1996 10.2 9.9 
1997 10.0 9.9 
1998 9.3 9.8 
1999 9.2 9.0 
2000 8.8 8.4 
2001 8.5 7.9 
 
Of course, litigants do not appeal all cases to the High Court.  
Nevertheless, the virtuous potential plaintiff can realistically 
expect, on average, that their case will be decided on average in 
16.4 months (using 2001 figures) from filing with the District 
Court even if the case is appealed.  This time frame is far more 
satisfying than the average 19.9 months prior to the New 
Code’s applicability.  
However, as in the case of judgments in the District Court, 
the problem with averages remains.  Thus, it is worthwhile to 
explore the percentage of judgment cases taking one or two or 
even three years to resolve after appeal has been filed.  In such 
circumstances, although a litigant may find the percentages 
comforting, the absolute numbers remain relatively high — this 
difference is accounted for by the increased number of High 
Court appeals filed in 2002, for example, in comparison to 1997, 
the last pre-New Code year.  The statistics expose this distinc-
tion:160 
  
 160. See id.  
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Judgment Cases Appealed to High Court 
Number and Percentage of Cases Resolved in One, Two 
and Three Years 
 
Year Total 
Cases 
Appealed 
One Year 
(Number/ 
Percent) 
Two Years 
(Number/ 
Percent) 
Three Years 
(Number/ 
Percent) 
1996 8259 3402/41.2 1764/21.4 304/3.7 
1997 8588 3554/41.4 1743/20.3 344/4.0 
1998 9024 3531/39.1 1784/19.7 412/4.6 
1999 9376 3338/35.6 1388/14.8 348/3.7 
2000 9812 3114/31.7 1357/13.8 314/3.2 
2001 9724 2955/30.4 1157/11.9 259/2.7 
2002 9817 2973/30.3 1043/10.6 181/1.8 
 
Thus, it appears that while the average case may be resolved 
in only 16.4 months through appeal, cases litigated to judgment 
and then appealed may take significantly longer.  However, the 
High Court has apparently significantly reduced appeal time in 
judgment cases from the pre-New Code percentages to the 2002 
projected percentages.  Of course, as the number of appeals con-
tinue to rise — from a pre-New Code total of 8588 cases ap-
pealed to a 2002 total of 9817 appeals filed — so too will the 
number of cases taking longer to resolve. 
As asserted previously, averages may not tell the entire story.  
For the potential litigant the “worst case” scenario may have 
greater impact than the average.  Since cases that take longer 
on appeal are likely to be the more difficult cases which may 
take longer at the District Court level, it is possible that such 
cases distort the potential average litigant’s view of the litiga-
tion process’ duration in general.  Accordingly data was sought 
as to how long it actually took for cases to work themselves 
from filing to judgment in the High Court.  Apparently such 
data is not currently available.  It is suggested that in the fu-
ture such data should be compiled so that a more meaningful 
analysis than the simple average can be made as to how long it 
actually takes for cases to go to judgment — at least in compli-
cated cases that are appealed.  This Article will also discuss 
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other issues surrounding complicated cases.161  For now, it is 
sufficient to note that a legal system that is perceived to be in-
capable of rendering timely relief in complicated cases is not 
likely to be seen as supporting a strong Rule of Law system 
even if the average time to resolve cases is quite reasonable or 
even low.  
Working backwards from the High Court’s 2002 provisional 
data, the public’s scrutiny of these litigation issues comes to 
light.  In 2002, the High Court decided 1043 cases that had 
been pending in the court for two years.  Accordingly, these 
cases had been decided in the District Court in the year 2000.  
In that year, the District Court decided by judgment 1,679 cases 
that had been pending for four years and an additional 1600 
cases that had been pending for five years or more.  If all 1043 
appeal cases had been pending in the District Court for four or 
five years (a distinct possibility since the longer the case pended 
in the District Court, the longer its appeal would likely take), 
then all 1043 cases had been pending for six or seven years.  
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that any of the above mentioned 
1043 High Court appeals cases decided in 2002 were decided by 
the District Court in less time than they were pending on ap-
peal.  Yet in 2000, of the 80,542 judgment cases decided, 61,454 
were decided in one year or less and approximately 70,000 of 
the judgment cases were decided in two years or less.  Of the 
cases decided in the District Court that took more than two 
years and were then appealed, it is clear that the average num-
bers distort the picture of how long it took to decide these cases. 
Perception of how long it takes to resolve a case affects the 
public ideas as to whether the judicial system is a reasonable 
place to bring legal disputes.162  The public press, of course, in-
fluences public perception.  The press, in turn, typically does 
  
 161. See infra Part III.E. 
 162. Ota, supra note 9, at 565 (noting that public frustration with the jus-
tice system leads some to use disreputable alternatives, such as yakuza (or-
ganized crime) or sokaiya (extortion), to resolve disputes).  See id.  See also 
Docs Who Removed Wombs from Healthy Women Lose Appeal, MAINICHI DAILY 
NEWS, May 29, 2003 (noting that the appeal filed by several doctors in a suit 
initiated in 1980s by several women who had their uterus and ovaries re-
moved in a medical scam to overcharge the national medical insurance pro-
gram was denied and the doctors were ordered to pay 510 million yen in dam-
ages), available at http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/archive/200305/29/index.ht 
ml. 
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not report on “average” cases.  Rather, reported cases tend to be 
either more complicated or cases that are perceived to be note-
worthy.163  It is precisely these cases that are likely to take 
longer at both the District and High Court levels.  These high 
profile cases do, in fact, move at a “snail’s pace” in many in-
stances.164 Moreover, the press rarely distinguishes between 
  
 163. See, e.g., Highway Boss Eyes Court Battle, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Oct. 
18, 2003, available at http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/archive/200310/18/20031 
018p2a00m0dm023000c.html. 
 164. At the time this Article’s underlying research was conducted in Japan, 
the Japan Times reported that the Tokyo Police had lost (at the District Court 
level) a significant HIV employment discrimination case.  Tokyo Loses Law-
suit Over Illegal HIV Test, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, May 30, 2003, available at 
http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getarticle.p15?nn20030530a8.htm. The  
Japan Times reported that the unlawful act (as found by the Court) — com-
pelling the HIV applicant to withdraw his application for employment — oc-
curred in July 1998, almost five years before the decision.  Id.  The article 
reported that the police intend to appeal.  Id.  If an appeal is filed, it is 
unlikely that a decision will be rendered earlier than six or seven years from 
the filing of the case.  Whether an appeal to the Supreme Court would be 
taken remains to be seen.  From a U.S. legal perspective, the case appears (at 
least from the news report) to be uncomplicated.  The fact issues are relatively 
simple — did the authorities perform an HIV test and did they then compel 
the plaintiff to withdraw his application upon discovering he was HIV posi-
tive?  In fact, soon after the decision, the Metropolitan Police announced that 
they would postpone a previously scheduled weekend of HIV tests for new 
recruits.  MPD Agree to Ditch HIV Tests for Recruits, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 
June 6, 2003, available at http://www12.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/search-
news/892127/HIV20tests-0-2.html.  Thus, it appears that there was no serious 
factual question as to whether the test was performed.  Id.  The legal ques-
tion, while interesting and perhaps even novel, is not “difficult” in the sense 
that it does not require a great deal of time for research and debate, etc.  Simi-
larly, just two days later, the Japan Times reported that the Osaka High 
Court had reversed a District Court decision in a case seeking damages for a 
vessel sinking in 1945, which contained South Korean laborers who were re-
turning to Korea after the war.  South Koreans Appeal Ship Case, JAPAN 
TIMES ONLINE, June 14, 2003, available at http://japantimes.com/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?n20030614 a9.htm.  The case had been pending in the Dis-
trict Court for nine years and the appeal was pending for almost two years, 
totaling eleven years.  Id.  Almost half of the plaintiffs died while the case was 
pending, and the matter is not yet resolved as the plaintiffs have appealed to 
the Supreme Court which will likely take additional years during which addi-
tional plaintiffs will likely pass away.  Id.  The likelihood is that these cases 
reported in the English language press were also extensively reported on in 
the Japanese language press.    
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civil and criminal cases.165  Many high profile criminal cases 
truly move at a “snail’s pace” — such as the Sarin poisoning 
cases.166  When the media lumps criminal cases with civil cases 
and the high profile civil cases move slowly, the public percep-
tion is likely to be that the resolution of all civil cases linger in 
the court system as well.167  
In any event, the question must be asked why any appeal at 
the High Court takes two or more years to be resolved.  Since, 
the District Court has tried all of these cases on appeal already, 
  
 165. See, e.g., Crippled Car Racer Wins Massive Payout, MAINICHI DAILY 
NEWS, Oct. 29, 2003 (reporting that a race car driver severely injured five 
years ago won a 90 million yen award against race organizers, whom he 
blamed for the injuries he sustained in the crash), available at http://www 
12.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/searchnews/896962/Crippled20Car2Racer20Wins
20Massive20Payout-0-1.html; Nary a Whimper; Guru’s Trial Ends, ASAHI 
SHINBUN, Nov. 1, 2003 (the founder of Aum Shinrikyo made no statement at 
the conclusion of his seven-year trial for murder and assault that is likely to 
result in a death sentence), available at http://www.asahi.com/english/na-
tion/TKY200311010151.html. 
 166. Lower House Approves Speedy Trial Legislation, supra note 18; Hiroshi 
Matsubara, Speedier Trials, Limited Jury System; Public Weight to Balance 
Scales of Justice?, JAPAN TIMES, June 4, 2003, available at http://japantimes. 
com.Jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.p15?nn20030604b6.htm.  The sarin cases refer to two 
incidents in which sarin gas was purposefully released to kill opponents of the 
Aum Shinrikyo cult or to cause massive panic.  Aum Doctor Ordered to Die in 
Sarin Cases, ASAHI SHINBUN, Oct. 30, 2003, available at http://www.asahi. 
com/english/nation/TKY200310300125.html.  In June 1994, cult members 
killed seven and made approximately 140 people sick in the Nagano Prefec-
ture.  Id.  In March 1995, cultists released sarin in the Tokyo subway system, 
killing twelve and making almost 3800 sick.  See id.  See also Nary a Whim-
per; Guru’s Trial Ends, supra note 165.   
 167. Although the judicial branch has been successful in reducing both the 
absolute number and percentage of cases pending for more than three years 
and for each category (four years, five years, ten years and over ten years) of 
pending cases, the fact remains that as of the end of 2000, there were 2,845 
cases pending for five years or longer.  See The Japanese Court System’s Sta-
tistics, supra note 96.  While this represents a scant 2.8% of all cases, this 
2.8% is likely to be picked up by the popular press and thus impressed on the 
minds of the public.  In addition to actually reducing time to decide cases, both 
the judicial system and the practicing Bar may require greater public aware-
ness of the improvements that have been made in the time it takes to bring a 
case to resolution in the District Court.  See also Haley, Litigation in Japan: A 
New Look at the Problem, supra note 68, at 127 (discussing how the litigating 
public in Japan responded to questions concerning their perception of the time 
it took to resolve litigation in Japan and how 72% of the people polled believed 
that litigation took too long to resolve). 
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and the Japanese legislature specifically designed the New 
Code in part to assure that all issues would be identified in 
these trials’ early stages, there should be nothing to “try” at the 
High Court level.   Therefore, the High Court cases should theo-
retically resolve cases in a shorter time frame.168  However, the 
fact that over 1,000 cases in 2002 took two years or more for a 
High Court decision indicates that the New Code’s reforms may 
not yet be been fully realized at the High Court level.169 
Because the New Code reduced the types of cases that can be 
appealed to the Supreme Court,170 it was hoped that most cases 
would end at the High Court level.  Although the Supreme 
Court appears to be controlling its certiorari docket by denying 
certiorari in most cases filed, the fact remains that cases filed in 
the Supreme Court have been rising since adoption of the New 
Code.171  Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court’s narrow and limited 
caseload, Japan’s Supreme Court appears to be accepting more 
certiorari cases each year.172  The available statistics show that 
the total number of cases in which certiorari, appeal, or both 
were sought has been rising since the New Code’s adoption and, 
  
 168. See, e.g., Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 778–79. 
 169. See Certiorari 1997-2001 Chart. 
 170. Article 312 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure limits appeal as of 
right.  MINSOHŌ, art. 312.  However, Article 312 also contains a broadly 
worded catch-all provision generally allowing appeals when the judgment 
appealed from omits the reasons for the decision or the reasons are inconsis-
tent.  Article 318 gives the Supreme Court a certiorari type jurisdiction, allow-
ing the Court to accept appeals at its discretion.  Id. at art. 318.  
 171. See Ota, supra note 9, at 579–80.  See also Certiorari 1997-2001 Chart. 
 172. In Japan, determining whether the Supreme Court has the ability to 
control its own docket is difficult because “appeal of right” cases still exist and 
statistics concerning Supreme Court judgments do not distinguish between 
meritorious appeals and those dismissed for improper filing.  See MINSOHŌ, 
art. 312 & 318.  The Code permits the filing of a “jokoku appeal” with the Su-
preme Court for “jurisdictional reasons,” namely that the composition of the 
deciding court was improper, one of its members was ineligible to participate 
in the proceedings, or jurisdiction properly resided exclusively elsewhere.  Id.  
Jokuku appeals are also granted for other reasons, such as a defect in repre-
sentation, an improper denial of an oral argument, or where there is a judicial 
defect in reasoning, either because the court failed to give its rationale or did 
so inconsistently.  Id.  Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which distinguishes 
between a dismissal and a determination under denial of “certiorari,” dismiss-
als of improperly filed claims in the Japanese courts are counted as judg-
ments, making it difficult to determine whether appeals are determined on 
their merits or on procedure.  Id. 
File: GoodmanMacro.doc Created on: 2/17/2004 5:47 PM Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:27 PM 
2004] JAPAN’S NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE 557 
further, that Japan’s Supreme Court is accepting more certio-
rari cases each year.173   
The statistical table below sets out the disposition rate of civil 
cases in which litigants sought either appeal or certiorari and 
the disposition of such cases from 1997 (immediately before the 
Code went into effect) through 2001:174   
 
Certiori 1997-2001 Chart 
Filed Cases Location of Termination of 
Decision 
Year 
Appeal 
Cert. 
 
Cert. 
Granted 
Appeal 
Granted 
Cert. 
Denied 
Cert. 
1997 2,741 — — 3,062 — — 
1998 2,542 768 1 3,040 370 0 
1999 2,160 1,770 12 2,389 1,528 11 
2000 2,418 2,106 26 2,410 1,820 19 
2001 2,323 2,314 53 2,298 2,089 40 
       
As the table above shows, it seems clear that attorneys are 
filing more certiorari cases each year.  While the Supreme 
Court is denying more of these petitions, it is also accepting 
more cases each year.  Similarly, bengoshi are seeking certiorari 
and filing appeals in more and more criminal cases each year.  
Thus, the number of cases in which litigants have sought Su-
preme Court review has increased from 4,086 in 1997 to 5,277 
in 2001.  Even so, the average number of months that a case is 
pending in the Supreme Court has been steadily falling since 
the effective date of the New Code:175 
  
 173. See  Certiorari 1997-2001 Chart. 
 174. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.  
 175. Id.  
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Disposition of Civil Cases in the  
Supreme Court — Number of Months 
Year Average Number of Months 
Pending 
1992 7.6 
1993 9.3 
1994 7.7 
1995 7.0 
1996 8.7 
1997 9.5 
1998 8.1 
1999 6.6 
2000 5.4 
2001 5.3 
 
Here again, average statistics can be misleading as cases in 
which the Supreme Court denied certiorari should also be re-
solved relatively quickly, whereas some cases in the Supreme 
Court have been pending for several years.  Adding a case’s du-
ration in the Supreme Court, High Court and to the District 
Court creates a distorted picture of Japan’s entire judicial sys-
tem.  This distortion can, in turn, effect the public’s perception 
of whether they can obtain timely justice from the nation’s judi-
cial system.  As a result, the public’s support for the judicial 
system may waver even more significantly and also lead to a 
diminution in support for the Rule of Law in general.  With this 
in mind, the judicial system may wish to explore the question of 
how it can gain greater control over the appeal (as distin-
guished from the certiorari process) and whether further legis-
lation limiting appeals to the Supreme Court and limiting evi-
dentiary proceedings at the High Court are warranted.176  
  
 176. Justice O’Connor’s observation concerning the experience of the U.S. 
Supreme Court may be instructional.  Justice O’Connor writes:  
When I arrived at the Court in 1981 we received about 4,000 applica-
tions a year to review particular lower-court decisions, but we ac-
cepted and decided with full opinion only about 150 a year. Recently, 
the Court has been receiving about 7,000 petitions a year and has 
been accepting fewer than 100. The number of petitions granted de-
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3. Summary of Findings 
It is generally agreed that the pace at which cases are dis-
posed of in Japan, either by judgment, settlement or otherwise, 
has accelerated.177  Whether this change is due to the New Code 
or to the altered procedures devised and put into practice prior 
to the New Code’s adoption is debated, but hardly relevant.  
Whether “invented” or simply adopted by the New Code, the 
fact remains that the new practices have quickened the pace of 
litigation in Japan.  Moreover, the judicial branch has clearly 
taken steps to reduce the trial disposition period.178  
Still, many high profile cases take several years at the Dis-
trict Court level to be resolved and some cases on appeal take 
even two or more years to be resolve.179  The New Code’s provi-
sions, designed to assure that all issues and evidentiary mat-
ters are discussed and thus defined or resolved “pre-trial,” (i.e., 
pre-Oral Argument), do not appear to have produced that de-
sired effect on litigation.180  It is probably the case that the new 
Preparatory Proceedings for Argument procedure has expedited 
the pre-Oral Argument stage of cases and has probably limited 
the scope of new arguments, issues, and facts brought up later 
on appeal; however, this procedure has not completely pre-
  
clined after Congress in 1988 made the Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
discretionary.  
O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 9–11. 
 177. See, e.g., Supreme Court Report Illustrates Lengthy Process of Civil 
Trial System, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, available at http://www.japantimes. 
co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20010406a8.htm. 
 178. In addition, the number of judges available to try cases at the District 
Court and High Court levels appears to have increased during the last few 
years.  Thus, the total number of judges available to handle cases — excluding 
those of the Supreme Court and the Summary Court — has gone from 2121 
judges in April of 1998 to 2296 in April of 2002, and to 2341 in April 2003.  See 
The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96 (specifically the data 
provided by the Judicial Secretariat).  This increase in the number of judges 
available to try cases has also undoubtedly had a positive effect on the speed 
with which cases are resolved.  It is anticipated that the number of judges in 
Japan will continue to increase as the new reforms take effect, increasing the 
number of bengoshi to approximately 3,000.  See Recommendations of the Ju-
dicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch. III, pt. 1(1).   
 179. See, e.g., Docs Who Removed Wombs from Healthy Women Lose Appeal, 
supra note 162 (noting the final appeal in this case began in 1999 and was not 
concluded until May 2003). 
 180. See, e.g., Ota, supra note 9, at 568–70. 
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vented new issues from being raised at a case’s Oral Argument 
stage before the District Court, and it has not obviated new ar-
guments, new issues and new evidence at the High Court ap-
peal level.181  This problem may be due to the fact that the New 
Code does not contain a “preclusion order” procedure.  In addi-
tion, the “paternalistic” judiciary’s general unwillingness to re-
ject new arguments and evidence also hinders procedural pro-
gress, albeit substantively more thorough.182  
4. The Failure of the Average Accelerated Pace of Dispositions 
to Lead to an Increased Use of the Judicial System 
The speed of average dispositions at the District Court level 
has not been without some potential damaging effects on litiga-
tion as a dispute resolution mechanism.  Thus, speed, while 
useful in making litigation a reasonable method of resolving a 
dispute in a timely fashion, may negatively effect how potential 
and actual litigants view Japan’s judicial system.  To the extent 
that litigants feel that they have not received an adequate hear-
ing from the Japanese court system, its utility as an upholder of 
the Rule of Law concept is damaged.183  Doubts about a hear-
ing’s adequacy may be raised when litigants feel that the sys-
tem operates so quickly that they have been denied a fair oppor-
tunity to present their side of the issue.  In addition, the proce-
dures used to promote speed may raise questions as to the ade-
quacy of the process to render what is perceived to be a “just” 
decision.  In this connection, statistical data concerning use of 
witnesses in cases is consistent with the views expressed by 
bengoshi interviewees that judges do not permit party or third 
person witness testimony as frequently as they did a decade 
  
 181. Id. at 576–77. 
 182. See generally Miki, supra note 85.  Masako Kamiya, Narrowing the 
Avenues to Japan’s Supreme Court: The Policy Implications of Japan’s Code of 
Civil Procedure Reforms, 4 AUSTRALIAN J. OF ASIAN L. 53, 56, 70 (2002) (noting 
that Japanese courts tend to have a paternalistic attitude) (on file with au-
thor). 
 183. See, e.g., Press Release, Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Not 
“Speedy Trials Bill,” but “Fair and Speedy Trials Bill” (Nov. 19, 2002) (public 
survey showed that only 18.6% of respondents were satisfied with the current 
civil trial system), at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/activities/meetings/200 
21119.html.  
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ago.184  Some bengoshi expressed the view that when judges do 
not permit witness testimony and rely on written materials 
rather than oral testimony, they either actually deny litigants 
an adequate opportunity to present their, or the parties per-
ceive the system as denying them their “day in court.”185  
This perception issue is significant to a Rule of Law analysis 
and has particular importance in Japan where judges serve as 
the gatekeepers to evidentiary hearings.186  Judges ultimately 
determine whether or not witnesses, including party witnesses, 
will testify.187  Therefore, litigants’ perceptions of an unfair or 
  
 184. See, e.g., Interview with trial lawyer (H) in Sendai, Japan (on file with 
author) (noting that as early as ten years ago, the court permitted witnesses 
to testify but that today such witness testimony is not freely permitted). 
 185. Some bengoshi noted that this reliance on written material also denied 
them the right of cross-examination, thus creating procedural due process 
issues.  Under Rule 113 of the Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure, the order for 
taking witness testimony is direct examination, followed by cross-examination 
and the redirect.  MINJI SOSH-O KISOKU, art. 113, para. 1.  The Rule also per-
mits examination by the court.  Id.  See also MINSOHŌ, art. 202 (setting the 
order of examination as the offering party first, followed by the opposing 
party, and then the court with judicial discretion to alter the order).  
 186. Although this paper is limited to civil non-administrative cases, it 
should be noted that Japanese judges are also gatekeepers in criminal cases.  
It has been reported that a Japanese District Court sentenced a British de-
fendant to fourteen years in prison for illegal importation of drugs after a trial 
in which the defense was that the defendant was duped by a traveling com-
panion and was unaware that he was carrying drugs.  Apparently, after being 
released from Japanese custody, the traveling companion was later arrested 
in Belgium for duping others to carry drugs.  The defendant sought the assis-
tance of the Japanese judge in obtaining records from a European court dis-
closing this duping incident, but the District Court as gatekeeper refused to 
assist.  Court Defies Outcry in Drug Case: Briton Handed 14-year Sentence, 
JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, June 13, 2003, available at http://www.japantimes.com/ 
cgi-bin/getarticle.p15?nn20030613a4.htm.  The judge rejected efforts by the 
defense “to enter evidence from a Belgium court, where [defendant’s] travel 
companion [was] on trial for smuggling drugs under similar circumstances.”  
Jake Adelstein, Drug Trial Highlights Gap Between UK-Japan Criminal Pro-
cedures, YOMIURI SHINBUN, July 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 5138432.  
 187. See, e.g., MINSOHŌ, art. 207 (stating that courts require written sum-
maries of proposed testimony, including the matters to be examined, prior to 
determining whether to permit such oral testimony).  See also id. art. 181 
(noting that the court has the authority to refuse to examine evidence offered 
by a party if the court finds such examination unnecessary); id. art. 205 (stat-
ing that the court has discretion, except when parties object, to require a wit-
ness to produce a document instead of giving oral testimony).  But see Inter-
view with lawyer (B) in Kyoto, Japan (on file with author) (noting that as a 
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inadequate judicial system reflect badly on both the court sys-
tem and its judges.   If wide spread, such a perception can de-
crease the reputation of the Japanese judicial system as a 
means for obtaining relief and thus can damage the use of the 
courts as a means for carrying out the Rule of Law.  The statis-
tical data below shows the number of witnesses allowed to tes-
tify at the District Court level.188 
 
Witnesses at the 
District Court Level (First Instance)189 
 
Year Third Person 
Witnesses 
Party Witnesses 
1996 38.0 48.7 
1997 35.0 44.5 
1998 32.3 41.6 
1999 30.4 42.3 
2000 29.3 39.4 
2001 28.0 37.9 
  
result of the hierarchical structure of the legal system, as well as the power of 
the judge as ultimate decision-maker, party objections are unlikely to be suc-
cessful if a judge requests a document in lieu of oral testimony); Interview 
with lawyer (B) in Kyoto, Japan (on file with author) (noting that while par-
ties bring in witnesses, the number of witnesses, as well as the number of 
witnesses actually testifying, is determined by the court, and as there are too 
few judges, they often do not have enough time to hear oral testimony).  In the 
U.S., however, courts cannot accept a proffer of proof in place of testimony, 
although they may prohibit testimony that is cumulative or in violation of the 
Rules of Evidence.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 
579 (1993); Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (finding that U.S. 
judges serve as gatekeepers where expert testimony is proposed and a party 
objects on the grounds that the testimony is not based on generally accepted 
scientific or otherwise applicable professional opinion).  See also FED. R. EVID. 
702.    
 188. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.  
 189. Excluded from this table are District Court cases where the court acts 
as an appeals court for Summary Court cases.  In these cases, the number of 
witnesses per 100 cases has declined at an even faster rate.  Thus, third per-
son witnesses have declined from 16.1 per 100 cases in 1996 to 15.0 in 1997; 
11.7 in 1998; 10.4 in 1999; 10.3 in 2000; and 7.2 in 2001.  The number of party 
witnesses has similarly declined in such appeal cases from 20.9 in 1996 to 
19.5 in 1997; to 15.7 in 1998; to 16.5 in 1999; to 15.8 in 2000; and to 13.0 in 
2001.  The decline in witness testimony at the appeals level is consistent with 
the intent of the New Code to make the initial court the trial court and to 
reduce “new trial” at the appeal level.  
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Although the above data slightly differs from the data set out 
in Professor Ota’s 2001 study, both data compilations disclose 
that the District Courts are handling witness testimony more 
quickly than in the past.  The number of cases involving wit-
ness testimony has declined, as has the number of witnesses 
per one hundred cases.  Thus, in 2001, there were a total of only 
sixty-six witnesses (including both third person witnesses and 
party witnesses) per one hundred cases or less than one witness 
per case.  Since less than a witness cannot testify, this means 
that there were no witnesses in at least one-third of the cases.190  
As some cases clearly involved testimony from two or more wit-
nesses, the numerical assessment above displays that the per-
centage of cases with no witness testimony exceeded one-third.  
The significance of limiting the use of witnesses may be high-
lighted by the realization that surely the complaining party has 
a story to tell and, having taken the bold step of initiating liti-
gation so as to elaborate, the plaintiff probably wants to convey 
their account directly to the case’s decision-maker.191  Further, 
in many cases, the defending party would also equally like to 
explain their side of the dispute to the decision-maker.  If the 
parties alone were to appear as witnesses, a case would require 
the minimum of two witnesses — the plaintiff and the defen-
dant.  However, in Japan, cases involving two witnesses are 
viewed as “complicated” and are unusual.192  For this reason, a 
losing party in Japan who wished to testify but was not permit-
ted to in their case will find the case’s decision as unjust and 
will consider the Japanese court system as unfair.  
Research suggests that while Japanese litigants prefer the 
adversary system to an inquisition system, “Japanese subjects 
appear uncomfortable with presenting their views in a confron-
  
 190. A bengoshi interviewed in Saitama (just outside Tokyo) stated in his 
interview that the one change he would make in civil procedure would be to 
permit more live witness testimony.  Interview with bengoshi (E) in Saitama, 
Japan (on file with author). 
 191. See, e.g., Interview with trial lawyer (H) in Sendai, Japan (on file with 
author) (noting that his clients wanted the chance to speak directly to the 
court and that this practice was not permitted as freely as in the past).  
 192. Cf. Supreme Court Report Illustrates Lengthy Process of Civil Trial 
System, supra note 177 (making special reference to trials that include the use 
of witnesses (i.e., 25% of all trials), and the change in length from 1991 to 
2001). 
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tation with the opposing party.”193  Thus, Japanese litigants ar-
guably do not wish to testify.  While dealing with the abstract 
issue of a Japanese litigant’s preference to avoid confrontation, 
this research does not address the question of how a losing liti-
gant views the fact that they could not testify.194  Here, the re-
sults could be different as losing parties may resent such testi-
mony procedures, despite any theoretical preconceptions of ap-
parent fairness.195  To complicate matters further, the failure to 
take witness testimony extends beyond mere refusal to hear the 
parties themselves. 
Indeed, the facts prove even starker than the above supposi-
tion.  Figures kept by the Supreme Court Secretariat show that 
the percentage of cases in which no witnesses testified in-
creased, from an already high percentage of 80.9% in 1996 to 
83.2% in 1998, the year the New Code went into effect, and has 
continued to steadily rise:196 
 
Year Percentage of Cases with No Witnesses 
 
1998 83.2 
1999 84.3 
2000 85.0 
2001 85.5 
2002 86.4 (provisional data) 
  
 193. Yoshiyuki Matsumura, Procedural Justice in Dispute Resolution — 
Japan and the West (June 26–29, 1991) (paper prepared for the Annual Meet-
ing of the Law and Society Association, University of Amsterdam) (on file with 
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  
 194. Interview with bengoshi (C) in Sapporo, Japan (on file with author). 
 195. Professor Matsumura’s study used students as questionnaire subjects.  
See Matsumura, supra note 193.  While the study showed that, in the ab-
stract, the subjects preferred not to present their views in confrontational 
situations, the study did not deal with actual parties to litigation.  Id.  Con-
sidering the Japanese aversion to litigation, a party who has filed suit may 
well hold views different from the general population, represented by the stu-
dents.  Similarly, a party who has been sued may have attitudes altered by 
the experience and, thus, may not be represented by the general population 
view.  Finally, a losing party may well have “after the event” views that differ 
from the generally held opinions of the population.  Therefore, while the study 
is useful for the purposes for which it was undertaken, it does not necessarily 
reflect the views of parties to litigation or the views that a losing party may 
pass on to others about the litigation experience.   
 196. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.  
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While it is true that in default cases there is no need for wit-
ness testimony, and the data above includes a certain percent-
age of such cases, the declining number of witnesses in non-
default cases shows that the court’s role as gatekeeper has 
steadily eroded the use of witness testimony.  Thus, in cases 
utilizing witness testimony, the number of such witnesses has 
also steadily declined — except for cases where ten or more wit-
nesses were called.197  The chart below displays this change in 
witness testimony.  
 
District Courts: Number of Witnesses and  
Percentage of Cases 
Year 1  
Witness / 
Percentage of 
Cases 
2–4  
Witnesses /
Percentage 
of Cases 
5–9  
Witnesses / 
Percentage 
of Cases 
10+  
Witnesses/ 
Percentage 
of Cases 
1996 14,564 / 10.0% 11,647 / 8.0% 1,424 / 1.0% 172 / 0.1% 
1997 13,933 / 9.5% 11,717 / 8.0% 1,263 / 0.9% 63 / — 
1998 13,570 / 8.7% 11,340 / 7.2% 1,288 / 0.8% 67 / — 
1999 12,437 / 8.1% 10,669 / 6.9% 1,084 / 0.7% 81 / 0.1% 
2000 11,993 / 7.6% 10,618 / 6.7% 1,150 / 0.7% 67 / — 
2001 11,597 / 7.4% 10,063 / 6.4% 1,043 / 0.7% 77 / — 
2002 10,854 / 7.0% 9,433 / 6.1% 816 / 0.5% 110 /0.1% 
  
In view of this steadily declining willingness to use witness 
testimony in civil cases, it is easy to understand why some 
bengoshi responded that the most significant change that could 
be made to Japanese Civil Procedure was for the courts to 
permit more witness testimony.  This view may also be the 
reason why some bengoshi felt that their clients did not receive 
a fair opportunity to present their case to the court.198  The 
courts’ exercise of their gatekeeper function to essentially 
dispose of witness testimony199 may have a detrimental effect on 
  
 197. See id.  The data in the above chart shows that only 0.1% of cases in-
volve ten or more witnesses, and so this increase is not significant, except 
perhaps to reflect the fact that the legal system is being used in some more 
complicated situations.  This point is discussed infra at Part III.E.  
 198. See supra notes 176, 187, 189–91 & accompanying text.   
File: GoodmanMacro.doc Created on:  2/17/2004 5:47 PM Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:27 PM 
566 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
testimony199 may have a detrimental effect on the public’s per-
ception of the Japanese judicial system as a protector of the 
Rule of Law and as an arm of such a system.200  Similarly, the 
courts’ limitation on expert witness testimony and cross-
examination for technical matters, such as patent disputes may 
also underlie the public’s perception that Judges are currently 
unable to handle technical legal expertise issues.201  Nonethe-
less, the judicial system faces a dual dilemma: on the one hand, 
the political departments demand faster resolution of cases; 
and, on the other, the same political forces fail to provide the 
judiciary with the resources needed to handle cases faster.202  
The end result is that the Japanese courts must do what it can 
to hustle the process — and this appears to mean less witness 
  
 199. As a bengoshi in Sendai succinctly stated: “Judges like documents more 
than witnesses.”  Interview with bengoshi (H) in Sendai, Japan (on file with 
author).  Additionally, a bengoshi in Hiroshima noted that judges are busy, 
and so they are not willing to examine witnesses.  Interview with bengoshi (L) 
in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with author).  A bengoshi in Sapporo criticized 
the system under the New Code as being “too quick” and complained that 
judges “restrict witnesses;” he advocated for judges to hear more witnesses.  
Interview with bengoshi (C) in Sapporo, Japan (on file with author).  
 200. The practice of avoiding witness testimony is also problematic in Japa-
nese criminal trials.  It has been suggested that notwithstanding changes in 
the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure for the creation of a 
more adversarial system, present process in Japan comes close to the pre-war 
system of “trial by dossier.”  See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra 
note 19, at 300–01.  See generally Ryuichi Hirano, Diagnosis of the Current 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 22 LAW IN JAPAN 129 (Daniel H. Foote trans.) 
(1989).  
 201. This perception has led to an amendment to the New Code to create a 
modified “expert Commissioner” system (July 2003).  See infra Part III.E.  
U.S. judges are capable of resolving highly technical expertise-laden cases 
after hearing direct and cross-examination of opposing expert witnesses.  
Japanese judges should be just as capable of resolving such questions if given 
direct and cross-examination of experts in open court. 
 202. A bengoshi interviewed in Kyoto stated that if he could make one 
change to the civil procedure system, he would greatly increase the number of 
judges.  Interview with bengoshi (B) in Kyoto, Japan (on file with author).  His 
reasons related directly to Rule of Law concerns.  Id.  He noted that if a judge 
takes the time necessary to hear a case, the lawyers are pleased, but the Judi-
cial Secretariat is not because it causes a large backlog of cases for the judge.  
Id.  Thus, judges must act too quickly, leaving both parties unsatisfied.  As 
the lawyer noted “speed alone is not satisfactory.”  Id.  Furthermore, since 
“the parties are not satisfied, they do not feel they have received procedural 
justice.”  Id.   
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testimony with concomitant pressures on Rule of Law con-
cerns.203  Similarly, as cases have been handled more quickly on 
average, the percentage of ordinary civil cases in which both 
sides were represented by counsel at the District Court level 
has declined as the number of cases in which neither side is 
represented by counsel has increased.  The data discloses:204 
 
First Instance District Court 
Ordinary Civil Cases — Percentage of Cases 
 
Year Both Sides  
Represented 
Plaintiff Only 
Represented 
Defendant 
Only  
Represented 
Neither 
Represented 
 
1996 42.2 35.5 3.3 19.0 
1997 42.5 35.1 3.3 19.1 
1998 40.9 34.7 3.6 30.8 
1999 41.2 34.0 4.0 20.7 
2000 41.3 32.9 4.4 21.4 
2001 39.4 34.8 4.7 21.1 
 
Apparently, litigants take more notice of cases and the need 
for professional assistance when an appeal has been filed to the 
High Court from an initial District Court decision.  Thus, from 
1996 to 2001, the percentage of High Court cases in which nei-
ther side was represented by counsel remained remarkably sta-
ble in the 5% to 6% range.205  The percentage of cases in which 
both sides were represented at the appeal stage in the High 
Court remained stable in the range of 75% to 78%.206  
  
 203. Doctors Debate in Court as Part of New System, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, 
Jan. 8, 2003, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn 
20030109b1.htm.  In a medical malpractice case, the Court heard from a panel 
of experts, who after giving their individual opinions on the matter, engaged 
in a debate concerning the issue and was finally examined by the parties.  Id.  
This “conference debate” format holds great promise in cases such as medical 
malpractice, where expert opinion is a critical element of the case.  However, 
lawyers interviewed had never been involved in such a process.  Id.  It is 
likely that this format will be overshadowed by the new procedure adopted in 
July 2003.  
 204. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.  
 205. In 1997, the percentage of cases where neither side was represented 
rose by 6.6% but fell back again in 1998 to 5.0%.  See id.  In 1996, the per-
centage was 5.9% and in 2001, the percentage was 5.8%.  Id.  
 206. Summary Court jurisdiction is limited to cases seeking less than 
900,000 yen (soon to be increased to 1,200,000 yen), and as is expected, a 
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The declining use of counsel at the initial stage may or may 
not represent the public’s perception of Japan’s Rule of Law and 
judicial process issues.  On its face, the declining use of legal 
professionals appears to represent a decline in the Rule of Law, 
since these professionals represent the technical expertise of 
the law.  The previous chart shows that while the percentage of 
cases in which both sides are represented by counsel is declin-
ing, the percentage of cases in which only one side is so repre-
sented is increasing.  Perhaps this change reflects the belief 
that representation by one side, when the other side is not rep-
resented, constitutes an advantage; whereas, if neither side is 
represented, the playing field is level for both.  Or perhaps 
these figures represent the view that it is the judge’s function to 
discover and find the facts in order to assure that substantive 
justice is achieved.  Thus, professional lawyers, who may per-
form part of these functions in other societies, are simply not 
required in Japanese litigation.  Furthermore, these figures 
may simply be a reflection of the limited availability of lawyers 
in Japan and/or the high cost of retaining counsel.207  Whatever 
the reason, the facts are that in over 21% of all cases no lawyers 
are involved at the trial court level and in over 60% of cases at 
  
higher percentage of Summary Court cases are thus handled without counsel.  
Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, ch. II, pt. 1, § 
5(3) (“Expansion of the Jurisdiction of Summary Courts & Substantial In-
crease in the Upper Limit on Amount in Controversy in Procedures for Small-
Claims Litigation”).  However, a significant percentage of Summary Court 
cases that are appealed to the District Court involve the use of counsel on the 
appeal.  See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.  But, here 
too, the percentage of cases in which counsel is retained has been declining.  
Id.  The statistics show that the percentage of cases appealed from the Sum-
mary Court to the District Court in which neither party was represented on 
the appeal are as follows: 1996: 26.1%; 1997: 29.3%; 1998: 27.5%; 1999: 30.8%; 
2000: 30.4%; and 2001: 31.5%.  Id.  Interestingly, the percentage of cases in 
which the appellant is represented by counsel has remained stable at a rela-
tively high rate of approximately 52%.  Id.  Apparently, losing parties at both 
the District Court and Summary Court level seek legal advice when they 
move to a higher court.  See id.  
 207. To the extent that the figures may reflect the paucity of lawyers in 
Japan, these statistics may change over time as the Judicial Reform Council 
recommended an increase of the annual admission of new lawyers from the 
present total of approximately 1,200 to 3,000, which is a dramatic increase 
from the previous annual 500 amount, a number that was constant for many 
years.  See Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at 
ch. 1, pt. 3, § 2(2). 
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least one party does not have counsel.  These statistics appear 
to be inconsistent with Professor Mattei’s view of the character-
istics of a “Rule of Professional Law” system.208  Additionally, 
these inconsistencies raise questions as to whether a Rule of 
Law society can effectively operate without professional legal 
representation in the organ responsible for dispute resolution 
under the Rule of Law. 
In any event, the time it takes to bring an average case to fi-
nal resolution through appeal to the High Court has decreased.  
However, this change may prove to be purchased at too high a 
price if the cost of such time reduction is the opinion or belief 
that the judicial system is not prepared or willing to hear one 
litigant’s side of the story.  To the extent that speed has been 
bought at the price of third person witness and party witness 
testimony, the price may be too high in Rule of Law terms.209  It 
is suggested that the Japanese judicial system, including its 
lawyers and professors, should explore this issue.210  
The Japanese Diet recently adopted legislation that will re-
quire both criminal and civil cases to be determined at the Dis-
trict Court level within a two-year time frame.211  While well 
intended, the legal community should carefully consider the 
Rule of Law implications for such legislation.  First, placing a 
time limit on judicial activities raises issues of judicial inde-
pendence.  While many legal scholars hope that judges will act 
  
 208. Ugo A. Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the 
World’s Legal System, 45 AM. J COMP. L. 5, 16–42 (1997).  
 209. Since Japanese judges are viewed by many as both “paternalistic” and 
protectors of the parties (whether or not represented by council), the conse-
quences of judges acting as gatekeepers and denying parties the right to ei-
ther tell their stories on the witness stand or to call witnesses may compound 
the potential damage done to the judicial system as a Rule of Law decision-
making organ, as witness testimony is not permitted in a high percentage of 
cases.  Tanabe, supra note 121, at 514, 520–22.  See also Miki, supra note 85, 
at 5.  
 210. One purpose of U.S. lawyers, who assisted in the revision of the Japa-
nese civil and criminal procedure systems, was to replace the concept of “trial 
by dossier” with an oral adversary system.  This objective does not appear to 
have been achieved in criminal adjudication and, with the decline in witness 
testimony in civil cases, it would appear that the objective of the occupiers 
was not achieved in the civil procedure arena either.  Hirano, supra note 200, 
at 129, 139. 
 211. Lower House Approves Speedy Trial Legislation, supra note 18.  See 
Trial to be Expedited, supra note 18.   
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quickly and dispose of cases expeditiously, a judge should take 
as much time as conscience requires in reaching a determina-
tion.  Additionally, other branches of government should not 
compel judges to ignore conscience considerations.  Second, time 
limits raise constitutional questions — the issue of judicial in-
dependence, which Japan’s constitution guarantees, and the 
judicial branch’s management, which is placed in the judicial 
branch itself.  Third, in order to reach the legislatively man-
dated time-limit, courts may further restrict the rights of par-
ties to testify or call witnesses — potentially further eroding 
public confidence in the judiciary as a mechanism for obtaining 
relief.  Finally, such time limit legislation appears entirely hor-
tatory and provides no means of enforcement.212   
While the legislation will place pressure on the judicial 
branch to quicken the pace of litigation, reality indicates that 
judges will continue to take the time necessary to fairly resolve 
cases — especially complicated ones.  However, the judicial 
branch’s failure to conform to legislative fiat then creates its 
own legal paradox, as the court system itself will in a sense fail 
to follow the law and its mandates.  Instead, legislation that 
significantly increases the pool of Japanese judges may better 
serve the Rule of Law objectives of the Judicial Reform Council, 
as opposed to limiting the time frame of judicial decisions.213  
  
 212. The Japan Times reports that the new two-year legislation makes it 
the clear “duty” of participants in the trial to conclude the case within two 
years.  Trials to be Expedited, supra note 18.  Thus, the legislation itself ap-
pears to not be mandatory, but simply hortatory.  Moreover, although the time 
limits apply to both criminal and civil cases, it is impossible to believe that a 
criminal case will be dismissed and an accused freed simply because the trial 
extends past the time limit.  With respect to civil cases, the general rule is 
already that most cases take less than two years.  Thus, it is not expected that 
the new two-year legislation will be applied to civil cases.  The reality is that 
judges are already under great pressure to speed up the pace of litigation to 
the point that criteria such as “whether the judge has managed to bring about 
a court-mediated settlement in civil suits within a certain time frame” and 
“the number of cases they have handled” are considered when deciding 
whether to promote a judge or not.  See Panel Seeks Transparent Career Sys-
tem for Judges, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2000, available at http://www. 
japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20000913b2.htm.  
 213. The number of judges in Japan (excluding Summary Court and Su-
preme Court judges) has risen from 2,121 in 1998 (when the New Code went 
into effect) to a current total of 2,341 (for fiscal 2003 through March 2004), 
increasing by 10%.  See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96 
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B. Production of Evidence 
1. Inquiry Procedure214 
Interviewees were also questioned as to the new procedural 
devices for obtaining evidence and narrowing issues.  The New 
Code’s “inquiry procedure” had been designed to mirror the “in-
terrogatory” procedure of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.215  Unlike the Federal Rules however, the New Code pro-
vides neither judicial oversight of the inquiry process nor sanc-
tions when a party fails to answer or responds inaccurately to 
questions.216  Moreover, the area of inquiry is more limited than 
in the U.S.  By relying on counsels’ obligations to each other as 
professionals, the objective of the new procedure is to obtain 
information that could assist in narrowing issues and thus ad-
vance trials without damaging confidence in the system.217 
In the U.S., interrogatories serve a dual purpose.  First, they 
are a means to clarifying the basis for the claims and defenses 
raised.218  Second, interrogatories act as a “first step” discovery 
device typically used at the outset of a case to compel the other 
  
(specifically the data provided by the Judicial Secretariat).  Nonetheless, the 
fact remains that the number of judges available to try cases in Japan is quite 
small compared to other advanced countries.  See ODA, supra note 1, at 403–
04 (2d ed. 1999).  
 214. MINSOHŌ, art. 163 (noting that a party may inquire on matters neces-
sary for the proof of factual allegations from their opposing party).  However, 
the New Code does not require that the served party actually answer such 
inquiries, nor does it necessitate that answers be truthful or made under oath.  
Kojima, supra note 15, at 702–03.  Additionally, the New Codes precludes 
inquiries that are not particularized, or which insult, embarrass, or attempt to 
cause undue expense to the other party and/or seek either an opinion or con-
cern a privileged matter.  MINSOHŌ, art. 163. 
 215. FED. R. CIV. P. 33. 
 216. See U.S. for General Electric Supply Corp. v. W.E. O’Neil Const. Co., 1 
F.R.D. 529 (D. Mass. 1941) (proper remedy for failure to answer interrogato-
ries is a motion by default, not a motion to require answers to the interrogato-
ries); Michigan Window Cleaning Co. v. Martino 173 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1949) 
(holding that if a party declines to answer interrogatories he may be pre-
cluded by the court from offering proof at trial).   
 217. See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Article 14, at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/civil_rep4/article14.html (last visited Feb. 
10, 2004).   
 218. See McElroy v. United Air Lines, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 100 (W.D.Mo. 1957) 
(stating that one principle purpose of interrogatories is to ascertain conten-
tions of adverse party). 
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side to identify potential witnesses to important events and op-
ponent documents that may contain or lead to evidence useful 
to the inquiring party.219  As a clarifying mechanism, interroga-
tories have not been very helpful since responses to such inquir-
ies are typically drafted by lawyers and signed by clients.220  The 
“lawyering” of interrogatory responses provides insufficient in-
formation to clarify claims early in the process and leave open 
potential for modification later.  But, as a first step discovery 
device, the interrogatory procedure has become a staple for liti-
gators and proven itself very useful in the U.S.221 
Some Japanese writers dealing with civil procedure argued 
that the inquiry process was a form of “discovery” new to the 
Japanese system;222 thus, interview subjects were asked 
whether the inquiry procedure had been previously used by 
them or their opposing counsel to gather information about po-
tential witnesses or documents.  No bengoshi interviewed had 
ever used the inquiry process for this purpose nor had it been 
used against them for this purpose.  Quite naturally, no one 
interviewed found the inquiry process helpful in identifying 
witnesses or documents.223 
The consistent theme of the responses was that the inquiry 
process was rarely, if ever, used, and even when used was not 
very helpful in narrowing issues or obtaining evidence.224  Vari-
  
 219. See Hercules Powder Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 3 F.R.D. 328 (D. Del. 
1944) (stating that one purpose of interrogatories under Rule 33 is to ascer-
tain facts and to procure evidence as to where pertinent evidence exists and 
can be obtained). 
 220. See McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 134 F.R.D. 275, 
287 (N.D. Cal. 1991), rev’d in part, 765 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating 
that interrogatories are not particularly useful because lawyers craft answers 
to interrogatories to reveal as little information as possible).  
 221. See Joseph N. Hosteny, Using Interrogatories Saves Time and Money, 
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Dec. 2001, at 28. 
 222. See, e.g., Miki supra note 85, at 6–7 (describing the inquiry process as a 
“method of obtaining evidence…basically modeled on the interrogatory of the 
United States”).  See also Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 776–79; Kojima, supra 
note 15, at 701, 702. 
 223. Reflecting the author’s U.S. litigation experience, inquiry subjects were 
asked: “Has the procedure for inquiry resulted in the identification and pro-
duction of documents detrimental to the position of the answering party and 
helpful to the inquiring party?”  
 224. For example, an official of the Hiroshima Bar Association stated in his 
interview that the New Code’s inquiry procedure was not much used despite 
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ous explanations of this phenomenon were given, ranging from 
the view that the court’s use, as an inquiring body, was prefer-
able over the informal inquiry procedure to the belief that nei-
ther side was likely to provide damaging answers, especially as 
there was no sanction for refusal to answer or refusal to answer 
“at this time.”225  Additionally, interview subjects were asked for 
their views on the conflict of ethical obligations inherent in a 
non-compulsory inquiry process, i.e., the conflict between the 
ethical duty to respond to opposing counsel and not to voluntar-
ily damage a client’s position.226  No interview subjects were 
willing to state that they had no obligation to respond227 nor 
were they willing to admit that they might inaccurately respond 
rather than damage their client’s interests.   Still, the general 
tenure of responses was that the obligation to the client out-
weighed the obligation to opposing counsel.228  Hence, some ra-
  
its usefulness in theory.  Interview with Official (M), Hiroshima Bar Associa-
tion, in Japan (on file with author).  A lawyer in Kyoto stated that Japanese 
lawyers do not use this procedure even after the reform — for example, he had 
never used the procedure and opposing council had only once requested that 
he do so.  Interview with lawyer (B) in Kyoto, Japan (on file with author).  A 
lawyer in Kobe stated that while the inquiry procedure was initially utilized, 
attorneys’ stopped using it.  Interview with lawyer (U) in Kobe, Japan (on file 
with author).  A lawyer in Hiroshima stated that the procedure is not used 
very often.   Interview with lawyer (W) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with au-
thor).  These interview responses simply serve as illustrations of the multi-
tude of responses portraying the majority view that the New Code’s procedure 
was of little use and was accordingly used sparsely.   
 225. Typical was the response of a lawyer in Tokyo who noted that as there 
was no sanction for failing to respond as this lawyer did not use the procedure 
because he did not expect it would produce anything of value.  Interview with 
lawyer (S) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with author). 
 226. Inquiry subjects were asked, “As the attorney for a party to whom an 
inquiry has been made, do you feel an obligation to provide an answer even if 
the answer is harmful to your client’s position?  If the answer could be harm-
ful to your client’s position do you feel an ethical obligation to: a) answer or b) 
refuse to answer the inquiry?”   
 227. Typical was the view of a lawyer in Hiroshima that by permitting a 
lawyer to make inquiry, the New Code implies that an ethical obligation to 
respond to the inquiry exists.  See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (W) in Hi-
roshima, Japan (on file with author).  However, this lawyer also noted that if 
the response were harmful to the client, the lawyer should find a way to pre-
vent such harm.  Id. 
 228. One lawyer responded that he had an obligation to respond to inquiries 
as an attorney, but that there was no ethical conflict because if the client tells 
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tionale for failing to respond would be employed when such re-
sponse would damage a client’s position.229  
On the other hand, where the answer would eventually be 
found in any event and disclosure at the time of response would 
not damage the client, responding attorneys appeared willing to 
voluntarily respond.230  Moreover, when circumstances make it 
impossible for opposing council to refuse to respond, inquiry 
may prove useful.  For example, when an employee is injured 
due to an industrial accident, the employer is required to file a 
report with the Ministry of Labor concerning the accident.231  
Inquiries such as whether a report was filed and requests for a 
description of the report and its contents cannot be ignored be-
cause it is general knowledge that filing the report was a re-
quirement.  In such a case, inquiry can assist in producing the 
report.232  However, where inquiry relates to internal documents 
or undocumented events, it appears that responding counsel 
need not and will not respond if to do so will adversely affect his 
or her client.  In short, the process was not very well used and 
  
him not to respond he must follow the client’s wishes.  Interview with lawyer 
(K) in Hokkaido, Japan (on file with author). 
 229. The response of a lawyer in Kyoto was typical — he noted that a lawyer 
should not say something that would disadvantage his client.  Interview with 
lawyer (B) in Kyoto, Japan (on file with author).  Thus, if the answer would 
hurt his client, he would either reply in an unresponsive way or would post-
pone answering at all.  As this lawyer noted, since there was no sanction for 
refusal to comply, non-response was preferable to hurting his client’s interest.  
Id.   
 230. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (E), Saitama, Japan (on file with au-
thor) (explaining the voluntary production of evidence in regular cases). 
 231. See KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE LABOR LAW (1992). 
 232. A lawyer interviewed in Hokkaido described an experience where a 
worker was killed on the job.  The worker’s family did not know the facts of 
the incident, but were concerned that the employer was at fault.  Under Japa-
nese Labor Law, the employer was required to make a report to the Ministry 
of Labor.  See SUGENO, supra note 231, at 39, 284–88 (1992).  The worker’s 
family sued, and the lawyer made inquiry as to the report filed with the Min-
istry.  The company could not deny the existence of the report because of the 
Labor Law’s reporting requirement.  After receiving the admission about the 
report, the lawyer requested that the court order the document produced and 
the report was produced.  In the lawyer’s opinion, once the existence of the 
report was shown, the court was more willing to order its production than it 
would have been under the previous Code.  Interview with lawyer (K) in Hok-
kaido, Japan (on file with author).   
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when used, was not very helpful.233  Furthermore, as a “discov-
ery device,” the process was almost completely non-existent. 
At this point in U.S. litigation practice, most lawyers recog-
nize their client’s obligation to provide answers and evidence in 
response to opposing counsel’s discovery requests.234  The rea-
sons for this recognition of an obligation to produce (or its pa-
tronage within the legal community) are not completely clear.  
The availability of court sanctions in the U.S. may play a role.235   
However, this reason may not be absolute or even substantial.  
In addition to sanctions, the U.S. litigator has a reasonably 
clear idea of clients’ and their own ethical and legal obligations 
in discovery.236  To the extent that a question of loyalties may 
arise, the sanction mechanism (even if unused) indicates to the 
lawyer his and the client’s primary obligations.  Moreover, in 
the U.S., the basic obligation to respond belongs to the client 
possessing the requested information — not the lawyer who is 
the conduit for transmission.237  The willingness of U.S. judges 
to sanction clients for failing to accurately respond defines the 
role of lawyers and clients as well as influencing clients’ will-
ingness to respond in a timely and accurate manner.238    
  
 233. Professor Koichi Miki reaches a similar conclusion.  See generally Miki, 
supra note 85.  Professor Miki notes that: 
A considerable number of people have pinned their hopes on [the in-
quiry procedure], although many others have doubted its effective-
ness.  Five years have passed since the New Code came into effect 
and it has become clear that the latter view was correct.  The number 
of cases in which Party Inquiry is used has proven negligible. 
Id. at 14. 
 234. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
789–90, 801 n.142.  See also Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 
1990) (“severe” sanctions were imposed when defendants failed to appear at 
depositions and produce requested documents). 
 235. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
 236. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
786–787. 
 237. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33 for the interrogatory analogue to Japan’s inquiry 
process that requires all interrogatories be either answered or objected to.  
Counsel signs objections whereas the “person” making the answer signs an-
swers.  This discloses that answers are to be made by a party, while lawyers 
need to make the objections.   
 238. Lawyers are, of course, the major players in discovery responses and 
have ethical obligations regarding searches for answers to interrogatories and 
document production in the U.S.  But, the interrogatory (for example) is di-
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Unlike the U.S., Japan has a non-compulsory process regard-
ing disclosure of information.  One reason for the nature of this 
process is that the Japanese Bar objects to a compulsory proc-
ess.239  However, a compulsory process may in fact be helpful to 
the Bar by providing an airtight answer to complaining clients 
who question why information must be disclosed to the other 
side.  Furthermore, by lifting the ethical dilemma from the 
shoulders of lawyers, the compulsory process results in greater 
use of disclosure methods by both sides and more efficient dis-
closure of relevant answers.  
It is the author’s view that the Japanese judiciary’s objections 
to a compulsory process may reflect its unwillingness to: (1) be-
come involved in disputes that do not affect substantive deci-
sion-making; (2) make sanction decisions that might hurt a cli-
ent when the lawyer may be at fault; and (3) exclude evidence 
when production is conducive to substantive justice whereas 
exclusion is not.  
However, by making the process compulsory, the judge is re-
lieved of the time-consuming task of dealing with preliminary 
evidentiary and issue inquiries, and is thus able to devote more 
time and energy to the substantive decision-making process.  
Placing the inquiry process at the early stage of a case — even 
prior to the first Preliminary Oral Hearing and surely before or 
during the new Preparatory Proceedings for Oral hearing — 
and making disclosure compulsory in certain areas will sub-
stantially advance the issue-determining process.  Meanwhile, 
the present process appears to have no significant effect.240  Fur-
ther, the existence of a “sanctions regime” does not mean that 
sanctions will be utilized on a frequent basis.  The threat of 
sanctions, backed up by their infrequent use, exerts pressure on 
parties to comply.241 
Perhaps, the biggest obstacle to a sanctions regime is the 
“distrust” between bengoshi and the judiciary.242  There appears 
  
rected to the client who signs the response.  The lawyer may assist in ferret-
ing out the information and in drafting the response as well as by objecting to 
over broad or otherwise improper interrogatories.  
 239. See Miki, supra note 85, at 6–7, 15.  See generally Ota, supra note 9.   
 240. Miki, supra note 85, at 11–16. 
 241. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
801. 
 242. See infra Part III.F. 
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to be a gap in understanding and collegiality between Japanese 
bengoshi and Japanese judges that does not exist in the U.S. 
legal system.243  Both history and present practice make the cur-
rent Bar skeptical of a system that gives judges (as government 
officials in a government bureaucracy) power over individual 
lawyers.244  Perhaps, a sanctions regime without U.S. remedies, 
such as authority to fine or otherwise sanction attorneys, will 
eventually arise in Japan.  Japanese bengoshi appear to view 
the inquiry process as lawyer-to-lawyer, creating a lawyer re-
sponse process in which the client is simply a minor player.245  
However, lawyers do not possess the first hand knowledge re-
quired to answer factual inquiries — only the client is in pos-
session of such first-hand knowledge.  Therefore, this objection 
to a sanctions regime may be overcome by clarifying that the 
duty to respond to inquiries lies with the party (i.e., the client) 
— assisted by the lawyer — and thus, failure to respond prop-
erly results in imposing sanctions on the client.   
The July 2003 reform adopts a “pre-lawsuit filing” inquiry 
process for obtaining factual information.246  Under the new 
scheme, a party contemplating litigation must send the pro-
spective defendant a somewhat detailed letter, notifying him or 
her of the intent to file suit by a certain date and setting out the 
reasons for the suit; however, not all of the evidentiary materi-
als required in a formal complaint must be disclosed.247  Once 
such a letter is sent, the potential plaintiff may make inquiries 
similar to those made in the post-filing inquiry process.248  There 
is even the possibility of receiving judicial assistance prior to 
filing a complaint in order to assist in the inquiry process.249  
  
 243. Id. 
 244. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
803, 806. 
 245. See Interview with lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan & Interview with law-
yer (G) in Rockville, Maryland (U.S.) (on file with author).   
 246. See Act to Amend Civil Procedure Act and Other Relevant Acts, 15 
Heisei (2003) Statute No. 108, adding articles 132–2 to 132–9 (Japan) (dealing 
with the pre-litigation inquiry procedure).   See also Interviews with lawyers 
(Q & T) from Japan (on file with author).   
 247. Interviews with lawyers (Q & T) from Japan (on file with author).   
 248. Id. 
 249. Such assistance may come through filing a form of motion.  The motion 
practice would require the payment of a fee, but not as high a fee as the filing 
fee for a complaint.  Id. 
File: GoodmanMacro.doc Created on:  2/17/2004 5:47 PM Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:27 PM 
578 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
Inquiry prior to complaint is potentially very important in 
Japan as the formal complaint requires significant factual in-
formation to be accepted by the court.250  Unlike the U.S., Ja-
pan’s factual “discovery” cannot wait until after the complaint is 
filed.  Inquiry as a potentially limited form of discovery is thus 
most important in the pre-filing stage, as it has the potential to 
provide a prospective plaintiff with the facts needed to file a 
formal complaint.251  Moreover, filing fees in Japan are high and 
the new inquiry process may aid in resolving cases without the 
need to file a formal complaint, thus saving the potential plain-
tiff some expenses.252  In turn, this early resolution may reduce 
the plaintiff’s settlement demand by the amount of the forgone 
filing fee.  
Unfortunately, the pre-filing inquiry process suffers from the 
same lack of  a sanctions regime (just as does the post-filing 
process).253  Thus, the expectation is that the pre-filing process 
will not have the positive effect that reformers envisioned.  On 
the other hand, this process is a first step towards the discovery 
of facts that make filing a valid complaint possible. Finally, if a 
sanctions regime is later applied to such pre-filing inquiries, the 
reform may have real significance. 
2. Document Production254 
When a proper request has been made for a document, the 
New Code permits the court to review the document in camera 
  
 250. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
801. 
 251. See id. at 789–90. 
 252. See id. at 791–92. 
 253. See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 250 (dis-
cussing limitations on the court’s sanctioning powers where a third person 
fails to produce a requested document). 
 254. Documents must be produced in four situations: (1) where a party in 
possession of a document refers to that document during the litigation; (2) 
where the party seeking the document is entitled to demand delivery or ex-
amination of it; (3) where the document was created for the benefit of the 
party seeking it or was drawn up to evidence the legal relationship of the par-
ties (such as a contract between the parties — a kind of mutual benefit docu-
ment); and (4) a catch-all provision covering any other document that is not: 
(a) self-incriminating, (b) privileged or containing privileged material, or (c) a 
document created solely for the use of the person in possession of the docu-
ment (a “self-use” document).  MINSOHŌ, art. 220.  
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to determine whether it should be produced.255  In the U.S., an 
in camera review permits the judicial officer to make a more 
informed decision about production while simultaneously pro-
tecting the fact-finder from exposure to inadmissible evidence, 
since the fact-finder is usually the jury, not the judge.256  How-
ever, in Japan, the judge is the fact-finder, and thus exposure to 
a contested document for in camera review may potentially 
prejudice the producer of the documents by exposing an “inad-
missible” document to the fact-finder.257  Both in the U.S. and 
Japan, professional judges often operate on the assumption that 
they can compartmentalize evidence so that an examined, in-
admissible document will not play a role in decision-making.258  
This fiction results in juries being warned not to consider the 
answer to a question that has been ruled inadmissible after re-
sponse.  Nonetheless, common sense tells trial lawyers that the 
damage is done when the evidence has been seen or heard be-
cause jurors are unlikely to completely forget what they have 
  
 255. Id. art. 223, para. 3.  To obtain a document, a party must move for its 
production.  Article 221 of the Code provides that the motion for production 
must contain: “(1) Indication of the document; (2) Gist of the document; (3) 
The holder of the document; and (4) The fact to be proven; (5) The ground for 
obligation for production of the document.”  Id. art. 221, para. 1.  The New 
Code modifies the moving party’s obligation by loosening the duty to comply 
with the first two requirements when 
[i]t is extremely difficult to clarify the matter mentioned in (1) or (2) 
of paragraph 1 of the preceding Article, at the time of the application 
it shall be sufficient to clarify, as a substitute for such matter, the 
matter which enables the holder of a document to distinguish the 
document under application. 
Id. at art. 222.  
 256. In the U.S., actions at common law seeking a recovery of twenty dollars 
or more entitle the parties to jury trial and “no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any court of the U.S., than according to the rules of 
the common law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 257. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
802 (stating that “the court that makes the in camera review is also the trier 
of fact because there is no jury.”); ODA, supra note 1, at 73 (stating that “the 
Japanese court system does not accommodate either a jury system or a system 
of lay assessors.”).  
 258. Practicing lawyers know that in trying a case before a judge rather 
than a jury, the rules of evidence are liberalized by the court and many docu-
ments that are inadmissible at a jury trial will come into evidence.  Further-
more, the court will note that the evidence will be given such weight as it de-
serves, including the possibility of no weight, if deemed appropriate. 
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heard or seen,  and the same is likely true of judges.  Accord-
ingly, in camera review by the fact-finder creates problems.259  
Regardless of the potential for improper exposure, all interview 
subjects indicated that they had never been involved in a case 
where the judge made an in camera review of a document.260  
However, some individuals had heard stories of cases with in 
camera review.261  Like the inquiry procedure, this reform also 
appears not to have taken hold.262  
In general, respondents felt that the New Code made it pro-
cedurally easier to obtain the documents required to be pro-
duced.263  Respondents found that judges were more willing to 
“recommend” and “suggest” that parties voluntarily produce 
documents than had been the case pre-New Code.264  Addition-
ally, respondents felt that parties were more likely to follow 
such suggestions than had been the case before the New Code.  
On the whole, respondents felt that the creation of the New 
Code led more documents to be produced than had ever oc-
  
 259. A judge interviewed outside Tokyo noted that judges do not at all like 
to use the in camera review process and will avoid doing so.  Interview with 
High Court Judge (R) in Japan (on file with author).  This judge noted that a 
problem exists with in camera review because even if the judge could divorce 
himself from using an improper document in his decision-making, the attor-
neys would object because the judge is the fact-finder.  Id.  Lawyers echoed 
this view.  Typical was the response of a lawyer in Kobe that because judges 
find it difficult to forget what they have read, lawyers do not like the in cam-
era review system.  Interview with lawyer (U) in Kobe, Japan (on file with 
author). 
 260. A Hiroshima lawyer gave a typical response when he stated that he 
had never experienced a situation where a judge either made an in camera 
review or redacted a document for production.  Interview with lawyer (M) in 
Hiroshima, Japan (on file with author).  But see MINSOHŌ, art. 223, para. 1 
(noting that redaction is permitted).  
 261. See, e.g., Interview with bengoshi (C) in Sapporo, Japan (on file with 
author).  
 262. Although not specifically addressed in the questionnaire, discussion 
with interview subjects shows that the new “redacting” authority given to the 
court is also rarely, if ever, utilized.  
 263. For example, a lawyer in Tokyo noted that courts are reluctant to order 
a party to produce documents and may instead suggest production, but with-
out sanction for failure to follow the suggestion.  In any event, he did feel that 
while the procedure for requesting documents from the other side was easier 
under the New Code, actual production had not changed significantly.  Inter-
view with lawyer (S) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with author).  
 264. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (L) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with 
author). 
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curred before.  The view was also expressed that the govern-
ment produced more documents under the New Code, especially 
after the 2001 Amendment covering government documents, 
since failure to do so would lead to unfavorable judicial deci-
sions regarding the government’s position on document produc-
tion.265  Nonetheless, most respondents did not feel that the new 
document provisions significantly aided plaintiffs.  In other 
words, significant documents that were “against a party[’s] in-
terest” were still not being produced and remained unavailable 
to plaintiffs.266  The self-use exception to document production 
requirements appeared to be the primary reason for the New 
Code’s failure to significantly enhance the plaintiff’s ability to 
obtain damaging documents from the defendant.267   
Although the New Code contains a “catch-all” document pro-
duction requirement (as well as the very narrow specific re-
quirements for categories of documents that should be produced 
contained in the old Code), it also contains a list of “exceptions” 
to the production requirement.268  In addition to the type of tra-
ditional exceptions found in the U.S. system (attorney-client 
privileged materials, self-incriminating materials, etc.), the 
New Code legislatively adopted the “self-use” document excep-
tion that prevailed under the old Code.269  Under this exception, 
documents that are created solely for the use of the creator are 
not subject to production.270  The rationale behind this exception 
  
 265. A lawyer in Kobe indicated that the government did not want the Su-
preme Court to take a case involving the question of production of self-use 
documents by the government and thus, the government often voluntarily 
produced such documents to avoid potential litigation about the issue.  Inter-
view with lawyer (U) in Kobe, Japan (on file with author). 
 266. A lawyer interviewed in Tokyo noted that if a defendant tries hard to 
hide a document’s existence, a plaintiff cannot find out that the defendant has 
the document.  Interview with lawyer (D) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with au-
thor). 
 267. See Goodman, The Somewhat less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
801–02; GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249. 
 268. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249. 
 269. MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(d) (noting that self-use document production 
is part of the “catch-all” provision of Article 220 that permits production in 
several instances, including when: “(4)…the document does not come under 
any of the followings;…(d) [a] document to be offered only for the use of a 
holder of a document…”).   
 270. Documents produced for the benefit of the party seeking production 
(such as a receipt) and documents produced for the benefit of both parties 
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is to permit the free flow of ideas within the preparing entity 
without fear that the document will later become the object of 
public scrutiny.271  The exception can be quite broad in scope 
and is likely to include the traditional “smoking gun,”  that is, 
the damaging documents that U.S. lawyers are always looking 
for in their discovery “fishing expeditions.”272  Indeed, most 
damaging documents maintained by a company defendant 
would likely be subject to the self-use exception.  If given broad 
interpretation, the exception will likely swallow the “catch-all” 
nature of the New Code’s document production approach — in 
fact, this breadth may have been one purpose for legislating the 
self-use exception. 
After the New Code’s adoption, the Supreme Court of Japan 
had at least two opportunities to discuss the self-use excep-
tion.273  In both cases, the Court broadly interpreted the exclu-
sionary character of the exception, and thus limited the nature 
of the “catch-all” discovery provision.274  In the Fuji Bank case, 
the Court held that the self-use exception prevented the plain-
tiff, the family of a deceased borrower, from obtaining the loan 
application files from the defendant, the lender.275  The plaintiff 
argued that the files would prove that the bank officials were 
aware of the deceased’s inability to make the loan payments, 
and therefore, the lender should never have made the loan in 
the first place.276  Accordingly, the plaintiff asserted that the 
lender was not entitled to recover payment of the loan from the 
  
(such as a contract) were required to be produced under the old Code and are 
still required to be produced under the New Code.   MINSOHŌ, arts. 220–23.  
 271. See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249–50 
(discussing the rationale of the Supreme Court of Japan in the Fuji Bank case 
(see infra note 273) “to require such documents to be produced would interfere 
with the frank discussion of views within the bank”). 
 272. See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249–50. 
 273. See Fuji Bank v. Maeda, Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 Minshu No. 8 at 1787 
(Sup. Ct., Petty Bench, Nov. 12, 1999) (Japan), English translation available 
at http://www.courtdomino2.courts/go.jp/home.nsf/ehome?OpenPage; Case No. 
35 of 2000, 54 Minshu No. 9 at 2709 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2000) (Japan), English 
translation available at http://www.courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/home.nsf/ehom 
e?OpenPage.   
 274. See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 248–50. 
 275. Fuji Bank v. Maeda, Case No. 2 of 1999 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 12, 1999) (Ja-
pan).  For a discussion of the Fuji Bank case and the “self-use” exception, see 
GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249–50. 
 276. Fuji Bank, Case No. 2 of 1999, at para. 1.1. 
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deceased’s estate.277  The Supreme Court found that loan offi-
cials were entitled to the free flow of information and ideas from 
their subordinates and that to require the production of the file 
would inhibit that free flow.278  Since the documents in the file 
were prepared solely to assist the bank officials in deciding 
whether or not to make the loan, they were self-use documents 
and thus not subject to production.  
A year later, in a derivative action against bank directors, the 
Supreme Court held that the self-use exception prevented the 
derivative plaintiffs from obtaining certain bank files on the 
grounds that the files were created for the self-use of the 
bank.279  As in the Fuji Bank case, the Court could have nar-
rowly read the exception to permit discovery,280 holding that 
since this derivative action was for the benefit of the bank and 
the plaintiffs were standing in the bank’s shoes, the document 
was created for the benefit of the plaintiff and thus should be 
produced.  The Court could have also held that since they were 
separate from the Bank, the exception did not apply to the Di-
rectors because the documents were not created for the Direc-
tors’ benefit, let alone for their sole benefit.  However, the sub-
ject of this Article is not whether the Court should or should not 
have entered into a narrow interpretation of the exception; 
rather, the point is that the Court has rendered a broad inter-
pretation of the self-use exception, thus limiting the scope of 
production by the lower courts.281  
  
 277. See id.   
 278. Id. at para. 3. 
 279. Case No. 35 of 2000, 54 Minshu No. 9, 2709 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2000) 
(Japan). 
 280. Some scholars suggest that Fuji Bank is a broad reading of the excep-
tion and a narrow reading of the production obligation.  See GOODMAN, THE 
RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249–50.  The Court could have logi-
cally found that making a “good loan” was in the interest of both borrower and 
lender while rejecting a loan application where the hopeful borrower was un-
able to repay was also in the best interest of both parties.  In such case, the 
application file could be viewed as having been prepared for the benefit of both 
parties and, thus, not subject to the self-use exception.  
 281. A High Court Judge interviewed outside Tokyo specifically referred to 
the determination of the Supreme Court and noted that this case is considered 
as the “basic case” for self-use documents and the lower courts must follow it.  
Interview with High Court Judge (R) in Japan (on file with author).  This 
Judge also noted that production of self-use documents could damage privacy 
rights of the party in possession of the documents.  Id. 
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Interview subjects clearly indicated that the Fuji Bank case 
and its limiting nature was well-known to both bengoshi and 
judges, and furthermore, both were adhering to Fuji Bank.  In-
terview subjects were asked:  
Q: Do you believe that the self-use document exception 
to production limits the ability of the plaintiff to obtain 
significant documentary evidence adverse to the inter-
ests of defendants?  The answer was generally “yes.”282 
Q: Would you like to see an amendment to the Code re-
stricting the definition of self-use documents so as to al-
low for greater production of self-use documents?  As 
was to be expected, those respondents who substantively 
responded to this inquiry did so based on their practice 
preferences.283   
Thus, attorneys who represented both plaintiffs and respon-
dents desired that the Code be amended and the self-use docu-
ment exception narrowed.  On the other hand, those who only 
represented respondents felt that the provision was acceptable 
  
 282. The response of a lawyer in Nagoya was typical.  He noted that the 
self-use exception remains very broad and has not changed with adoption of 
the New Code.  Further, this lawyer noted that, due to the near impossibility 
of proving the existence of a document and the ability of the defendant to 
avoid admitting that a document exists (while the plaintiff must specify facts 
about the content of the document), very little change was effected by the New 
Code in most cases.  Interview with lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan (on file with 
author).  This lawyer was of the view that change had been achieved in con-
nection with medical malpractice cases where the existence of documents and 
the subject matter of their contents were more readily available.  Id.  A lawyer 
in Hokkaido responded that production of self-use documents would violate 
the privacy rights of the party in possession.  Interview with lawyer (K) in 
Hokkaido, Japan (on file with author).  A High Court Judge also made this 
argument for privacy rights.  Interview with High Court Judge (R) in Japan  
(on file with author).  Further, this rationale is used by the Supreme Court in 
its broad reading of the self-use exception in the Fuji Bank case.  See Fuji 
Bank, Case No. 2 of 1999, at para. 3.  
 283. A lawyer in Nagoya who primarily represents corporate interests re-
sponded that, in his view, plaintiff’s lawyers wanted the doctrine to change 
while defendant’s lawyers were opposed to change.  Interview with lawyer (A) 
in Nagoya, Japan (on file with author).   
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as is.  Some attorneys felt the question was irrelevant since 
pressure from business interests rendered change impossible.284 
In general, the new document production provisions of the 
Code were viewed as simplifying the procedure in order to ob-
tain documents, but failing to significantly open up the oppos-
ing party’s records.  In other words, although more documents 
were being produced in response to the judges’ “requests,” 
plaintiffs still had great difficulty obtaining defendants’ docu-
ments, particularly if the documents were adverse to the defen-
dants’ interests.     
C. Legislative Changes Limiting Damage Awards in Derivative 
Cases 
In the U.S., plaintiff’s counsel in class action and derivative 
lawsuits typically receive contingent fee awards which are set 
by the court after the case is resolved.285  Where the size of such 
awards is tied to the monetary damages won (or computed as 
won), the amount of damages that can be obtained in such cases 
is a strong factor in determining whether such cases are 
brought.286 Counsel has a strong incentive to sue if there is the 
chance of a large recovery (i.e., large fee award) and less incen-
tive if there is a small recovery.   Thus, to the U.S. lawyer, the 
Tokyo District Court’s decision in the Daiwa Bank case, where 
huge damages were awarded against the company officials (in 
favor of the company via the derivative plaintiffs), represented 
  
 284. Nonetheless, the question of change has been brought up in a legisla-
tive committee with responsibility for civil procedure matters.  Discussion 
with Professor Miki in Tokyo (on file with author).  Such discussion does not 
mean that change will be achieved or if it is, it will be  in the near future.  
 285. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 550 (3d ed. 1992). 
 286. In some cases, plaintiffs actually receive no monetary recovery, but, 
nonetheless, a substantial monetary recovery is computed for fee-setting pur-
poses.  Thus, where a settlement involves the use of “coupons” to be distrib-
uted to plaintiffs so as to grant them a discount on future purchases, no 
money has actually changed hands but the damage award calculation for fee 
purposes may include the total value of the coupons, even if no receiving party 
ever uses a coupon for a future purchase.  See generally Christopher R. Leslie, 
A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer 
Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991 (2002) (criticizing the use of 
coupon settlements in class action litigation); Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. 
Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 
(1997).   
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the possibility that derivative suits would dramatically increase 
in Japan.287  The Daiwa Bank case represented an interesting 
example of lowered barriers leading to greater litigation, as the 
case was brought after the Commercial Code reduced the filing 
fee for derivative lawsuits.288  
Shortly after the lower court decision in Daiwa Bank, and 
while the case was pending appeal, the Japanese Diet amended 
the Commercial Code to limit the recovery against a director in 
a derivative lawsuit.289  Previously, the Diet amended the envi-
ronmental laws to create administrative remedies.  This charge 
occurred after the courts rendered favorable decisions for plain-
tiffs in the “Big Four” pollution cases.290  Some scholars suggest 
that this legislative response was designed to take pollution 
cases away from the judicial system and place pollution abate-
ment responsibilities back in the hands of Japanese administra-
tive government officials.291  Thus, the question was raised as to 
“whether this amendment [reducing damages against corporate 
officials in derivative cases] will stifle the prophylactic effect of 
  
 287. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
798. 
 288. For a discussion of the Daiwa Bank case and the question of whether it 
will lead to additional litigation, see Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant 
Litigant, supra note 15, at 798.   
 289. For an English language synopsis of the amendment to the Japanese 
Commercial Code, see Amendment to Limit Execs’ Liability, JAPAN TIMES 
ONLINE, Nov. 30, 2001, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/get 
article.pl?nb20011130q9.htm; Revised Code Limits Liability of Executives, 
JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 6, 2001, available at http://www.japantimes. 
co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.plg?nb200011206a3.htm.  Under the amendment to the 
Commercial Code referred to by the Japan Times, director liability may be 
capped at the total employment benefits received by the director for a certain 
number of years, depending on the responsibilities of the director and whether 
he/she is an independent director.  Id.  
 290. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY IN POSTWAR JAPAN, supra note 70, at 
35.  The Big Four consist of Aoyama et al. v. Mitsui Kinzoku, Nagoya High 
Court, Aug. 9, 1972, 674 Hanji 25 (Japan); Ono et al. v. Showa Denko, Niigata 
District Court, Sept. 29, 1971, 22 Kakyu Minshu (Nos. 9–10) (Japan); Wata-
nabe et al. v. Chisso, Kumamoto District Court, Aug. 9, 1972, 696 Hanji 15 
(Japan);  Shiono et al. v. Showa Yokkaichi Sekiyu, Tsu District Court, July 24, 
1972, 672 Hanji 30 (Japan) (on file with author). 
 291. See generally UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY IN POSTWAR JAPAN, supra 
note 70.    
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derivative litigation in the future.”292 Accordingly, interviewees 
were asked: 
After the Daiwa Bank derivative lawsuit decision, the [Japa-
nese] Diet enacted a law permitting the limitation of liability of 
Directors in derivative cases. What effect do you think such leg-
islation has had on the willingness of persons to file derivative 
lawsuits? What do you think was the reason that the Diet 
passed such a limitation of liability provision? 
Typically, interviewees believed that the purpose of the legis-
lation was to make it easier for companies to obtain directors 
willing to serve.293  This rationale was, of course, used by the 
government in enacting the law. On the whole, bengoshi re-
sponded that they believed this to be the purpose of the law.  
Indeed, there is reason to believe that such limited liability may 
be necessary, especially as Japan’s corporate law moves from 
boards composed solely of insiders to those on which outside 
independent directors are expected to hold several positions.  
While enacting the limited liability provision the Japanese Diet 
was also shifting the corporate structure in Japan to a style 
more similar to the U.S., with greater reliance on outside direc-
tors.294  However, if outside directors were subjected to the same 
unlimited liability that was applied to the Daiwa Bank defen-
dants, outsiders might refuse to serve.  In fact, there is anecdo-
tal evidence that in recent years U.S. Boards have experienced 
a substantial turnover of outside directors due to candidates’ 
concerns over potential liability.295 
  
 292. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 198. 
 293. Typical was the response of a lawyer in Tokyo who commented that in 
his opinion, the limit on damages would not affect the number of derivative 
type cases brought since the end result sought was not monetary damages but 
change in management actions.  Interview with lawyer (S) in Tokyo, Japan 
(on file with author).  Id.  In addition, he felt that the reason for the monetary 
limitation was responsive to the need to obtain directors willing to serve as 
such.   
 294. Corporate Government and Reform of Japan’s Commercial Code, J-IRIS 
RESEARCH NEWSL. (Japan Investor Relations & Investor Support, Inc., Tokyo, 
Japan), Nov. 10, 2003, at http://www.j-iris.com/newsletter/nl02.pdf. 
 295. “Corporate America is undergoing the largest turnover in corporate 
boards of directors in several years as a result of the enactment of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act, representatives of an industry group representing directors 
and several executive search firms told BNA in recent interviews.”  BNA Cor-
porate Law & Business, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 47, Dec. 9, 2002, availa- 
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Surprisingly, most bengoshi believed that the limitation pro-
visions had no effect on plaintiffs’ decisions to file derivative 
actions.  Although the majority of bengoshi interviewed had 
never been involved in derivative litigation, those who ex-
pressed an opinion believed that derivative plaintiffs filed suit 
for non-monetary reasons.296  Since derivative suits were not 
viewed as “economically” motivated, the amount of the damage 
award was of relatively little consequence.  Moreover, some sub-
jects believed that Japanese lawyers who filed derivative suits 
were not paid based on the amount recovered in the case;297 
thus, the damage amount was not relevant to a lawyer’s deci-
sion to file a derivative case.  Again, respondents were of the 
view that factors other than economics lay behind the filing de-
cision.  To some extent, the responses were an echo of the cul-
tural and societal arguments voiced by some scholars as to why 
Japanese citizens appear to be more reluctant to file lawsuits 
than U.S. citizens.298   
The statistical evidence available is too slim to make any con-
clusion as to whether the 2001 law has had any effect on litiga-
tion rates.  While interesting, the decline in the number of de-
  
ble at http://corplawcenter.bna.com/pic2/clb.nsf/id/BNAP-5GJSW3?OpenDocu 
ment.  
 296. Representative was the view of a lawyer in Nagoya that derivative type 
cases were motivated by a desire to punish bad managers and not to provide 
economic relief to plaintiffs or high fees to plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Interview with 
lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan (on file with author).  For a thoughtful discussion 
of the potential reasons for derivative litigation in Japan, see West, Why 
Shareholders Sue, supra note 71, at 368–75.  West suggests that there is little 
direct benefit to shareholders from derivative litigation in Japan, lending 
support to the idea that such litigation is fee driven.  Id.  However, he notes 
that with the exception of a small number of cases brought by an “elite” share-
holders litigation consortium most derivative litigation does not produce high 
legal fees.  Id.  For such “non-elite” cases, motivation other than fees may be 
at work and for some cases it is possible that Sokaiya have moved into the 
litigation business.  Id.  
 297. For a discussion of relationship between fees and recoveries in deriva-
tive cases, see West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 71, at 368–75. 
 298. For a discussion of the various theories (including cultural and societal 
theory) supporting the evidence that Japanese file fewer lawsuits than U.S. 
citizens, see Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, 
at 789–97.  
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rivative cases initiated in 2001299 is inconclusive, especially as it 
mirrors the 1998 decline.300  The available data shows:301 
 
Derivative Cases Filed From 1996-2001  
in the District and High Courts 
District Court High Court 
Year Newly Filed Disposed New Appeals Disposed 
 
1996 68 66 12 13 
1997 88 66 11 9 
1998 73 59 17 18 
1999 93 77 15 11 
2000 83 98 32 30 
2001 68 80 28 25 
 
Further study is required regarding derivative lawsuits, once 
data for 2002 and 2003 is available.  
D.  Representative Actions 
Unlike U.S. law, Japanese civil procedure does not provide for 
class action suits.302  In Japan, each allegedly injured party 
must separately claim damages.303  However, Japanese law does 
recognize the “representative action.”304  In a representative ac-
tion suit, numerous parties are named as plaintiffs.305  From 
  
 299. In 2001, a great deal of publicity was given to the government’s bill to 
limit the liability of directors in derivative litigation, although the law did not 
get passed until December 2001, and did not become effective until May 2002.  
Corporate Government and Reform, supra note 294. 
 300. While interesting, it is noted that the drop in the number of derivative 
cases between 2000 and 2001 is exactly the same (15 cases) as the drop be-
tween 1997 and 1998.  See Derivative Cases Filed From 1996-2001 Chart. 
 301. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.  The data 
provided by the Secretariat differs slightly from data reported by Professor 
West for 1996–1999.  See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 71, at 356 
(Table 1).   
 302. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust 
Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 
604, 631 (1985). 
 303. See id.  
 304. See Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 782–83. 
 305. See id.  
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these plaintiffs, a small group is designated to represent the 
entire plaintiff group in the litigation.306  In this fashion, one 
case can try the issues and facts common to all claims made by 
the entire group of plaintiffs.  Unlike the U.S. class action, how-
ever, all the plaintiffs must in fact be real plaintiffs who appear 
in the case, and the plaintiffs do not represent others similarly 
situated who did not join in the lawsuit.307 
The writers of the New Code of Civil Procedure were aware of 
the U.S. style class action and were aware of the existing opin-
ion that Japanese law should permit class actions.308  The idea 
of permitting U.S. style class actions was rejected by the New 
Code, but the “representative action” was modified to permit 
parties to join the action after the complaint had already been 
filed.309  This joinder provision was seen as a step towards 
greater access to the court process, placing the New Code 
somewhere between the Old Code and the U.S. class action.310  
Bengoshi interviewees were also asked whether the new rep-
resentative action provisions had significantly changed the role 
of litigation in Japan (as class actions have significantly 
changed the role of litigation in the U.S.).  The response was 
that the new change had made virtually no difference in litiga-
tion.311  Respondents felt that while some new plaintiffs may 
have joined suits, the New Code brought about no great 
change.312  At the time the New Code was written, one issue 
raised was whether representative plaintiffs’ counsel should be 
allowed to “advertise” the pending suit and invite others to join 
the litigation.313 Interview subjects were asked: 
  
 306. See id.  
 307. See id.  
 308. See id. at 782.  
 309. ODA, supra note 1, at 395–98. 
 310. See Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 783. 
 311. For example, a lawyer interviewed in Kobe stated that he had not yet 
seen a representative action brought in the Kobe District Court.  Interview 
with lawyer (U) in Kobe, Japan (on file with author).   
 312. Interview subjects were asked: “Have the provisions allowing for per-
sons to join representative actions after the lawsuit has already been filed 
resulted in significant numbers of persons joining such suits after they have 
been filed?”  
 313. Kojima, supra note 15, at 719 n.208 (“Placing the burden on the plain-
tiffs to provide such notice would seem to undercut the potential effectiveness 
of this device.”). 
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Do you think [that] lawyers under [the] supervision of 
the court should be allowed to place notices in the news-
papers advising persons of the filing of a representative 
suit and advising as to how persons may join such suits? 
Responses varied greatly.  Some bengoshi believed that they 
already had the right to place such advertisements without 
court approval.314  Some interviewees even felt that the court 
should have no say in what the bengoshi published, while oth-
ers felt the court would want no role in this issue in order to 
avoid responsibility for the advertisement.315  Additionally, some 
bengoshi felt that such advertising would be bad for the Bar’s 
public reputation, while others considered this issue as unim-
portant.316  Among the various rationales for this viewpoint was 
the notion that lawyers already had the ability to advertise the 
filing of such cases through newspaper interviews and other 
devices, and therefore newspaper advertising was neither sig-
nificant nor important.  Another factor may very well be the 
costs of such advertisements.  Unlike in the U.S., where a law-
yer’s contingent fee may be greatly enhanced by the size of the 
plaintiff class and the value of the class claim, lawyer’s fees in 
Japanese representative cases are not related to the number of 
plaintiffs represented, although the “success” portion of the fee 
may be related to the amount of damages recovered.317  Thus, a 
  
 314. A bengoshi in Saitama noted that advertising was taking place in 
connection with representative suits but also noted that he had recently seen 
some advertisements and public relations (i.e., interviews with the press, an-
nouncements to lawyers groups) relating to consumer fraud cases.  Interview 
with lawyer (E) in Saitama, Japan (on file with author).   
 315. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (U) in Kobe, Japan (on file with au-
thor).   
 316. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (V) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with 
author); Interview with lawyer (W) in Hiroshima, Japan  (on file with author).  
An interviewee bengoshi in Saitama noted that the image of U.S. lawyers in 
Japan was not good and that such advertising might create a similar image 
for Japanese bengoshi.  Interview with lawyer (E) in Saitama, Japan (on file 
with author).   
 317. In Japan, it is customary for the Bar Association to prepare a chart of 
lawyers fees for cases.  The chart encompasses the “up-front” portion of the 
fee, based on the recovery sought, and a “success” component, based on the 
success in the case and typically represents a percentage recovery.  Such 
charts were regularly published at the front of address/note/memo books pre-
pared by the Bar Association for its members.  Recently such charts, such as 
official guides to fees, have been moderated because of anti-trust arguments.  
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lawyer placing an advertisement might not be able to recoup 
the cost of preparing and printing such advertisements.  In 
sum, there did not appear to be great support among bengoshi 
for an advertising option paid for by the plaintiff group.  
E.  Complicated Cases 
In Japan, cases in which two or more witnesses testify are 
viewed as complicated cases.318  In the Preparatory Proceeding 
for Oral Argument phase of a case, the judge will narrow the 
number of issues and witnesses required to try those issues to 
such a great extent that if two or more witnesses are needed to 
resolve the issues the case is, by definition, complicated.319  Us-
  
For an English language Japan Federation of Bar Associations retainer and 
success fees schedule, see Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 28, at 448.  See 
also West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 71, at 365.   
 318. For example, when keeping statistical records, cases are categorized as 
those involving only one witness and those in which two or more witnesses 
appear. The number of cases where only one witness appears exceeds the total 
of all other cases where two or more witnesses appear.  See, e.g., Average 
Number of Months from Filing of Complaint to Disposition Chart, supra Part 
III.A.1.  
 319. The “narrowing of issues” by Japanese judges represents a significant 
difference in the role of the court in the U.S. and Japanese systems.  In Japan, 
the Judge can “narrow” issues by preventing a party from raising an issue for 
trial without rendering a decision or order as to the validity of the issue.  
Moreover, a judge can use his/her narrowing of issues authority to refuse to 
permit witness testimony.  See MINSOHŌ, arts. 165(1), 170(6) & 177.  See also 
id. art. 181(1) (the court can decide whether evidence is required).  Prior to the 
Second World War Japanese civil procedure was such that the trial judge had 
strong directive powers in the process of “fixing issues” and “proof taking.”  
Tanabe, supra note 121, at 507–08.  For example, the court assumed the lead-
ership and responsibility for both fixing and narrowing the issues, as the court 
would ‘clarify’ matters throughout the entire trial process.  Id.  Although in 
form this procedure was changed by the occupation to a more adversarial pro-
cedure, the reality was that the role of the judge changed little.  Id. at 517–25.  
See also Kamiya, supra note 182, at 56.  Kamiya explains: 
After five decades, it appears that lawyers (and judges) still take it 
for granted that the presiding judge will be in control, not only during 
the trial…but also in case management.…In other words, the adver-
sarial structure of the proceedings has not denied courts and presid-
ing judges the opportunity to be paternalistic, or even meddle in 
many aspects of the litigation.  
Id.  In the U.S., the court lacks such authority and as a consequence the par-
ties are in control of the issues until the court makes a ruling that is a part of 
the record and thus part of the record on appeal, on the validity or invalidity 
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ing this methodology, the consolidated trial procedure is a use-
ful method for dealing with testimony in complicated cases. 
Further, both interview responses and statistics show that this 
procedure is being used on an ever-growing basis.  For purposes 
of this discussion, however, complicated cases are considered to 
be cases that involve complicated issues of fact — especially 
those involving facts typically outside the experience of the 
judge.  Such cases usually need some form of expert advice.320  
For example, medical malpractice cases require technical medi-
cal expertise, construction cases may require technical engi-
neering expertise, and intellectual property cases may require 
technical expertise in any of a number of fields.  In the U.S., on 
direct and cross-examination, expert witnesses typically present 
technical facts to either a judge or a jury, who usually lack such 
technical knowledge.321  Although U.S. judges have the right to 
appoint experts, they rarely do so.322  Additionally, when such 
experts are appointed, their opinions may be subjected to cross-
examination and challenged by party witnesses.323   
Although the rate of litigation has not increased with adop-
tion of the New Code, there is evidence that the number of com-
plicated cases has increased.  This increase, combined with the 
need to further reduce the time necessary to resolve cases, is 
creating additional stress in the Japanese judicial system.  For 
example, the number of medical malpractice cases brought in 
the District Court has risen consistently from  the adoption of  
the New Code until today.  The figures for medical malpractice 
cases show:324 
  
of an issue.  See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 35.  Thus, in the U.S., the court can 
only narrow the issues in a case by resolving the issues raised by the parties. 
 320. See Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: 
A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 480, 490–93 (1988). 
 321. See Geoffrey M. Howard & Elizabeth A. Ybarra, Court-Appointed Ex-
perts, 12 NO. 1 PRAC. LITIGATOR 55, 56 (2001).  
 322. Id.  
 323. Id.  
 324. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96. 
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Malpractice Cases 
 
Year New Cases Filed Backlog 
1992 371 1, 257 
1993 442 1,352 
1994 505 1,465 
1995 484 1,523 
1996 572 1,595 
1997 593 1,661 
1998 622 1,699 
1999 663 1,793 
2000 775 1,878 
2001    805325 1,968 
 
Bengoshi and others interviewed noted this increase in com-
plicated cases (in this sense of the term) and the need to handle 
such cases better than they are currently. Those interviewed 
agreed that the consolidated hearing system embodied in the 
New Code helped deal with the increase in complicated cases.  
Since these cases involved the use of several witnesses, they 
lend themselves to the consolidated hearing method.  However, 
there was a general feeling that more needed to be done in or-
der to move these cases along to judgment faster.  As of 2001, 
statistical evidence showed that medical malpractice cases were 
resolved in an average of 32.7 months, whereas in 1999 (the 
year for which figures were used by the Judicial Reform Coun-
cil) such cases were resolved in approximately 34.6 months at 
the District Court level.   
The Judicial Reform Council recognized this problem in its 
report and made several recommendations to deal with these 
lengthy resolutions.  Among the recommendations were using 
  
 325. From a Rule of Law judicial system standpoint, the increase in medical 
malpractice cases proves interesting and bodes well for the legal system as a 
Rule of Law mechanism.  It is not known why the number of malpractice cases 
is increasing, but it is suggested that factors outside the New Code are re-
sponsible.  Particularly important may be the public’s greater knowledge of 
medical mistakes made by doctors and institutions such as hospitals, as well 
as the developing substantive law concerning patient’s rights in Japan.  See 
Yutaka Tejima, Recent Developments in the Informed Consent Law in Japan 
(I), 36 KOBE U. L. REV. 45 (2002).   
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“expert commissioners to support judges,” improving the 
“[c]ourt appointed expert witness system,” and strengthening 
the technical expertise of the legal profession.326  The judicial 
system has recognized the challenge presented by these new 
complicated cases and is attempting to find solutions.  Since it 
is recognized that both judges and lawyers lack technical 
knowledge, one idea being considered is that the judicial system 
should hire its own experts to work along side judges, as part of 
the judicial system.  Thus, physicians or engineers might be 
hired as judicial research assistants to provide technical advice 
to the judge.  Such a system, mimicking the system in effect for 
intellectual property cases, is seen as having the advantage of 
accuracy, since the expert is assisting in the decision-making, 
rather than a layperson.  Expert assistance also expedites the 
task of issue clarification.  However, such a system may have 
Rule of Law ramifications.  
If experts are hired as a part of the court bureaucracy to ad-
vise judges in camera, parties will not have the opportunity to 
challenge the expert opinion in front of the decision-maker.  
Such a system may be seen as taking the decision out of the 
public arena and placing it in a secret arena.327  Even if experts 
on the court payroll are required to present their findings in 
open court, by denying parties the opportunity to challenge the 
court expert (through cross examination and/or party hired ex-
perts), parties may feel that they are being denied a public and 
fair process.  Indeed, a system that does not permit open chal-
lenge to the expert opinion may undercut the objective of accu-
racy being sought.  Whatever the shortcomings, the ability to 
cross-examine an expert and to put on expert testimony in sup-
port of a party’s position does have the advantage of exposing 
the experts’ views to public scrutiny and allowing challenges 
  
 326. Recommendations of a Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch. 
II, pt. 1, § 2 (“Strengthening Handling of Cases Requiring Specialized Knowl-
edge”). 
 327. In discussing use of technical experts as “expert [C]ommissioners to 
support judges,” the Judicial Reform Council expressed concern that any such 
system could “assur[e] the transparency of procedures” and raised questions 
regarding whether expert commissioners “can be considered fair and neutral 
from the standpoint of both patient and doctor, and whether expert commis-
sioners might exert some hidden influence on the process whereby judges form 
their decisions.”  Id.  These same concerns should apply to a new “expert em-
ployee” or “expert research assistant” system.  
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that the expert may not have considered.  Such examination 
will aid the court in reaching a “correct” judgment. 
Another alternative is for the court to create a list of “expert 
Commissioners.”  These Commissioners would not be full time 
court employees.  Instead, one such Commissioner would be 
called upon by the court, on a case-by-case basis, to sit with the 
judges hearing a case.  The “expert Commissioner” would advise 
the judge as to the expert testimony heard in the case.  In ef-
fect, the “expert Commissioner” would be a “super expert,” 
commenting on the validity of the opinions expressed in open 
court by witnesses.  However, if the court received the views of 
the “expert Commissioner” in camera and without confrontation 
or possibility of contradiction, severe due process and Rule of 
Law questions could arise.  Indeed, if taken as part of the 
court’s deliberations and not as evidence, the views of the “ex-
pert Commissioner” would not be available for review by an ap-
pellate court.  
Of course, requiring court-appointed experts, hired experts, 
or expert Commissioners to give the parties copies of their opin-
ions and subjecting them to cross-examination and/or opposing 
expert views takes time.  Nonetheless, some scholars find that 
the increased fairness and perceptions of fairness among par-
ties and the public, as well as greater accuracy, is worth the 
extra time.328  While today’s bengoshi are not sufficiently edu-
cated in medical or engineering matters to conduct a valuable 
cross-examination, the legal education system is changing and 
part of that change is allowing persons from faculties other 
than the law faculty to become bengoshi (and hence judges as 
well).329  This change may have the effect of opening the legal 
field up to persons with knowledge in these specialized fields.  
Further, one of the objectives of the new law school system is 
educating students on the practical aspects of lawyering.330  
With an education based on the Socratic method and challenge 
to responses, tomorrow’s bengoshi may be better prepared for 
such cross-examination than may be the case today.  In an ef-
  
 328. Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch. 
II, pt. 2.   See also Lee, supra note 320, at 490–93.  
 329. Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch. 
III, pt. 2, § 2 (covering the Judicial Reform Council’s recommendations for law 
schools). 
 330. Id. 
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fort to bring more expertise in other fields to the legal and judi-
cial practice, perhaps new law schools should exempt some lim-
ited number of licensed or otherwise accredited professionals in 
specific non-law fields from the entrance exam requirements or 
give such persons extra consideration.  Such exemption might 
be particularly useful where medical doctors or construction 
engineers (two fields where complicated cases appear to be on 
the rise) are law school applicants.  
If cross-examination is deemed unnecessary for a civil law 
non-adversary system,331 then expert opinion, including the 
views expressed by “expert Commissioners,” should, at a mini-
mum, be made publicly available to the parties in advance of a 
decision.  With this notice, parties can submit conflicting expert 
opinion or views to correct perceived errors in “expert Commis-
sioner” advice.  Additionally, this system would create a dia-
logue between experts and judges and might reveal areas of 
inquiry not considered by court-retained experts as witnesses or 
Commissioners.  Giving the court the gatekeeper function of 
determining whether a party should be allowed to submit an 
expert to contradict a court employee expert is inadequate.332  A 
judge is unlikely to permit such a contradicting witness because 
to do so would both sanction a challenge to a colleague and take 
additional time in the trial.  Moreover, once the court has de-
termined that expert advice is important in the case, failure to 
allow the parties an opportunity to present their own expert 
witness would be inconsistent with the objective of the new re-
forms to better train lawyers so that they can better prepare 
and try cases.  Further, denying a party’s request to present its 
  
 331. While retaining a “civil law” based substantive law system, the post-
war procedure in Japan was modeled on the U.S. adversary system, and the 
New Code retains the adversarial form of examination and cross-examination 
of witnesses.  ALFRED C. OPPLER, LAW REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN 130–34 
(1976).  Under Rule 114 of the Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure, cross-
examination is limited to matters brought out on direct examination or mat-
ters relevant thereto as well as credibility issues.  MINJI  SOSH-O KISOKU, art. 
114.  
 332. A Japanese judge’s role in determining whether a party in such cir-
cumstance can present a witness is not similar to the role of the U.S. judge 
under Daubert, since in the Japanese situation, through its actions in appoint-
ing an expert, the Court has impliedly decided that the expert advice sought 
meets the reliability and professional standards set in Daubert.  For a discus-
sion of Daubert, see supra note 187 and accompanying text.  
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own expert will likely lead to that party filing an appeal and 
urging the appeals court to hear its witness.  Even in the likeli-
hood that the appeals court refuses to hear the witness, the ap-
peal itself will take time and will add to the costs of the litiga-
tion system. 
The July 2003 reform adopts a form of the “expert Commis-
sioner” system but does not adopt the full time expert employee 
system.333  Under the 2003 reform, the opinion of the expert 
Commissioner must be given in the presence of opposing coun-
sel (or if given by phone, a record of the opinion must be made 
and given to counsel); counsel then has an absolute right to pre-
sent an expert opinion of their own.334  The opinion of the expert 
Commissioner will be a part of the record in the case and thus 
will be available to a reviewing court.335  Since the court is com-
pelled to hear an expert proffered by a party whose opinion dif-
fers from the expert Commissioner, the Commissioner’s opinion 
is not conclusive.  Nonetheless, the court is likely to give greater 
weight to the opinion of the expert Commissioner than to that 
of an expert presented by a party.  There is nothing inherently 
wrong with such a system because the expert Commissioner 
may be viewed by the court as neutral, while a witness prof-
fered by a party may be viewed as somewhat less neutral. 
F.  Relations between the Bench and the Bar 
One of the more interesting serendipitous perceptions arising 
from the interview process was the gap in thinking, under-
standing and respect between the Bench and the Bar.  Among 
Japanese lawyers, the perception existed that judges were ei-
  
 333. Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch. 
II, pt. 1, § 2 (“Strengthening the Handling of Cases Requiring Specialized 
Knowledge”).  In July of 2003 the Diet enacted a form of “Expert Commis-
sioner” system to be used in complicated cases.  See Act to Amend Civil Proce-
dure Act and Other Relevant Acts, 15 Heisei (2003) Statute No. 108 (Japan) 
(adding Articles 92–2 to 92–7 to Japan’s New Code of Civil Procedure). 
 334. It remains to be seen whether Japanese judges will use their gate-
keeper authority to limit such expert opinion to written opinion or whether 
they will permit the parties to present oral expert testimony.  If limited to 
written opinion, it can reasonably be assumed that the opinion of the party 
expert will play little, if any, role in the determination of the case. 
 335. Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch. 
II, pt. 1, § 2 (“Strengthening the Handling of Cases Requiring Specialized 
Knowledge”). 
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ther unwilling or lacked the time to make difficult decisions 
regarding the consideration evidence that could affect a case.336  
Yet, lawyers appeared to be unwilling or lacked the time to edu-
cate the court regarding the necessity of making decisions or 
allowing of certain evidence.337  Lawyers instead wanted judges 
to prod opposing counsel to produce or find evidence and issues 
to assist their client.338  They wanted judges to suggest settle-
ments so that cases could be resolved, rather than lawyers be-
ing the vehicles for settlement talks.339  Judges, on the other 
hand, complained that lawyers were ill-prepared and unwilling 
to do the work needed to move the cases along swiftly.340  Judges 
felt the need to be paternalistic in their approach341 because so 
many parties were either not represented or were (in the judge’s 
view) inadequately represented.342 
In short, there appeared to be a significant divide between 
these legal professionals.  This divide is mirrored in the discus-
  
 336. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (E) in Saitama, Japan (on file with 
author). 
 337. Id. 
 338. A lawyer in Nagoya reasoned that the inquiry procedure was infre-
quently used because it was much better for the court to do the questioning 
than for counsel.  Interview with lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan (on file with 
author).   
 339. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (M) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with 
author).  A judge interviewed outside Tokyo expressed the view that settle-
ment should be in the hands of the lawyers, but that lawyers were afraid to 
raise settlement discussions for fear it would expose weaknesses in their case. 
Interview with High Court Judge (R) in Japan (on file with author).  As a 
result, lawyers want judges to raise settlement issues, remaining sensitive to 
the lawyers’ need for the court to initiate such discussion for fear of exposing 
individual case weaknesses.  Id. 
 340. A judge interviewed outside Tokyo noted that due to problems with 
lawyer preparation, judges had to be actively involved in the cases.  Interview 
with High Court Judge (R) in Japan (on file with author).  Moreover, this 
judge was of the view that lawyers in general had confidence in the govern-
ment, including the judicial branch, and thus wanted judges involved.  Id. 
 341. Miki, supra note 85, at 5 (“Japanese judges tend to be paternalistic and 
support the weaker side….”).  
 342. Interview with High Court Judge (R) in Japan (on file with author).  
Lawyers are aware of this feeling by judges.  As one lawyer noted, judges have 
a certain “arrogance” and look down on lawyers.  Interview with lawyer (E) in 
Saitama, Japan (on file with author).  See Kamiya, supra note 182, at 70 (not-
ing that the paternalistic attitude of courts “may be justified by the fact that 
the Code allows litigation to be filed and conducted without legal counsel or 
representatives”). 
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sion regarding entrance requirements for new law schools that 
will become operational at the beginning of 2004.  To begin 
with, issues arise regarding whether entrance exams for these 
new law schools should be prepared by the Ministry of Educa-
tion (probably with some input by the Judicial Branch)343 or the 
Bar Associations.  The likelihood is that two different entrance 
exams will be prepared and law schools will be allowed to 
choose one or the other and, perhaps in some cases both.344 Simi-
larly, with the advent of the new law schools, what will be the 
role of the Judiciary’s Legal Training and Research Institute?345 
  
 343. Although there is said to be a separation of powers in Japan, judges are 
regularly assigned to the executive branch to assist and work alongside ad-
ministrative officials.  ODA, supra note 1, at 395–98.  This assistance can in-
clude the representation of the government in litigation as well as opining on 
the constitutionality of legislation throughout the legislative process.  Id.  The 
former creates the specter of a judge as counsel for a party, and the latter 
complicates the judicial function when an issue of constitutionality is raised in 
a case or controversy due to the likelihood that, in a highly administrative 
State such as Japan, their colleagues respect judges assigned to the executive 
branch.  See CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, supra note 8, at § 3.02(4).   
In the course of their long careers and as a step in their promotion, 
the judges are sometimes appointed to a non-judicial task inside or 
outside the judiciary….Outside the judiciary, the greatest number of 
judges are assigned to various positions in the Ministry of Justice, as 
legislative or administrative staff, or as government attor-
neys.…Generally speaking a judge’s career path is regarded highly 
when it includes one or two of the above-mentioned special assign-
ments. 
Id.  The fact that colleagues have approved of the court’s ability to challenge 
the constitutionality of laws places a burden on courts which might have ques-
tions concerning the constitutionality of certain laws.  This burden certainly 
places the challenging party at a disadvantage.   
 344. In August of 2003, eighteen thousand persons took the exam for en-
trance to the New Law Schools administered by the Japanese Bar, i.e., the 
Japan Law Foundation.  However, another entrance test was administered on 
August 31 by the National Center for University Entrance Exams.  “It is up to 
each graduate school to decide which tests to consider in evaluating appli-
cants, but many graduate schools are expected to refer to both….”  18,000 
Take Exams for New Law Schools, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 4, 2003 at http://www. 
japantimes.co/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20030804a3.htm.  
 345. The likelihood is that the Institute will continue, although the time 
required for attendance will be shortened from eighteen months to one year 
and the reduction will be distributed among the various aspects of Institute 
study, namely the classroom, intern program and final class sessions to incor-
porate what has been experienced in the intern program.  Discussions with 
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Should there be continuing legal education requirements and, if 
so, is it appropriate for the judges to lecture at these CLE 
courses?  Would such lecture process be seen by the Bar as an 
attempt by the judicial branch to control the Bar?  
Some Japanese lawyers and professors interviewed did not 
see this divide between bengoshi and judges.346  Others ac-
knowledged the existence of such a divide, but contended that it 
was small, at least in comparison to the past divisions between 
the two branches of the profession.347  Nonetheless, comments 
by both the Bench and the Bar indicate that a significant divide 
exists.  In part, this gulf is historical, based on the Bar’s desire 
to preserve its autonomy and viewing judicial involvement in 
Bar matters with concern.348  This concern is heightened by the 
  
Judicial Secretariat and officials at the Institute in Tokyo Japan (on file with 
author). 
 346. See generally Interview with lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan & Interview 
with lawyer (I) in Osaka, Japan (on file with author) (noting that the person-
ality of the judge primarily affects how bengoshi perceive the divide between 
bengoshi and judges).  But see Tanabe, supra note 121, at 553. 
 347. See Tanabe, supra note 121, at 553.  See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (T) 
from Japan (on file with author). 
 348. At one time, all judges were graduates of the Imperial Universities and 
accordingly were highly respected.  Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 70.  At the 
same time, the predecessor of the bengoshi, the kujishi and later the daigen-
nin were not required to be graduates of any school and many had no profes-
sional training or qualifications.  Id. at 71.  In the early period of modern 
Japanese law the reputation of daigennin was so bad “that a special term of 
opprobrium, sambyaku daigen, a term which it has been suggested might best 
be translated as ‘shyster’ or ‘pettifogger,’ gained currency.”  Id. at 67.  One 
purpose of the Lawyers Law of 1933 was to raise the qualifications for bengo-
shi “to the same level as those of judges and procurators.”  Id. at 75.  As re-
cently as 1974, Professor Tanaka could write:  
[I]t must be said that the legal profession as a group still has a long 
way to go in order to gain general social acceptance of the social 
status it claims and of the role it plays.  This is as much a question of 
changing the way of thinking of the general public as it is a challenge 
to the legal profession to improve its standing by its own efforts.   
Tanaka, supra note 28, at 265; see also TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, 
supra note 8, at 550 (“Practicing attorneys were in a lower position socially as 
well.”).  Thus, the view that being a bengoshi was an “honorable” profession is 
of relatively recent origin while the judge position was always viewed as a 
highly regarded public servant.  In a country where the bureaucracy is highly 
respected, judges were (and remain) among the most highly regarded.  More-
over, until the Post-war period the legal profession was under the control of 
the Ministry of Justice.  The profession had long chaffed under government 
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fact that Japan’s Supreme Court is specifically given rule-
making authority for all matters relating to attorneys.349  In 
part, the divide represents a different experience with and out-
look toward the litigation process. 
The Judicial Reform Council recommended that the Bar be 
more involved in judging and teaching.350  Thus, the new law 
schools are encouraged to use “adjunct professors” who are 
members of the litigating Bar,351 and the judicial branch is en-
couraged to hire practicing lawyers as judges.352  Although tech-
nically eligible to become judges after entering the practice of 
law, the reality is that “[j]udges are nearly always selected 
from…assistant judges with 10 or more years of experience, be-
cause public prosecutors, lawyers and law professors with 10 
years experience normally are not available for appointment to 
a Judgeship.”353  These recommendations are likely to have 
muted success.  Some law schools appear to have adopted a pol-
icy under which the “adjuncts” work full-time for a few years, 
thus giving up their active practices and financial rewards.354  
This approach is unlikely to attract the “best” of the practicing 
Bar.355  Similarly, the salary discrepancy between successful 
practicing lawyers and judges of similar age and experience 
may prevent successful lawyers from seeking judicial positions.  
  
regulation.  The Post-war occupation did away with Ministerial control and 
made the Bar mostly self-governing.  Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 76–77, 80.    
 349. KENPŌ, art. 77 (“The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making 
power under which it determines the rules of procedure and of practice, and of 
matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts and the 
administration of judicial affairs.”).   
 350. See generally Recommendations of a Judicial Reform Council, supra 
note 19. 
 351. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, supra note 8, at § 3.02(2).     
 352. Id. 
 353. See TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 552 (noting 
that practicing attorneys are reluctant to accept the decrease in income that 
inheres to entering the judiciary); Takahara, supra note 29.  
 354. Discussion with Professor Miki in Tokyo (on file with author). 
 355. The prospect for adjunct judges is better as new legislation permits 
judges to continue to remain in their judicial positions while teaching at law 
schools.  Previously, judges who wanted to adjunct teach were required to take 
time off from their judicial positions, while under the new law such teaching is 
considered a judicial duty and can therefore be performed on “judicial time.”  
See Act to Dispatch Judges, Prosecutors to National Civil Service Employees 
to Law Schools, 15 Heisi (2003) Statute No. 40 (Japan). 
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Moreover, there are currently few practicing lawyers in Ja-
pan.356  Transferring some of these practicing lawyers to judicial 
positions will further reduce the number of lawyers available 
for the public.  A more radical approach to Bar and Bench rela-
tions may have to be considered if the gulf between them is to 
be addressed. 
In the U.S., the divide between the Bench and the Bar is not 
nearly as broad as appears to be the case in Japan.357  One ex-
planation is that federal U.S. judges are typically appointed 
after a successful (and profitable) career in the private prac-
tice.358  In any event, even the thought of a District Court judge 
appointment without any litigation experience is bizarre.  Many 
U.S. judges were leaders in Bar Associations before joining the 
Bench and many continue to be actively involved in Bar Asso-
ciation activities after appointment.359  The fact is that U.S. 
  
 356. For a discussion of the practical effects of the scarcity of lawyers in 
Japan, see Joseph Gurnee, Practical Aspects of Litigating in Japan: an Ameri-
can Lawyer’s Perspective, at http://www.intl-lawyers.com/articles/jplaw/ (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2003). 
 357. In the U.S., the failure of Congress to raise the salaries of federal 
judges and bring them closer to the salaries of lawyers in major firms has 
created something of a gulf between the Bar and federal judges.  The Need for 
Judicial Pay Reform, Statement of the American Bar Association President, 
submitted to The National Commission on the Public Service, available at 
http://www.abanet.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).  The Bar responded by 
supporting the judicial branch’s efforts to get pay relief.  Independence of the 
Judiciary: Judicial Compensation, 2002 A.B.A. Legis. & Gov’t Priorities, 
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/judcom.html (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2003), which states: 
The ABA supports legislative action to increase judicial compensation 
and ensure regular cost-of-living increases for federal, state, and ter-
ritorial judges and the administrative judiciary, and urges Congress 
to de-link Congressional pay from judicial pay. The ABA also recom-
mends periodic, systematic review of the adequacy of federal judicial 
pay (along with the adequacy of pay for other top-level government 
officials) in order to provide our judges with adequate and fair com-
pensation. 
Id.  
 358. Marcus, supra note 35, at 28 (“U.S. Judges, too, were distinctive.  
Rather than emerging from professional training directed toward service in 
the judiciary, they came usually from the practicing Bar, and also had limited 
formal education.”).  
 359. The Japanese Federation of Bar Associations is composed of local Bar 
Associations and “all individual lawyers…members of the bench or procuracy 
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judges are members of both the Bench and the Bar.360  Judges 
understand the challenges and frustrations of the private prac-
tice because they experienced them themselves.  Furthermore, 
lawyers tend to be more understanding of the pressures placed 
on the Bench because there is open dialogue about these issues. 
Both the Bench and Bar participate in legal education activities 
as adjunct professors, while actively employed outside the aca-
demic world.  In short, there is a commonality of experience and 
interests between U.S. lawyers and judges. 
Meanwhile, Japanese judges are part of a career civil service 
system361 and are exposed to the practice of law during their 
tenure at the Legal Training and Research Institute.362  All 
trainees are required to intern in the field at law offices, prose-
cutor’s offices and judge’s chambers.363  Through these training 
internships, trainees are educated to respect, and at times de-
fer, to the other branches of the legal profession.364  However, 
this exposure is only for a relatively short period at the begin-
ning of a career and does not provide the in-depth exposure to 
the practice of law that comes from dealing with clients and 
client-related issues on a daily basis.  
On the other hand, U.S. judges are not moved from location to 
location but are appointed to the circuit or district where they 
serve.365  As a consequence, U.S. judges have a close relationship 
with the communities where they live and work.  That relation-
  
cannot be members of the Federation.”  CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, 
supra note 8, at § 205(2).  
 360. Bureau of Labor and Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupa-
tional Outlook Handbook, 2002-2003 Edition, Judges, Magistrates, and Other 
Judicial Workers, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos272.htm (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2003). 
 361. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, supra note 8, at § 3.02(4).  
 362. Id.   
 363. LEGAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JAPAN, supra note 76, at 7.  
 364. Id. at 11–12.  The Legal Training and Research Institute notes that: 
During the field training term, legal apprentices are assigned to the 
district courts, the district public prosecutors’ offices, and the local at-
torney’s associations throughout the country. The field training lasts 
twelve months and is subdivided into three-month rotational assign-
ments at each of the civil trial, criminal trial, public prosecution, and 
private practice of law. 
Id.  
 365. 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133.   
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ship extends to others who have similar training, experience 
and backgrounds — in other words local lawyers. Unlike Japa-
nese judges, U.S. judges do not live together in compounds cre-
ated or funded by a judicial bureaucracy.366  Judges may have 
friends among their colleagues, but they also have friends 
among their former colleagues at the Bar and among the gen-
eral community.    
Most significantly, U.S. judges are not career judges who 
start their professional life as judges and seek to prosper within 
the judicial bureaucracy.367  They are not “inbred,” learning 
their craft from the judges who came before them. Instead, they 
bring new experiences and new ideas from outside the Bench to 
the courtroom.  However, this discrepancy can lead to unfortu-
nate consequences in individual cases; for example, judges may 
be unprepared to sit on the Bench, may not understand how to 
work within the judicial system, or may be appointed because 
their brother went to school with a U.S. Senator rather than 
because of  their ability.368  Whatever the shortcomings, the U.S. 
system does provide a commonality of experience between 
judges and lawyers, as well as, a greater understanding and 
appreciation of each other’s experiences.  Additionally, the 
knowledge and experience that judges with previous litigation 
experience may have in representing and understanding client 
issues is important from the judicial standpoint.  
Still, convincing bengoshi to give up their lucrative practices 
and lifestyles in communities where they have ties and are re-
spected only to move into the bureaucratic world of the travel-
ing Japanese judge may prove difficult.369  However, something 
  
 366. See Sabrina Shizue McKenna, Japanese Judicial Reform: Proposal for 
Judicial Reform in Japan: An Overview, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y  J. 121, 140 
(2001) (noting that the Japanese system of separating judges from the rest of 
the community by providing them with government housing is meant to pre-
vent judicial favoritism towards acquaintances).  See also 28 U.S.C. § 44 (stat-
ing that U.S. judges shall be residents of the circuit for which appointed). 
 367. Marcus, supra note 35, at 28 (“[U.S. judges] surely did not rise through 
a judicial bureaucracy.”).  
 368. See generally American Bar Association, supra note 111 (noting that 
the U.S. judiciary is becoming increasingly politicized, creating public doubt 
as to whether judges make decisions on matters of fact and law or based on 
political pressure and special interests). 
 369. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, supra note 8, at § 3.02(4).  
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short of such a dramatic change may prove useful.370  Perhaps 
aspiring judges, who choose the judicial life when in school or at 
the Legal Training and Research Institute, may be required to 
spend five years in the active private practice before they can be 
appointed as judges in training.  Such a requirement would as-
sure that judges have some practical experience before ascend-
ing to the Bench.371  This requirement would also make them 
active members of the Bar community before becoming judges 
and might help to bridge the gap between the Bench and Bar in 
Japan.372  Additionally, practicing bengoshi recruited for the 
  
 370. One bengoshi interviewed stated that if she could change one thing 
about the civil justice system she would abolish the career judge system and 
require that all judges be appointed from among practicing lawyers.  Inter-
view with lawyer (E) from Saitama in Washington, D.C., U.S.A. (on file with 
author). 
 371. In the past, the Japanese judicial system has opposed such a sugges-
tion.  See Supreme Court Accepts Advisory Panel on Judges, JAPAN TIMES 
ONLINE, Feb. 20, 2001, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/get 
article.pl5?nn20010220a3.htm (Supreme Court of Japan accepted a panel to 
assist on Judicial selection but rejected the Bar Associations suggestion that 
all new judges first “work as lawyers or prosecutors for five years to broaden 
their experience.”).  However, in light of changing attitudes towards Judicial 
Reform, it may be well to rethink this opposition and take a more global atti-
tude that encompasses both the staffing needs of the judiciary and the judici-
ary’s need for a broader base of experience in the corps of judges.  See Rabi-
nowitz, supra note 8, at 77 for a discussion of the Bar’s attempts, as early as 
1956 — the date of the Rabinowitz article — to achieve professional “integra-
tion,” meaning “selection of members of the judiciary from the Bar rather than 
directly from among graduates of the Judicial Research and Training Insti-
tute.”  Id. 
 372. Similarly, Japanese prosecutors tend to be career prosecutors who have 
never represented criminally accused clients.  LEGAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE OF JAPAN, supra note 76, at 12–14 (“Upon successful completion of 
the final qualifying examination, a legal apprentice may choose to be an assis-
tant judge, a public prosecutor, or a practicing attorney.”).  Japanese defense 
lawyers, on the other hand, have rarely been prosecutors as such service en-
tails also a career in civil service.  As a consequence neither truly understands 
the position of the other.  Whatever the shortcomings of the U.S. criminal law 
system, distance in experience between prosecuting attorneys and defense 
attorneys is not one of them.  Generally, most U.S. prosecutors have spent at 
least some time as defense attorneys and most defense attorneys have worked 
as prosecutors.  There exists a real revolving door between the prosecution 
and defense Bar.  As a consequence, while the prosecutors and defense law-
yers may sharply disagree on issues, they each understand the position of the 
other — having been the other and perhaps considering being the other in the 
future.  Japan may wish to explore whether it is helpful to the criminal law 
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Bench can be exempted from the transfer requirements, under 
which judges are moved around the country on an average 
three-year cycle.  Having established ties in a particular local-
ity, these bengoshi may be given the option of remaining in that 
locality during their service as a judge.  Apparently, the Japa-
nese Supreme Court has already decided to exempt such law-
yers from the travel rotation system.373  More problematic, 
though, is determining how to deal with the practice that a ben-
goshi judicial candidate has built up over the years.  Not only 
must the financial value of that practice be resolved, but the 
goodwill created over the years must be up-kept and the clients 
losing a trusted counselor must be protected.  
Another problem in carrying out the Reform Council’s rec-
ommendation that more bengoshi become judges relates to the 
pay scale of judges — not simply where to place previously suc-
cessful bengoshi judges without judicial experience on the pay 
scale, but also how to ensure that such judges receive appropri-
ate pay consideration in the future.374  The likelihood is that any 
bureaucracy — including a judicial bureaucracy — will look 
more favorably on experience within its ranks than on outside 
experience.  However, if bengoshi are to be recruited as judges, 
they must be assured as to future pay and responsibility equal 
to those who are their contemporaries in age and total profes-
sional experience.  At the same time, if paid on the basis of ex-
perience and age alone, unsuccessful bengoshi may seek judicial 
appointment as a good alternative to unsuccessful practice.  
Yet, these individuals are not the bengoshi that the Reform 
Council envisions as future judges.  In this regard, the practic-
ing Bar also has a screening responsibility. 
Another issue is that regarding retirement. Judges (except for 
Supreme Court Justices and Summary Court Judges) must re-
  
system and the public perception of that system to have defense and prosecu-
torial lawyers who have had some experience on the other side of the aisle.  
Having judges who were at one time defense lawyers would likely affect the 
decision-making in criminal cases. 
 373. Toshiko Takenaka, Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Court Systems 
for Patent Litigation: A Special Court or Special Divisions in a General Court?, 
STREAMLINING INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NO.5, 47, 48 (2000), available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number5/pub5atcl6.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2004). 
 374. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
807. 
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tire at age sixty-five.375  Thus, a career judge who serves forty 
years as a judge has a significant retirement benefit.  But, for a 
bengoshi becoming a judge after twenty years of experience, the 
retirement benefits received at sixty-five will be substantially 
less.  Moreover, such a “bengoshi-turned-judge” may not wish to 
attempt to re-start a law practice after retirement, having al-
ready created a practice once before.  Thus, such a bengoshi 
may be at a substantial disadvantage in retirement.  To recruit 
successful, middle-aged bengoshi, the retirement rules may re-
quire modification.  Perhaps, the law should be modified to al-
low “bengoshi-turned-judge” personnel to work until a later age 
or even be given retirement credit for some, if not all, of their 
years of active bengoshi practice.  In any event, if the goal is to 
recruit successful bengoshi, some mechanism must be found to 
ameliorate the economic disadvantage that face bengoshi who 
wish to become a judge.376    
Further, rather than providing government subsidized hous-
ing where young judges are clustered together, consideration 
might be given to providing newly appointed judges with a 
housing allowance that would enable and encourage them to 
live among the people whom they serve.  This housing will give 
judges more access to the lives of the people whose cases they 
  
 375. The compulsory retirement age of lower court judges is sixty-five, ex-
cept for Summary Court Judges, who retire at 70.  CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 
REVISED, supra note 8, at § 3.02(2).   
 376. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at 
807.  Without some accommodation regarding the economic disadvantage of 
moving from bengoshi to judge, the likelihood is that only unsuccessful bengo-
shi will elect to become judges — but this is not the quality of judge that the 
system should be attempting to recruit.  Of course, bengoshi who are so com-
mitted to the legal reforms may sacrifice themselves for the legal system and 
elect to become judges.  However, such bengoshi should not be compelled to 
make this personal sacrifice and it will be difficult to find large numbers of 
such committed bengoshi.  For example, in 1992, only a handful of practicing 
bengoshi actually became judges.  In 1992, the National Bar Federation intro-
duced a system in which they make recommendations to the Supreme Court 
regarding lawyers seeking judgeships.  Although thirty-seven lawyers have 
made the change to the bench since the system was introduced, enthusiasm 
for the opportunity has been minimal.  The change usually involves accepting 
a lower salary, giving up established clients and often a transfer to courts in 
remote areas.  Takahara, supra note 29. 
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decide and give the public greater access to judges as real peo-
ple at an early stage in their professional life.377 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
One objective of the New Code of Civil Procedure, and a goal 
of the Judicial Reform Council, was to strengthen the judicial 
system as a Rule of Law dispute resolution mechanism.  A few 
steps towards this goal were making the system more readily 
accessible to the public and strengthening the mechanisms of 
decision-making, such as quickening the pace of resolution and 
expanding the discovery of evidence, so that the public would in 
fact utilize the legal system for dispute resolution.378  To make 
the system more accessible, the New Code expanded the juris-
diction of the Summary Court and introduced a new one-day 
small claims dispute resolution mechanism.379  The small claims 
jurisdiction of the court appears to have had the desired effect 
as the number of small claims cases has increased on an annual 
basis at a rate that far exceeds that of new case filings in the 
judicial system on the whole.  With respect to increasing the use 
of the judicial system in general, the New Code does not appear 
to have achieved its desired goal.  The fact of the matter is that 
when the new small claim cases are factored out of the system, 
the number of new cases filed has barely changed since the New 
Code’s adoption.380   
While the general use of the judicial system has not increased 
(with the exception of the small claims cases mentioned above), 
the pace of litigation has quickened so that on average new 
cases filed in the District Court are resolved relatively 
  
 377. See generally McKenna, supra note 366, at 140 (noting that judges are 
subject to transfer to different geographical locations and are provided with 
housing in the same area as other judges).  More experienced judges, who 
have saved sufficient funds to purchase their own residence and who can con-
template transfers within a relatively close geographic area, already purchase 
their own residences and many live among the general public.  Id. However, in 
their early years these judges tend to live in small, old and very inexpensive 
housing complexes that the Judicial Secretariat provides to them.  Id.  
 378. Id. at 135–37. 
 379. MINSOHŌ, art. 370 (concerning the principles of a one-day trial). 
 380. See Hayashi, supra note 143 and accompanying text (the table demon-
strates that when small claims cases factored out, the increase in new cases 
filed in District and Summary Courts was negligible). 
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quickly.381  This increase may be due to the “legalized” proce-
dures in the New Code or due to the fact that judges are permit-
ting fewer witnesses to testify in open court than was the case 
in earlier years.382  One question to be considered is why the 
number of new cases filed has not increased significantly since 
the adoption of the New Code.  Undoubtedly, many other fac-
tors not considered in this study also have an effect on the 
number of new cases filed, such as the comparatively small size 
of Japanese damage awards, the continued high cost of litiga-
tion, the difficulties of collecting on a judgment, the time lag for 
the new bengoshi reforms and legal education systems to take 
effect, and cultural factors.  But, some of the factors considered 
herein may also be relevant. 
Although the time to resolve an average case has significantly 
declined since adoption of the New Code, the fact remains that 
high profile cases continue to take several years for resolution 
at the District Court level and appeals of such cases take years 
at the High Court level.383  Due to the previous slow pace of 
resolution, the Japanese legal system needs to overcome the 
public perception that the system operates at a “snail’s pace.”  
The fact that some high profile cases take many years for reso-
lution only furthers that perception.  Similarly, the perception 
of the public is influenced by news reports that focus not on the 
improvements made in the time required to resolve the average 
litigation, but rather on the time delays in cases of public inter-
est, both civil and criminal.  
In addition, the failure to make greater use of the judicial 
system to resolve legal issues may be related to the way in 
which the system operates.  Thus, the present system’s focus on 
“narrowing,” rather than resolving, issues presented in a case 
may have an effect on the system’s use.  In approximately 85% 
of cases in the present system, no witnesses are heard, and in 
cases where witnesses are heard, the number keeps declining.384  
Cases are resolved based on written materials or a form of trial 
  
 381. See Average Number of Months from Filing of Complaint to Disposition 
– District Court Chart, supra Part III.A.1. 
 382. See Trials to be Expedited, supra note 18. 
 383. See Percentage of Judgment Cases Decided in One and Two Years 
Chart, supra Part III.A.1.  
 384. See Witnesses at District Court (First Instance) Chart, supra Part 
III.A.4.  
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by dossier.  Additionally, in many cases, there may only be a 
question of law which can be decided without evidence (rather 
than factual issues), and in others, a party may default.  Even 
considering the dismissal of these cases, the high percentage of 
cases without witnesses and the declining number of witnesses 
in cases with oral testimony are likely to result in appeals, pri-
marily based on procedural justice for the appellant, rather 
than substantive issues.  To be an adequate dispute resolution 
system, the judicial system must not only do justice but must be 
perceived by the legal community as doing justice.  A system in 
which the litigating parties rarely have an opportunity to per-
sonally state their case in front of the decision-maker in the 
formal setting of a trial or Oral Hearing is likely to be looked at 
as “removed” from the parties and failing to provide a “day in 
court.”  Issues exist as to whether the cost of efficiency — the 
accelerating trend of not hearing live testimony — is too high.  
Just as a minority of high profile, slow moving cases leads to 
the incorrect perception that all cases proceed slowly (when in 
fact the average case in Japan moves rather quickly), so too the 
lack of witness testimony may present a “perception” problem.  
“Paternalistic” Japanese judges are concerned with providing 
“substantive justice.”  Judges want to issue a substantively cor-
rect decision to ensure that the party that should win does in 
fact win.  Such judges are more concerned with a correct deci-
sion than with the procedural niceties surrounding the proc-
ess.385  U.S. judges, on the other hand, are more concerned with 
procedural niceties and less concerned with whether substan-
tive justice is achieved, as demonstrated by the relatively few 
jury awards that are set aside by the trial court.386  Yet, the pos-
sibility exists that some Japanese citizens do not use the legal 
system because they feel that the system does not provide them 
with justice, while many U.S. citizens use the system because 
they feel they can attain justice.  If such is the case, perception 
(as distinct from reality) may have an impact on the judicial 
system as a Rule of Law dispute resolution mechanism.   
  
 385. See Tanabe, supra note 121, at 520–22. 
 386. See, e.g., BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (noting 
that only when an award is “grossly excessive” in relation to the State’s le-
gitimate punishment and deterrence interests does it violate due process). 
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Further, the New Code reforms aim to make trials more reli-
able, efficient, and speedy, through the new inquiry procedure, 
the expanded document production language of the New Code 
and the new tools available to judges dealing with document 
production requests (in camera review and redacting).387  How-
ever, these goals appear not to have been realized in practice.  
Thus, in camera review and redaction are virtually never used 
and the new inquiry procedure is similarly moribund.  The in-
quiry procedure is not used to discover evidence, nor does it ap-
pear to narrow the issues to be tried or speed up the judicial 
process.  Whether the reason for the failure of the inquiry sys-
tem lies in the system itself — i.e., the fact that there are no 
sanctions for failing to respond or responding accurately — or 
elsewhere is a matter that should be further studied.  One clear 
conclusion is that lawyers are not using the system as the New 
Code intended and in this regard, the system is not achieving 
its objective. 
Similarly, while leading to the greater production of docu-
ments through the use of court suggestions, new document pro-
cedures do not appear to lead to the greater production of sig-
nificant documents, at least in cases between private parties.  
Whether the reason for this problem is the reluctance of courts 
to punish individuals for failing to respond, or the substantive 
rules surrounding production requirements (i.e., the self-use 
document exception), it appears that the New Code’s catch-all 
document provision has not had a significant effect on making 
truly relevant documents available.  According to bengoshi in-
terviewed, the New Code’s “discovery” provisions do not make it 
easier for a righteous plaintiff to obtain judicial relief.  
Although most bengoshi interviewed were not prepared to 
suggest that litigation today be instituted because it may be 
resolved at any higher rate than in the past, in certain areas 
the pace of new filings has increased.  These cases generally 
consist of more complicated cases, such as malpractice.  Here, 
the reasons for increased filings may be related to factors other 
than the New Code and new judicial activism to speed up reso-
lution of cases.  In the malpractice field, the substantive law 
seems to be changing, placing a greater burden on doctors to be 
more open with their patients and to more closely consider their 
  
 387. See Ota, supra note 9, at 568–70. 
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patient’s wishes.  Perhaps, more malpractice cases are insti-
tuted today due to the combination of this higher burden on 
doctors and greater public awareness of medical matters 
(through availability of information on the World Wide Web and 
otherwise).  Complicated malpractice cases take longer to re-
solve than simple litigations.  Thus, although methods to en-
hance the efficiency of such cases should be pursued, restricting 
a party’s ability to challenge the expert opinion of a court-
employed expert may be counter-productive to obtaining a “cor-
rect” decision and to enhancing the public’s perception of the 
judicial system as a Rule of Law system wherein justice can be 
obtained.  
Based on the fact that the greatest rise in new cases is in the 
area of complicated cases and the average case is disposed of 
quicker than in the past, the conclusion can be reached that on 
the whole, cases are actually disposed of at a faster rate than 
the average figures would show.  On one hand, the figures are 
skewed because all cases, even default cases, require at least 
two months for resolution if for no other reason than to allow 
for an answer and to determine whether there has been a de-
fault.  On the other, the figures are skewed because non-
average cases are the more complicated cases.  Accordingly, the 
new procedures of the New Code designed to speed up litigation 
appear to be working.  It matters not whether the reason is the 
“Code” itself, the judges’ perceived new inclination to expedite 
litigation, or the “legitimization” of the pre-Code reforms by the 
New Code.  Average cases are resolved quicker than before the 
New Code’s adoption, and “non-average” cases are also disposed 
of more quickly.  The fact that this improvement has not led to 
greater litigant use of the judicial system should be further ex-
plored if the objective of strengthening the judicial system in 
Japan as a Rule of Law dispute resolution mechanism is to be 
realized. 
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APPENDIX A  
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Have the preliminary procedure provisions speeded 
up the pace of litigation?  Has the procedure resulted in 
significantly narrowing the issues to be tried? 
2.  Has the procedure allowing inquiries to be made of 
the other side resulted in significant discovery of facts 
not already known to the inquiring party? 
3.  As the attorney for a party to whom an inquiry has 
been made, do you feel an obligation to provide answers 
even if the answer is harmful to your client’s position?  If 
the could be harmful to your client’s position, do you feel 
an ethical obligation to a) answer or b) refuse to answer 
the inquiry? 
4.  As a Professor of Civil Procedure Law do you believe 
that a lawyer who has been asked an inquiry has an ob-
ligation to provide an answer even if the answer is harm-
ful to his client’s position?  If the answer could be harm-
ful to his client’s position do you feel a lawyer has an 
ethical obligation to a) answer or b) refuse to answer the 
inquiry? 
5.  Has the procedure for inquiry resulted in the identifi-
cation and ultimate production of documents detrimen-
tal to the position of the answering party and helpful to 
the inquiring party? 
6.  Has the procedure for making inquiry of the other 
side resulted in significant changes in document produc-
tion by one party to another?  If so, how would you de-
scribe such changes? 
7.  Have the new document production provisions, such 
as the court’s in camera review, the redacting of docu-
ments so that portions of a document may be produced 
and portions not produced, the new “catch-all” provision 
of the document production section CCP220(iv) had a 
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significant effect resulting in the production of relevant 
documents not obtainable under the prior code? 
8. Have the new document production provisions made it 
easier for a potential plaintiff to be successful in litiga-
tion? 
9.  Have the new document production provisions re-
sulted in more and more important documents being 
produced by defendants in the aid of a plaintiff’s case? 
10.  Since the adoption of the new Code of Civil Proce-
dure, have you observed any change in the Court’s atti-
tude toward the production of self-use documents? 
11.  Have you observed any change in the Court’s atti-
tude toward what the Court would consider to be a self-
use document?  If so, what change: a greater willingness 
to allow production; or less of a willingness to allow pro-
duction? 
12.  Do you believe that the self-use document exception 
to production limits the ability of the plaintiff to obtain 
significant documentary evidence adverse to the interest 
of defendants? 
13.  Would you like to see an amendment of the Code re-
stricting the definition of self-use documents so as to al-
low for greater production of self-use documents?  Why? 
14.  What effect, if any, do you think liberalization of the 
self-use document exception so as to allow for production 
of self-use documents when the document is directly 
relevant to the issue of whether a party knew of should 
have known that its actions were improper, would have 
on litigation rates in Japan?  Would such a change result 
in more litigation or would it have no meaningful effect 
on the number of cases that might be brought?  As a liti-
gating lawyer do you think such a change would result 
in your recommending that client’s sue in more cases 
than you recommend today?  Can you think of any situa-
tions in which you recommend that a client NOT sue 
where you would have recommended that a client sue 
had there been no self-use exception to the document 
production rule? 
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15.  After the Daiwa Bank derivative lawsuit decision 
the Diet enacted a law permitting the limitation of liabil-
ity of Directors in derivative cases.  What effect do you 
think such legislation has had on the willingness of per-
sons to file derivative lawsuits?  What do you think was 
the reason that the Diet passed such a limitation of li-
ability provision? 
16.  Have the provisions allowing for persons to join rep-
resentative actions after the lawsuit has already been 
filed resulted in significant numbers of persons joining 
such suits after they have been filed?  Do you think law-
yers under supervision of the Court should be allowed to 
place notices in the newspapers advising persons of the 
filing of a representative suit and advising as to how 
persons may join such suits?  Why?    
17.  Has the New Code of Civil Procedure affected how 
the judge acts during litigation in the District Court?  If 
so, in what way?  For example, is the judge more or less 
active (or the same) in examining witnesses or proposing 
settlements? 
18.  Do you think more or less (or the same number of) 
cases are referred to conciliation under the new Code 
than were referred under the Old Code? 
19.  In view of the changes made by the New Code of 
Civil Procedure, are you more likely to recommend that 
clients file civil cases in the District Court than you were 
under the Old Code? 
20.  In view of the changes made by the New Code of 
Civil Procedure, are you more likely to recommend that 
clients file civil cases in the Summary Court than you 
were under the Old Code? 
 
 
